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by
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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a case study of the metalworking machinery industry
in the New England region. The major purpose of the analysis is to
determine what factors influence the health of firms in this industry,
and how firms in New England fare, relative to those in other parts of
the country. The thesis is based on information gathered in interviews
of a sample of metalworking machinery firms in the region. To the
extent possible, secondary data sources were utilized to substantiate
the opinions expressed in the interviews.
The thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter
presents a description of the metalworking machinery industry, the
methodology of the analysis, and the organization of the study. Chapter
Two is a brief history of the industry. Important characteristics of
the metalworking machinery industry are examined in Chapter Three, with
emphasis on its cyclical sensitivity and labor problems. An analysis
of investment behavior is presented in Chapter Four. Factors which are
thought to influence both short and long term investment decisions are
discussed, with particular reference to firms in the New England region.
The study concludes, in Chapter Five, with a brief review of the
principal findings of the analysis. Finally, the implications of these
results for the metalworking machinery industry in New England are
examined.
Thesis Supervisor: Bennett Harrison
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This analysis is a case study of the metalworking machinery industry
in the New England region. The major purpose of the analysis is to
determine what factors influence the health of firms in this industry,
and how firms in the New England region fare, relative to those in other
parts of the country. The principal issues of interest concern invest-
ment behavior in this industry. An attempt is made to determine what
factors influence the investment decisions of metalworking machinery
firms, and how these factors influence decision making. Then, by looking
at the differential incidence of these factors in New England relative
to other concentrations of the industry, it is possible to see if location
within New England has a beneficial, detrimental, or neutral impact on
metalworking machinery firms. It should be noted at the outset, however,
that this study does not presume to provide definitive answers to the
question raised above. The study is exploratory in nature and, given
the paucity of data available with which to empirically test specific
hypotheses, the findings and conclusions of the analysis are somewhat
speculative.
This chapter will present a very brief description of the primary
products and markets of firms in the metalworking machinery industry
and its component sub-industries, followed by a discussion of the
methodology of the study. Finally, a brief description of the subse-
quent chapters will be presented.
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Description of the Metalworking Machinery Industry
The metalworking machinery industry, although small in absolute
terms, is a very important sector in any industrialized economy. The
industry produces the machinery and equipment used by the manufacturers
of mass production goods like automobiles, refrigerators, appliances, etc.
Metalworking machinery is sold primarily to industrial customers; the
equipment is not a consumer (or final demand) product. The metalworking
machinery industry (SIC 354) is divided into seven sectors:
SIC 3541 - Metalcutting machine tools;
SIC 3542 - Metalforming machine tools;
SIC 3544 - Special tools and dies, jigs and fixtures;
SIC 3545 - Machine tool accessories;
SIC 3546 - Power driven hand tools;
SIC 3547 - Rolling mill machinery; and
SIC 3549 - Metalworking machinery, not elsewhere classified.
It is difficult to describe the metalworking machinery industry as a
whole, because of the very wide diversity of products and types of
firms. Therefore, this discussion will divide the industry into its
three major sub-sectors: the machine tool industry; the tool and die
industry; and the "other" metalworking machinery industry.
The Machine Tool Industry
SICs 3541 (metalcutting machine tools) and 3542 (metalforming machine
tools) are the two components of the machine tool industry.
1 In 1976, for example, employment in the metalworking machinery
industry comprised only .4% of total employment, and 1.5% of manufacturing
employment, in the U.S.
2Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget,
Standard Industrial Classification Manual, 1972, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., pp. 172-175.
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A machine tool is a power driven machine, not portable
by hand, which is used to shape or form metal by cutting,
impact, pressure, electrical techniques, or a combination of
these processes. It is a complicated, highly-sophisticated
device that must be designed and built by skilled engineers
and craftsmen to extremely fine tolerances.
Machine tools range in size from the so-called "elephant
tools" weighing hundreds of tons to the smaller and more
delicate watchmaker's -lathe. Prices range from a few hundred
dollars for the smaller machines to as much as a half a
million dollars for a numerically controlled (highly sophis-
ticated) machining center.3
The Standard Industrial Classification definitions of these two components
of the machine tool industry are presented below.
SIC 3541 - Machine tools, metalcutting types: the manufacture
of machines, not supported in the hands of an operator,
that shape metal by cutting or use of electrical
techniques, the rebuilding of these machines, and
the manufacture of replacement parts. There are
about 50 to 70 separate products included in this
4 digit category, including boring machines, drilling
machines, gear cutting and finishing machines, grinding
and polishing machines, lathes, milling machines, and
other metalcutting machine tools.
SIC 3542 - Machine tools, metalforming types: the manufacture of
machines, not supported in the hands of an operator
while in use, for pressing, hammering, extruding,
shearing, die casting, or otherwise forming metal into
shape, the rebuilding of these machines, and the manu-
facture of replacement parts for them. There are about
50 or so separate products included here.5
3
U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Special Investigations of
Small Business Problems of the Select Committee on Small Business,
Problems of the Tool and Die Industry, and Associated Problems of Manu-
facturers and Distributors of Machine Tools: Hearings on H.Res. 13,
89th Congress, 2nd session, July 26 and 27, 1966, p. 165.
4Please see Appendix for a complete listing of the products of all
the four-digit components of metalworking machinery.
5Executive Office of the President, Standard Industrial Classification
Manual, pp. 172-173.
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Although machine tools are crucial for mass production technology,
the tools themselves are not mass produced. Machine tools are usually
"custom built to meet the end use requirements of the customer; (there
are some standard lines of machine tools) but even a standard machine
today normally has special-features (designed specifically) for a customer's
particular use."6 There have been some recent developments in machine
tool technology that have made the production process somewhat more
automated. However, industry spokespersons express the opinion that machine
tool production will never be as automated as the production of most other
commodities.
The demand for machine tools is a derived demand; it is generated by
the demand for other goods. Machine tool companies sell capital goods,
almost exclusively to industrial customers, for investment purposes. The
following table illustrates the importance of the products of the machine
tool industry in industrial investment.
Table 1
Machine Tool Consumption and Capital Investment
U.S. Machine Tool Machine Tool Purchases as a Percentage of
Consumption Total Industrial Capital Capital Expenditures
(Millions of Expenditures for Plant for Equipment
dollars) and Equipment
1960 $655.0 12.3% 16.9%
1970 1,444.8 13.0 17.3
1976 2,135.3 10.9 13.5
Source: 1978-1979 Economic Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry.
6
U.S. Congress, Problems of the Tool and Die Industry, 1966, p. 165.
7This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.
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These figures show that machine tool purchases are a -fairly substantial,
albeit declining, share of capital investment expenditures in the U.S.
The major customers of the machine tool industry include the important
manufacturing industries of the nation. Table 2 presents information on
those industries with large stocks of machine tools in their plants. It
can be seen that the fabricated metals, machinery except electrical,
electrical machinery, and transportation equipment industries own the
largest shares of machine tools. It is of interest that the metalworking
machinery industry itself is an important customer.
Because the metalworking machinery and equipment industry
is a large user of its own output, there is a certain feedback
wherein demand for machine tools by other capital-using industries
creates a demand for new machine tools to produce the tools
initially ordered by the other industries. Several writers
have pointed out that machine tools can almost be considered
"living things" because they are the only class of machines
that can reproduce themselves.8
Firms in the machine tool industry sell their products on a national,
and international market. The ties of machine tool firms to local industries,
as a source of customers, are rather minimal. The larger machine tool
firms use national advertising and national and international trade shows
to market their products. The smaller firms in the industry that cannot
afford extensive marketing facilities make use of distributors in order
to reach this national market. The major geographical markets of the
machine tool industry in the U.S. are the principal industrialized regions
of the country. Specifically, the following areas had the highest
8
James Abert and Clayton McCuiston, The Defense Dependency of the
Metalworking Machinery and Equipment Industry and Disarmament Implications,
Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by Resource
Management Corporation, Bethesda, Maryland, May 1969, p. 4.
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- Table 2
Major Customers of the Machine Tool Industry
Industry Year1
25 Metal Furnishings, Fixtures
33 Primary Metals
34 Fabricated Metal Products
Cans and Spray Containers
Cutlerly, Hand Tools, Hardware
Heating and Plumbing Fixtures
Fabricated Structured Metal Products
Screw Machine Products
Metal Stampings
Coating and Engraving
Ordnance and Accessories
Misc. Fabricated Metal Products
35 Machinery exc. Electrical
351 Engines and Turbines
352 Farm machinery
353 Construction, Mining Machinery
354 Metalworking Machinery
355 Special-Industrial Machinery
356 General Industrial Machinery
357 Office, Computing Machinery
358 Refrigerator, Service Machinery
359 Misc. Machinery
36 Electrical Machinery. Eguipment
Trans., Distri. Equipment
Electric Industrial Apparatus
Household Appliances
Elec. Lighting and Wiring
Radio, T. V. Equipment
Communications Equipment
Electronic Components
Misc. Electric Equipment
37 Transportation Equipment
Motor Vehicles, Equipment
Aircraft and Parts
Ships and Boats
Railroad Equipment
Motorcycles, Bicycles
Guided Missles, Space Vehicles
Misc. Trans. Equipment
38 Precision Instruments
39 Misc. Manufacturing
Employees Machine Tools
(000) Owned (000)
1977 125.7
1978 1,222.4
1977 1,549.2
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
75.5
204.7
69.0
413.4
105.9
267.9
53.3
118.4
240.4
1976 2,169.4
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
144.4
140.8
343.3
306.7
221.5
319.9
327.1
188.4
177.4
1,820.3
147.9
248.2
183.9
89.6
514.7
310.2
167.5
1977 1,834.0
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
875.5
551.5
189.5
58.8
17.3
107.3
34.2
1978 546.93
1978 248.9
Total 3,516.8
36.8
117.3
631.6
20.2
63.9
22.4
162.5
94.3
113.8
13.3
38.8
102.4
961.0
41.8
50.5
89.1
42.1
97.6
133.5
33.2
39.9
233.3'
339.1
28.3
63.7
57.8
6.8
62.8
47.9
29.6
361.1
178.0
139.2
12.4
9.0
6.5
7.0
9.0
132.5
51.3
2,630.7
Industry Share of
Total Machine
Tools
1.4%
4.5
24.0
.8
2.4
.8
6.2
3.6
4.3
.5
1.5
3.9
36.5
1.6
1.9
3.4
9.2
3.7
5.1
1.2
1.5
8.9
12.9
1.1
2.4
2.2
.3
2.4
1.8
1.1
13.7
6.8
5.3
.5
.3
.2
.3
.3
5.0
2.0
100.0
1
Year Surveyed
Source: 12th/ American Machinist Inventory of Metlaworking Equipment, 1976-1978.
SIC
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
369
Units/
100 Employees
26.5
9.1
37.3
26.2
29.4
30.8
34.7
79.3
40.3
19.1
32.3
38.6
36.1
28.6
33.3
24.7
62.6
39.8
38.6
9.8
20.1
76.3
17.5
18.2
23.9
28.7
7.0
11.8
14.2
7.0
17.9
18.6
23.9
4.9
14.3
22.9
6.4
16.1
22.2
18.7
24.4
371
372
373
374
375
376
379
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percentage of the machine tool stock in the country in 1978: Chicago with
14.4%; Los Angeles with 7.8%; New York/Newark with 7.4%; Detroit with
6.7%; Boston with 5.9%; Philadelphia/Camden with 5.1%; Atlanta/New Orleans
with 5.1%; Cleveland with 5.0%; and Bridgeport/Hartford with 4.2%.9
Internationally, the major customers of the machine tool industry
include: Europe (receiving 36% of 1977 U.S. machine tool export sales),
particularly the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France and the Soviet
Union; North and Central America (receiving 24% of 1977 U.S. machine tool
exports), particularly Canada and Mexico; Asia (receiving 19% of 1977 U.S.
machine tool exports), particularly Japan and Taiwan; and South America
(receiving 16% of 1977 U.S. machine tool exports), particularly Brazil
10
and Venezuela. It should be noted here that, not only is there a
large export market for American made machine tools, but there is also a
growing American market for foreign made machine tools.11
The Tool and Die Industry
The Standard Industrial Classification definition of the tool and
die industry (SIC 3544) is presented below, followed by a further explan-
ation of the products of this industry.
American Machinist,"The 12th American Machinist Inventory of
Metalworking Equipment, 1976-1978," December, 1978, pp. 133-148.
10 National Machine Tool Builders' Association, 1978-1979 Economic
Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry, McLean Virginia, National Machine
Tool Builders' Association, July, 1978.
11
The foreign trade situation, and its implications for the metal-
working machinery industry, will be discussed further in subsequent
chapters.
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SIC 3544 - Special dies and tools, die sets, jigs and fixtures, and
industrial molds: includes establishments commonly known
as contract tool and die shops and primarily engaged in
manufacturing special tools and fixtures for use with
machine tools, hammers, die casting machines, and presses.
Included in this industry are a wide variety of special
toolings, such as dies; punches; die sets and components
and sub-presses; jigs and fixtures, and special chucking
devices.12 -
Dies - A die set consists of a pair of cutting or shaping tools
which, when moved toward each other, produce a certain desired form
in, or impress a desired device on, an object or surface by pressure
or by sharp force. The term "die" may also refer to one of the
basic die set members; the "punch" is the other.
Jigs and Fixtures - Jigs are devices for supporting the workpiece
and for guiding the cutting tool of the machine tool during pro-
cessing. Fixtures are of several types, but the more typical ones
support or hold in place a workpiece during its processing; others
are used in assembly and checking operations. In general, jigs and
fixtures may do all or some of the following operations: locate,
clamp or support a workpiece, and guide a tool ....
Mold - A device that forms parts as molten metal, rubber, plastic,
or comparable material is fed into it.
Gage - An instrument used to determine whether a given part's
dimension is within specified tolerance limits.
Special machines - Nonstandard machine tools, usually used for
metalworking operations, and mostly of a metal removal type.13
The tool and die industry is very similar to the machine tool
industry in that, while its products are necessary for mass production,
the products themselves cannot be mass produced. These products
1 2Executive Office of the President, Standard Industrial Classification
Manual, p. 173.
1 Harold Arnett and Donald Smith, The Tool and Die Industry -
Problems and Prospects, Michigan Business Report (New Series) Number 1,
Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, The
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1975, pp. 2-3.
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. . . . are "custom made. Only, one die, or set of dies, for
example, is needed for the production of many thousands of auto-
mobile fenders or hoods of a given design. Dies for such purposes
are fashioned at the cost of thousands of highly-skilled man hours
in a shop equipped with costly machines, all under the supervision
of expert management. In short, the construction of tooling devices
contrasts sharply with the ultimate production of goods made possible
by the tooling.14
The owner of a tool and die shop further states that:
We are not production companies in the sense that we produce
the same product or the same item over and over. Virtually
everything is special and different. The end itself is fre-
quently referred to as the keystone to mass production, without
which no civilian or military hard goods could be produced on a
quantity basis.15
However, there is an important difference between the two sectors, in
that machine tools are considered capital equipment, while tools, dies,
jigs, etc., are usually treated as current account, expendable equipment.
The tool and die industry is characterized by relatively small firms.
In Connecticut and Massachusetts, for example, the average sized tool
16
and die firm was 13 employees in 1976. Unlike the machine tool
industry, these firms are very closely tied to the local economy.
1 4 William A. Paton and Robert L. Dixon, Make-or-Buy Decisions in
Tooling for Mass Production, Michigan Business Report Number 35, Bureau
of Business Research, School of Business Administration, The University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1961, p. 1.
5U.S. Congress, Problems of the Tool and Die Industry, p. 20
16
Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, 1976, Washington,
D.C., Government Printing Office. Data were not available for other
New England states. It should be noted that the average sized firm
in New England is less than the national average, due to the existence
of larger tool and die firms in the Mid West. These larger firms are
closely associated with the automobile industry.
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This is due to the basic nature of the industry. (It)
is really a service industry and ... most .. '. production is
done to customer's specifications. This means that there is
a need for day to day contact and consultation between the
supplier and the customer.17
Therefore, the tool and die industry is very dependent upon the local and
regional economy. A survey by the National Tool, Die and Precision
Machining Association found that "16% of all companies reported (in 1964)
that 100% of their business was within 100 miles of their plant; over
half of the companies reported that 75% or more of their business was
18
within 100 miles." The tool and die firms in New England are closely
tied to the economic base of the region, particularly the aircraft
industry in Connecticut; the tool and die firms in the Mid West are much
more dependent upon the automobile industry. The major customers of the
industry, based on a survey of 112 companies, are presented below.
Table 3
Major Customers of the Tool and Die Industry
United States
Customer Percentage of Sales
Automotive industry 27.3%
Business machines and electronics industry 22.3
Appliance industry 9.7
Aircraft industry 6.7
Space-related industries 5.3
Other military-related industries 4.5
Other industries 24.2
Source: National Tool, Die and Precision Machining Association, "Report to
the National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic
Progress," in Donald Smith, Technological Change, 1968.
17U.S. Congress, Problems of the Tool and Die Industry, 1966, p. 34.
1 8National Tool, Die and Precision Machining Association Report,
Table 10, in Abert and McCuistion, The Defense Dependency of the Metal-
working Machinery and Equipment Industry, p. 43.
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The tool and die industry is not involved, to any significant degree,
in international trade. The same factors that limit sales to the local
region (need for contact and consultation with the customer) make it
infeasible for the industry to compete internationally. By the same token,
the domestic firms do not face much competition from foreign companies.
There is, however, foreign competition in the form of what is termed
"hidden tooling." That is, for every car or radio imported into the U.S.,
the American tool and die industry has "lost" the business that would have
been generated had the car or radio been produced in this country.
The "Other" Metalworking Machinery Industry
The final component of the metalworking machinery industry has been
termed "Other" for lack of a better title. This component consists of
SICs 3545 (machine tool accessories), 3546 (power driven hand tools),
3547 (rolling mill machinery) and 3549 (metalworking machinery, not else-
where classified). These four-digit sectors produce both tools and
accessories for, and components of, machine tools, and complete machines
that are not classified as machine tools. The Standard Industrial
Classification definition of these sectors is presented below.
SIC 3545 - Machine tool accessories and measuring devices: The
manufacture of cutting tools, machinists' precision
measuring tools, and attachments and accessories for
machine tools and for other metalworking machinery, not
elsewhere classified. There are about 50 to 70 separate
products included here.
SIC 3546 - Power driven hand tools: the manufacture of power driven
hand tools, such as drills and drilling tools, pneumatic
and snagging grinders, and electric hammers.
SIC 3547 - Rolling mill machinery and equipment: the manufacture of
rolling mill machinery and processing equipment for
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metal production, such as cold forming mills, structural
mills, and finishing equipment.
SIC 3549 - Metalworking machinery, not elsewhere classified: the
manufacture of metalworking machinery, not elsewhere
classified, such as gas cutting and welding equipment,
wire fabricating machinery and equipment and automotive
maintainence machinery and equipment.19
The characteristics of this "other" sector of the metalworking
machinery industry fall somewhere in between those of the machine tool
sector and the tool and die sector. Some firms produce complete machines,
such as firms in SICs 3547 and 3549, and have much in common with the
machine tool sector. They sell on a national market, their products are
usually considered capital equipment, they engage in export trade, and
their customers are primarily the same manufacturing industries that
buy machine tools. On the other hand, firms in SIC 3545 produce equipment
that is usually considered expendable, such as cutting tools that periodi-
cally wear out. These firms tend to have more in common with tool and
die firms, in that they often serve a local or regional market. However,
some firms in this category do sell nationally, and export/import trade
is relatively more common among firms in this sector than in the tool and
die sector. The customers of firms in this sector are very similar to
the customers of the machine tool industry; some of these products are
accessories to'or attachments for machine tools, and therefore are sold
to the same companies that buy machine tools. Since this "other" category
of the industry is something of a miscellaneous grouping, and because
1 9 Executive Office of the President, Standard Industrial Classification
Manual, pp. 173-175.
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firms within the group exhibit characteristics similar to both machine
tool and tool and die firms, the subsequent discussions in this study
will concentrate on either the metalworking machinery industry as a whole,
of the two more clearly defined components of the industry -- machine tools
and tools and dies.
Methodology of the Study
This analysis is a case study of a particular industry in the New
England region. As such, representatives of a number of firms, trade
organizations, and unions were interviewed, and it is the data from
these interviews that make up an important source of information for the
analysis. Eleven firms in the metalworking machinery industry in the
region were selected for interviews. It is important to note that the
selection of these firms was by no means random. The firms were chosen
for a number of reasons, the most important of which was variety.
The sample included one firm with over 1000 employees, two firms
with between 500 and 1000 employees, three firms with between 100 and 500
employees, two firms with between 50 and 100 employees, and three firms
with less than 10 employees. Four of the firms were owned by corporations
or conglomerates; the remainder were independently owned (although in
one case, the independent firm owned a number of other firms). Some of
the firms had been in existence for over 100 years, while others were
relative newcomers to the industry in the region. Three of the firms
had moved at least once within the last twenty years (two were independently
owned, one was owned by a larger corporation; two were large firms with
- 21 -
more than 500 employees, one had less than 100 employees), all to
locations within the region. The employees of five of the firms were
represented by collective bargaining units, while the remaining six firms
were non-unionized. In terms of geographical representation, two of
the firms were located in Massachusetts, one was located in Rhode Island,
three were located in Vermont, and five were located in Connecticut.
It is necessary to recognize that, although the sample contained a
variety of firm types, this by no means assures that the firms selected
are representative of all or most metalworking machinery firms in the
region. The problem of beinig able to generalize from the individual
interviews to the industry in the region becomes more clear when it is
realized that only eleven firms were included in the sample, while there
were over 1200 firms in the industry in New England in 1974.20 Moreover,
as the preceding description of the industry shows (and the information in
the Appendix makes even more striking), the industry itself is incredibly
diverse in terms of the range of products produced. Therefore, the
possibilities of having obtained a very unrepresentative sample are not
insignificant. In order to alleviate this problem to some degree, other
sources of information were utilized.
In addition to the firm interviews, a number of spokespersons for
the metalworking machinery industry were interviewed. These included
20
Dun and Bradstreet data, prepared by D. Birch at M.I.T.
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representatives of some industry trade associations and unions whose
members are employed in the industry. And finally, in an attempt to
substantiate the information gathered from these interviews, a fair
amount of secondary data was obtained. These data were used both for
descriptive purposes, and in order to determine if opinions given in the
interviews could be generalized to the metalworking machinery industry,
as a whole, in the New England region (and in some cases, the U.S.).
Organization of the Study
The second chapter of the study presents a brief history of the
metalworking machinery industry, both nationally and in New England.
Since the American metalworking machinery industry originated in this
region in the 18th century, its history is both rich and very interesting.
However, in order to keep the length of the history manageable, the
chapter concentrates on the following topics: the early development of
the industry; the industry's historical relationship to the government;
and more recent changes in the technology of metalworking machinery.
Chapter Three of the study examines some important characteristics
of the metalworking machinery industry, both in the New England region
and in the nation as a whole. One of the most important characteristics
of this industry is its vulnerability to general business cycles.
Chapter Three begins with a discussion of why the industry is so
cyclically sensitive, and an examination of which sectors of the industry
are most volatile. The chapter then explores the volatility of the
industry in the New England region, relative to that in the nation, and
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offers some explanations as to why it appears to be more volatile in
New England. The ways in which firms attempt to deal with this instability
are then explored. These attempts are.classified in one of two categories:
active responses to unstable demand and reactive, or passive, responses
to unstable demand. The active responses consist of attempts by firms
or the industry as a whole, to actually modify the character of demand;
that is, to smooth out the variations in demand for metalworking machinery.
These active responses include attempts to diversify (both products
produced and customers), and it is here that the foreign trade activities
of the industry are discussed. Specifically, the metalworking machinery
industry has attempted, throughout its history, to use the export market
as a buffer, to pick up the slack in business that occurs when domestic
demand is very low. A number of reasons why the industry has not been
entirely successful in pursuing this strategy, including the fact that
the American industry may not be competitive on world markets, are
discussed. The other active response of the industry has been lobbying
to get customers to follow more steady, long range investment programs
that are not so susceptible to variation with short term changes in the
economy.
Reactive responses consist of the ways in which firms cope with,
rather than try to change, the unstable nature of demand for the products
they produce. Before discussing these reactive responses, however, an
important constraint on the ability of firms to cope with unstable demand
is introduced. Specifically, the metalworking machinery industry has
been experiencing a very important shortage of skilled labor, both in
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the New England region and in the nation as a whole. This shortage has
made firms much more reluctant to layzoff workers (the way firms would
usually deal with declining sales) inbusiness cycle troughs for fear
that the firm will never be able to replace these workers on the business
cycle upswing. The causes of the labor shortage (long training period
necessary to attain competence in these occupations, reluctance of many
firms to institute extensive apprenticeship training programs, declining
interest in blue collar occupations, etc.) are discussed, along with the
effects of this shortage on the management policies of metalworking
machinery firms. These firms appear to have become more reluctant to
lay off their workers in downturns, even in the face of declining
productivity, in recent years than had been the case in the past. Empirical
data suggest that this response is not entirely rational (i.e., that
workers who are laid off are not irrevocably lost to the industry in
periods of expansion), and an attempt is made to reconcile this reluctance
to lay off with the empirical data mentioned.
Chapter Four examines investment behavior in the metalworking
machinery industry. Investment behavior is looked at from two perspec-
tives -- short term and long term. Short term investment decisions
concern annual capital budgeting planning, while long term decisions
relate to issues of expansion, contraction, relocation, and decisions to
remain in business. Since most investment in the industry is financed
out of retained earnings, the cyclical vulnerability of the industry is
an important determinant of short term investment decision-making.
That is, in business cycle troughs, most firms simply do not have the
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resources to invest in new plant and equipment; many firms are actually
losing money. Therefore, short term investment behavior is quite cyclically
sensitive. However, some firms do pursue steady investment programs, and
two factors are investigated (firm size and ownership status of the firm)
insofar as they influence the ability to follow stable, as opposed to
cyclical, capital investment programs. These two factors are also
examined as influences on the character of capital investment in the
industry, along with the influences of the labor shortage, and government
policies.
The factors influencing long term investment behavior are examined to
see how the New England region fares as a site for investment in the metal-
working machinery industry. Again, the influences of firm size and owner-
ship status are explored as determinants of decisions to expand, contract,
relocate, or go out of business entirely in the New England region. The
differential availability of and cost of labor in New England is also
discussed. And finally, other factors thought to influence long term
investment behavior in the region, including differential costs of doing
business in New England, agglomeration economies, and what are termed
"idiosyncratic" influences, are discussed.
The study concludes, in Chapter Five, with a brief review of the
principal findings of the analysis, and a discussion of the implications
of these findings for the metalworking machinery industry in New England.
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Chapter 2
History of the Metalworking Machinery Industry
The Development of Metalworking Machinery as an Industry
The New England region was the birthplace of the metalworking machinery
industry in the United States, as it was for many other manufacturing
industries. In the first half of the 18th century, metalworking in the
American colonies was more-of a craft than an industry, with a single
craftsperson working alone or with a few apprentices. The English govern-
ment, moreover, tried to maintain this primitive nature of the industry
and the colonies' dependence upon England for all manufactured goods by
passing a law in 1719 that forbid metalworking in the colonies. Following
the American Revolution, the English government prohibited the export of
machinery and mechanics to the United States, in the hope of maintaining the
dependence of the new nation on England for manufactured goods. It was,
however, these conditions that provided the impetus for the development of
the American metalworking machinery industry, an industry that would soon
overtake its English counterpart.
David Wilkinson, of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, is credited with being the
founder of the American machine tool industry.1 In 1794 he invented a screw
cutting lathe with a slide rest that is the first example of an American
made and designed machine tool. The early growth of the industry was re-
lated to a nurber of interrelated factors (some of which are still important).
lAmerican Machinist, Metalworking: Yesterday and Tomorrow - The 100th
Anniversity of American Machinist, McGraw-Hill Publications Company, New
York, 1977, p. 15.
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First, the demand for manufactured products was growing rapidly in the new
nation, but the means to produce these goods were limited. Further, there
was a "continuing critical shortage of labor (in the colonies) that put
a premium on labor-saving devices of every sort, establishing an American
attitude that would later be crucial. "2 This shortage of labor, which has
been a recurring phenomenon throughout the development of the industry, was
due not only to the small absolute size of the population in the country,
but also to the fact that most colonists were not interested in working in
industry; they would work until they had saved enough capital to strike
out on their own and buy a farm. Finally, coupled with both these factors
was the enormous demand in the new nation for arms, both for national defense
purposes and also for the pioneer movement to the west.
In this early period of development, Middletown, Connecticut was the
center of arms manufacture in the United States, with other areas in New
England such as Hartford, Connecticut; Springfield, Massachusetts; Bridge-
water, Massachusetts; New Haven, Connecticut; North Providence, Rhode Island;
etc., also becoming very important locations of armament production. In
1794, Springfield, Massachusetts was selected as the site for the first fed-
eral armory in the country (perhaps influenced by the fact that then Secret-
ary of War, Henry Knox, was a native of Massachusetts). In 1798, the govern-
ment needed still more guns, and Congress passed an act to purchase $800,000
of arms and munitions from private sources since government-owned facilities
could not meet the needs of the country. 3 These contracts were let to
2Ibid., p. 11.
3 This act was augumented in 1808.
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manufacturers like Eli Whitney in New Haven, Simeon North in Middletown,
Robbins and Lawrence in Windsor, Vermont, and other New -England entrepre-
neurs.
The importance of these defense contracts for the metalworking machinery
industry became clear in the middle of the 19th century. The manufacturers
of armaments were trying to develop a system whereby the parts of the guns
they produced were interchangeable, so that the arms could be easily re-
paired when a part malfunctioned (especially in the more remote areas of
the country) . The ability to produce interchangeable parts, in turn, depend-
ed upon the accuracy of the machine tools used in the production process.
The arms manufacturers, then, were inventing and building their own machine
tools in order to be able to produce these interchangeable parts demanded
by the government. The industry was being transformed from its handicraft
tradition, where the accuracy and quality of the product was a result of
the craftsperson's skills, to what came to be known as the "American system
of manufacture," where the accuracy of production was a result of the mach-
ine tools used. By 1850, American manufacturers had succeeded in develop-
ing this system of interchangeable manufacturing. Throughout the first
half of the 19th century, then, the need for interchangeable parts on guns
spurred the development of innovations in machine tool design in the United
States, and this development was supported by contracts from the federal.
government to many arms manufacturers, particularly in the New England
region.
It is important to note that the growth of the metalworking machinery
industry was also related, as mentioned previously, to the growth of
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manufacturing of consumer goods. Again, the design and construction of
machine tools was usually done by the manufacturer of the final good. The
emergence of metalworking machinery as an industry in its own right appears
to have occurred in the mid to late 1800's. In the early part of the 19th
century there existed a number of very small machine shops which served the
demands of the manufacturing industries of the area.
Although capitalizing on the system of interchangeable
manufacture that the arms makers had created, these new firms
did not grow out of arms makers. Rather, they developed out
of the unique type of general machine shop that would develop
and build any kind of machine that one might wish to order for
any purpose. Such shops did riot produce standard machines and
go out and sell them: they innovated on demand.
These shops were a'unique element of the New England scene
in the early part of the 19th century and constituted what Monte
Calvert has called a "shop culture." It was an elite group in
a day when a machinist was "one who invents, or makes, machines."
The shops were usually individual or partnership operations, and
they rarely grew very large. To sign on as an apprentice in such
a shop in those days was the route, and the only route, to be-
coming a mechanical engineer.4
These shops were closely tied to other New England industries, including
the textile, hardware, and watchmaking industries. By the mid to late
1850's, however, metalworking machinery had truly emerged as an industry in
its own right, with large factories supplementing, but not completely replac-
ing, these smaller shops.
The fact that New England was the center of industrial activity in the
nation not only provided an eager market for machinery, but also served quite
literally as a "breeding ground" for inventors and skilled labor in the
4 American Machinist, Metalworking: Yesterday and Tomorrow, p. 25.
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region. There are many examples of cases where, for instance, an individual
inventor/designer would take an apprentice, who would in turn marry the
boss' daughter, become a partner in the business and go on to develop new
machines tools in his own right. The reputation of the region as a source
of skilled labor was unparalleled in this period. Roe, in 1916, noted:
If New England no longer holds all the good mechanics in
the United States, there was a time when she came so near it
that the term "New England mechanic" had a very definite meaning
over the whole country.5
Shifting Customers and Geographical Location of the Industry
By the latter half of the century, a number of firms had emerged which
produced machine tools exclusively. New England maintained its position as
the major location of the industry through this period, and in 1876, Worces-
ter, Massachusetts was the center of the industry.6 During the period of
the Civil War, there was a greatly expanded demand for the products of the
metalworking machinery industry. There was again an enormous demand for
arms, and demand for railroad and transportation equipment also boomed.
Moreover, because so many men were required to fight the war, there emerged
a demand for labor saving machinery in agriculture. After the war, there
was a great deal of expansion in the manufacture of civilian goods - railroad
5Joseph Wickham Roe, English and American Tool Builders , Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1916, p. 109.
6 New England had a definite locational advantage in this era, since
proximity to water power was a very important factor in machinery manufactur-
ing.
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equipment and other consumer goods - and also a growth in the export market
of the industry. Another important source of demand for metalworking mach-
inery in this period was the growing bicycle manufacturing industry. Con-
current with the expanding market of the industry was the growth in demand
for special, rather than general, purpose machinery.
In this period, the irrdustry began to spread out over a larger geograph-
ical area. The Mid Atlantic states of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania
were becoming more industrialized, and the machine tool industry grew in
importance in this region. It was not a case of the firms in New England
migrating to this area or going out of business. Rather, the machine tool
industry in the Mid Atlantid region, especially in Philadelphia, developed
to serve a market that was expanding greatly and hence it also grew.8 By
the late 1800's, Philadelphia had become the dominant center of the industry,
largely due to the growth of the railroad and steam engine. At the same time,
the industry was also shifting further into the west. The Mid West, parti-
cularly, was growing in importance, as the farm machinery industry grew.
The industry's development prior to the 20th century was then closely related
to the expansion of other industries - textiles and textile machinery, arms
and ammunition, and watches and clocks in New England; railroads and steam
locomotives in Philadelphia; and farm machinery and bicycles in Chicago,
7Largely to the European market.
8It is, however, true that to a large degree, it was entreprenuers and
skilled workers trained in the New England metalworking machinery industry
that started up and worked in the newer firms in the Mid Atlantic region.
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Cinncinnati and the Mid West.
The next industry to exert an influence on both the location and char-
acter of the metalworking machinery industry was the automobile industry.
By 1900, Cinncinnati was the leading machine tool center in the nation, and
in the first two decades of the twentieth century, Michigan and Illinois
grew most rapidly due to the expansion of the auto industry in Michigan
and the growth of the farm equipment, construction machinery and tractor
industries in Illinois. The fact that electricity was coming into use to
power machinery was an additional factor that permitted the dispersal of
the industry over a wider geographical area. The. geographical location of
the industry, then, has been closely related to the location of its principal
customers. This has been the case throughout most of the 20th century (as
it was in the past) with the Mid West still maintaining its dominant position
as the automobile industry had become, and still remains, one of the major
customers of metalworking machinery. In recent years, the West Coast has
grown in importance as a location for the industry, serving the expanding
industrial market of the region, particularly the aerospace and defense-rel-
ated industries. New England is still a very important concentration of the
industry, but its relative share of total national production has declined.
Additionally, competition from foreign manufacturers in the domestic market
has grown, particularly in the last five to ten years, as countries such as
West Germany, Japan, Switzerland and others have "caught up" technologically
with many manufacturers in the United States. The. major customers of the
metalworking machinery industry in the 20th century include the automobile
industry, the aerospace industry (especially during and after World War II),
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durable goods manufacturers, and the producers of consumer goods like refrig-
erators, electrical appliances, etc.
Relationship to Government
The history of the metalworking machinery industry has been greatly
influenced by government policies, and so the development of the industry
in the 20th century will be examined in relation to the activities of the
federal government.9 As noted previously, the support of the development
of the interchangeable system of manufacturers had a great influence on
the growth of the metalworking machinery industry in New England. Moreover,
in the Civil War, federal procurement activities had stimulated the growth.
of the industry.
9 In addition to the support of arms manufacture, there are other
examples of government (in this case, at the state and local levels) support
of the industry in the region. For example, the Robbins and Lawrence firm
in Windsor, Vermont, was benefited by the fact that the owner of the company
was made the Commissioner of Corrections of the area's prison farm, and
was therefore able to use prison labor (at the rate of $.25/day) in his
factory (coincidentally, the firm got its real start producing guns for the
federal government for the Mexican War in 1838).
Ironically, in the late 1960's, the Cone Automatic Machine Company in
Windsor was using the Vermont State Prison Farm as a source of apprentices
(in conjuction with a Department of Labor training program) . In this later
period, however, the prisoners/apprentices were paid regular wages.
There are also examples, from the 19th century, of firms receiving pro-
perty tax abatements from towns trying to attract new industry.
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In the 20th century, the fortunes of the industry were very closely
tied to not only the civilian industrial expansion of the nation, but also
to the foreign policies of the government, both in war and in peace-time
(insofar as the government influenced foreign trade). The machine tool
industry began exporting in the mid 1800's, first to England, and then to
other European countries. As early as 1900, members of the industry were
becoming interested in using foreign trade as a means to protect themselves
against the cyclical nature of their sales in the United States. However,
in this period, the American manufacturers felt that they were not able to
compete effectively on the foreign market for a number of reasons: protect-
ive tariffs, they felt, were encouraging retaliation among European countries;
they were concerned that they were unable to protect their designs from
copying by foreign tool makers; and finally, they felt that transportation
costs and wage differentials made it difficult for them to compete effectively
in foreign markets. The German industry, particularly, was a threat to the
American industry in the early 20th century. A trade association, the
National Machine Tool Builders Association, was formed in 1902 as a vehicle
through which the manufacturers could lobby for policy changes at the federal
level. By 1911, the association was working towards tariff revisions and
other areas of interest to the industry. It should be noted that this
foreign competition was not really affecting domestic sales - rather, it
encroached on the foreign market of the American producers. 1 0
1 0 This situation did change later in the century, as foreign machine
tool builders have made significant inroads into the U. S. market for machine
tools.
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In the years preceeding World War I, the export business of the industry
was very strong, as European countries tooled up for the war. At the out-
set of the war, American builders were against the hostilities because
they feared that war would hurt their export business. However, the war
soon proved to create an enormous demand for the products of the metalwork-
ing machinery industry, and these fears- were forgotten. The demand for these
products was so great that prices began to rise substantially, and in 1917,
the War Revenue Act was passed which imposed an excess profits tax on the
increased earnings of a company due to the buildup of the war. The industry
compgained that this act was inequitable for the following reasons:
.... with the builder of machine tools, business is either
feast or famine ....
When times are good, his order books cannot hold all the
business offered him. He cannot take the best advantage of
his opportunity, for to be able to do so would mean a plant
investment out of all proportion to his average needs.
His life is made miserable by dunning customers who
insist that they must have the machinery immediately ... Many
a buyer would have been willing to pay several times the new
prices if the premium would have meant immediate shipment,
for the machine would have soon paid for itself ... It is in
these periods that the machine tool builder makes his money,
if he is to make any at all.
When business is dull, the market dwindles to almost
nothing. The machine tool is the basic tool ... when the user
finds business falling off, the natural thing is to stop ordering
equipment ....
So, one big reason for the higher prices is that in flush
years the machine tooler must make a large profit to provide
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for several years for himself and his stockholders ... and to
take care of his working force, a handsome reserve fund means
everything. 11
The tax was nonetheless imposed, and it is difficult to determine whether
or not it really was inequitable to this industry. Another important dev-
elopment in the first World War was that of the aerospace industry. Although
quite small, it nevertheless represented a new market for the industry, and
one that was to grow substantially in the future.
After the war, the industry became concerned that, since they had pro-
duced so much during the war, their markets would be saturated. They were
also worried that the government would dump their machine tools on the al-
ready depressed market. The government, however, did not dump the tools;
rather they worked out "an equitable 'service value' pricing formula based
12
on use and 'present market value' of comparable machines." Additionally,
in 1919, "Congress passed the Caldwell Act, authorizing the government to
sell surplus machine tools to trade, technical, and public schools and
universities at 15 percent of cost.,,1 3 This act not only allayed industry's
fears that the government would depress the market, but also was important
in that it represented a subsidization by the federal government of training
programs for skilled labor, an issue of great concern to the industry.
Iron Trade Review, January 6, 1916, p. 112, in Wayne G. Broehl Jr.,
Precision Valley: The Machine Tool Companies of Springfield, Vermont,
Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1959, p. 90.
1 2 Wayne Broehl, Precision Valley, p. 103.
13 Ibid., p. 103.
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The industry started to look again to export trade in the post war
period. After a short period of poor business immediately following the
war, the market again picked up and continued strongly throughout the 1920's.
Domestically, the expansion of the automobile industry in this period provid-
ed an extremely important market. Moreoever, the 1920's were a boom period
for many other American industries; firms were becoming more mechanized and
were spending a lot for capital improvements, and so the metalworking mach-
inery industry was quite prosperous. On the foreign side, demand for capital
equipment was great, and shipments to countries such as Belgium, Poland,
Argentina, Mexico, and China grew.
The great depression did not really affect the metalworking machinery
industry until the early 1930's. Again, the industry looked to foreign
trade as a means to stabilize business. Russia, which had been a relatively
unimportant market previously, "suddenly became far and away the number-one
customer" of the industry. The U. S. S. R.'s Five Year Plan for industrial-
izaton created the need for a great deal of capital equipment which the
country imported, and this market was especially important to the American
industry in the early years of the depression (in 1931, exports to Russia
14
constituted about 23 percent of total domestic output). Sales to the
U. S. S. R. dropped off in 1932-1933, and the idustry lobbied the government
to recognize that nation in order to stimulate sales. Roosevelt recognized
the U. S. S. R. in late 1933, but sales to the U. S. S. R. never went as
high as they had been in 1931.
l 4 Ibid., * 127.
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By this time, the domestic market had collapsed and industry sales de-
creased dramatically. However, by 1935 to 1937, domestic sales had picked
up to some degree, due in large part to the expansion of the automobile
industry. This period "was marked by surprisingly heavy investments in
plant improvements. The automakers were determined to get all the work
done in a 40-hour week and avoid payment of overtime wages."15 But, once
again, the export market became increasingly important, as other countries
began "tooling up" for World War II. In 1938, one half of the industry's
sales went to exports, with the Soviet Union and Japan the major customers.
The growth of exports to the Allies prior to direct United States involve-
ment in the war was immense. As a result of this, the industry was well
prepared, in terms of capacity and employment, to handle the enormous demand
generated by American direct involvement in the war.
Nonetheless, the industry was criticized in the beginning of war mobil-
ization efforts. Reminiscent of the experience in World War I, the industry
was denounced as;
The greatest single detriment to the fulfillment of the
national defense effort ... refusing to expand and exacting in-
ordinate profits from their privileged position
Again, the industry responded:
.... its economy was really cyclical (and history had time
and again shown it was); sizable fat-year profits were needed to
pile up a sufficient reserve for the lean years ... Further, if
the industry built up its plant and equipment enough to fully
satisfy demand when a boom began, it would usually find itself
1 5 American Machinist, Metalworking: Yesterday and Tomorrow, p. 70.
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burdened with an excess capacity that would rapidly eat away
the profits of the short high-demand period.16
The industry's complaints appear to have been given consideration, in that
during the mobilization for the war, machine tool plant capacity was expanded
with new facilities costing $160 million; but of this, $70 million was pro-
vided by the Defense Plant Corporation and $91 million was privately financed.
A part of this $91 million, moreover, was financed by advances the industry
received on pool orders (pool orders were orders placed by the government
which advanced up to 30 percent of a contract ahead of the actual production
of the product, in order to give the manufacturer working capital to expand
17
facilities if necessary).
The industry had completed most of its war-related production by 1943,
and it was about this time that the industry began again to become nervous
about prospects in the post-war period. The industry had been subject,
again, to an excess profit tax during this period, and in addition, the
government had instituted a renegotiation procedure, whereby the government
could review the costs of a product after delivery, and renegotiate the cost
downward if it was determined that the price was excessive. The industry
experienced difficulty after the war, due to both the dumping of about
16
Wayne Broehl, Precision Valley, pp. 166-7.
17
Harless D. Wagoner, The U. S. Machine Tool Industry from 1900 to
1950, The M. I. T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 271.
- _: --------- --ill
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235,000 surplus machine tools by government,18 and also the fact that there
was excess capacity in the industry due to the war-related expansion. The
export market was relatively important in this period until the time when
many European countries recovered sufficiently to compete with the American
industry again. It was only a short time, moreover, until the beginning of
the Korean War, another period of great demand for the industry's products.
At the outset of the Korean War, however, the industry was depressed
and hence was somewhat less prepared for the increased production necessi-
tated by the war. Again, the industry was accused of dragging its feet and
being a bottleneck in the mobilization effort. Following the Korean War,
the industry was, as usual, concerned with post-war adjustment. It appears,
however, that the industry was more successful in making the government
sympathetic to their demands. For example, in 1954, the government changed
the depreciation laws in order to stimulate investment, and hence the sales
of the metalworking machinery industry. This change had been advocated by
the industry in the 1940's as a means of easing the post-war reconversion
efforts of the industry. (The new law enabled investors to use either the
declining balance or the sum-of-the-digits methods as an alternative to
straightline depreciation).
1 8 Resource Management Corporation, The Defense Dependency of the Metal-
working Machinery and Equipment Industry and Disarmament Implications, ACDA/
E-130, prepared for The U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Bethesda,
Maryland, May, 1969, p. 24. The federal government sold off their excess
capital equipment at prices as "little as 10 percent of the original cost."
It is interesting that, unlike the case after World War I, the government
did not turn over this surplus machinery to schools for training purposes.
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After the Korean War there was a great deal of expansion in the civil-
ian economy, which, aside from a downturn in 1957-58, provided an ever
expanding market for the metalworking machinery industry. This period was
also characterized by relatively heavy peace-time defense expenditures (a
result of the Cold-War). Moreover, the Vietnam War, combined with the gen-
eral prosperity of the 1960's, enabled the industry to reach record levels
of production in this period.
In addition to government/defense related demand for the industry's
output, the industry also received other government support. For example,
the Department of Labor, in conjuction with both the National Machine Tool
Builders Association and the National Tool and Die and Precision Machining
Association, instituted a number of apprenticeship training programs during
this period in order to alleviate extreme shortages of skilled labor in the
industry. Additionally, Congress, in the mid 1960's, further liberalized
depreciation laws and instituted an investment tax credit program which not
only greatly expanded the demand for metalworking machinery, but. also enabled
firms in the industry to update and modernize their own plant and equipment.
And finally, the government, beginning in the late 1940's and 1950's became
more active in supporting research and development in the machine tool
industry, reminiscent of the early history of the industry when the govern-
ment supported the development of the "American system of manufacture."
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Technological Developments in the Metalworking Machinery Industry1 9
Prior to the 20th century, most of the technological developments in
the metalworking machinery industry were the product of a single inventor
working independently in a machine shop. As noted previously, the small
shops of the 19th century, -especially in New England, provided an important
source of innovation. In addition to government supported developments in
arms manufacture and developments that emerged from related industries such
as textile manufacturing, these shops were responsible for the major
innovations in this period. Typically, an individual machinist would develop
a new type of machine, or perhaps an improvement in the design of an exist-
ing production procedure. In many cases, this individual would then strike
out on his own; since the capital requirements for entry into the business
were rather modest this was possible. A large number of the machine tool
firms still in business today began in just this way.
As the metalworking macinery industry grew into an independent industry,
this trend in innovation appears to have continued; most major inventions
19
This is a rather cursory and non-technical review of some principal
technological advances in the industry. For a more detailed description of
this subject, the following sources are recommended: Joseph Roe, English
and American Tool Builders , Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut,
1916; Thomas C. Rolt, A Short History of Machine Tools, The M. I. T. Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965; American Machinist, Metalworking: Yesterday
and Tomorrow - The 10th/ Anniversary Issue of American Machinist, McGraw-
Hill Publishing Company, New York, 1977; "The Machine Tools That are Building
America: A Trilogy on Metalworking in America - Part III," Iron Age, Vol. 28,
No. 9, August 30, 1976; and David F. Noble, "Social Choice in Machine Design:
The Case of Automatically Controlled Machine Tools," Case Studies in the
Labor Process, Monthly Review Press, New York, forthcoming in 1979.
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were the product of a single machinist, whether working in his own firm
or in the larger companies that had begun to emerge. A very interesting
example of this phenomenon is provided in the. history of the machine tool
companies of Springfield, Vermont. Jones and Lamson had hired, in 1889,
a young engineer named Hartness to run their company. He in turn hired
a friend named Fellows in 1803 to be his chief machinist. While working
at Jones and Lamson, Fellows developed the gear cutting machine in his
spare time. Hartness decided to set up Fellows in his own business: he
provided Fellows with financing and also helped out the Fellows Company in
its early years of operation (with subcontracts when business was poor).
Bryant, hired to replace Fellows, invented a grinding machine that was
superior to those currently in use.20 Hartness set up a similar financing
arrangement with Bryant, and a new company was formed across the street
from Jones and Lamson. And finally, another worker at Jones and Lamson,
Fred Lovejoy, developed a new kind of cutting tool, and again Hartness
set up Lovejoy in his own business.
It is difficult to isolate exactly when the character of technological
development changed. "In the first two decades of the twentieth century,
development and improvement of new machine tools and metalworking practices
2 0 The Bryant grinder. could do internal, face, and external grinding,
making it possible to do all the grinding on a piece without having to
move the piece.
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continued to be largely dependent on the individual efforts of a relatively
small number of engineers, tool designers and skilled mechanics as it had
21
during the nineteenth century." After World War I, however, the use of
special purpose machines grew, especially in the automobile industry.
There was, concurrent with this trend, a growth in the engineering and dev-
elopment facilities of firms in the industry. The demand for automatic
machinery was also growing in this period, and the -automobile industry,
particularly under the leadership of Henry Ford, was the forerunner of this
phenomenon. The drive towards automation continued and intensified through-
out the century, necessitating the development of more and more sophisticated
types of machinery. The research and development activity in the industry
shifted from the individual designer who had very close contact with the
actual use of the machine (often as an operator or supervisor of the shop)
to the somewhat anonymous engineering department of a firm. At the same
time, the actual expense of carrying out research grew as the technology
became more sophisticated, and so small firms could not really afford to
be actively engaged in the process.22
Another aspect of the changing character of the technological develop-
ment process was the increased involvement, especially after World War II,
21
Harless Wagoner, The Machine Tool Industry, p. 28.
22The inability of small firms to participate actively in technological
development is evident in the tool and die industry, where the average size
of firm is very small, and where innovations come either from the suppliers
of their capital goods (the machine tool industry) or from their customers
research efforts.
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of universities and research firms. "By 1950, systematic and cooperative
research and development under the control of large corporations, founda-
tions, universities, and the federal government has largely replaced the
23
efforts of individual inventors and engineers." It should be noted,
moreover, that these "large corporations" were not necessarily machine tool
builders. "Because of the relatively small size of most machine shops, the
problem of financing and coordinating research was more difficult than in
industries which were dominated by a few large units capable of supporting
substantial research programs or of taking the lead in developing coopera-
tive research programs."24 Rather, firms in the automotive, aerospace,
electrical products and other industries (which are often substantially
larger than the largest metalworking machinery firm) have become quite
involved in developing new technologies that fit their particular needs.
These developments are then passed on to the machinery industry, with
instructions of "this is what we want, make it." Even in the large firms
in the industry, with specialized research and development facilities,
much of the researchis of a more applied nature, with the "pure" or "basic"
work being done in universities, government supported facilities, etc.
The nature of the innovations that have been introduced and accepted
can be divided into two categories - materials used and machine design. One
of the most important material innovations in the history of the industry
was the introduction of high-speed steel. Frederick Taylor's development
23
Harless Wagoner, The Machine Tool Industry, p. 33.
24
Ibid., p. 39.
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of high speed steel in 1906 made it possible to increase cutting speeds
enormously, to take deeper cuts that were previously feasible, and in gen-
eral resulted in immense increases in machine productivity. Other advances
in materials in the 20th century include the increased use of lubricants
to allow faster cutting speeds with less distortion of the piece being
machined, the development of better cutting materials such as tungsten-car-
bide (developed by General Electric under the name Carboloy) , ceramic and
polycrystalline diamond tipped tools, and the use of new techniques, such
as powder metallurgy, electrical discharge and electrochemical machining,
25
etc.
The changes in machine design can be examined in light of the statement
made earlier, that the "premium on labor saving devices of every sort esta-
blished an American attitude that would later be crucial." In addition
to this drive to reduce the skilled labor requirements of production, there
has been a trend towards taking the "control" over the production process
out of the hands of labor by building the skill into the machine. As early
as the late 19th century, Frederick Taylor wrote that his "original object-
ive was that of taking the control of the machine shop out of the hands of
the workmen and placing it completely in the hands of management, thus
superseding 'rule of thumb' by scientific control."26 This trend had
25Please note, again, that this is certainly not an exhaustive nor in-
clusive discussion of the significant technological developments in the
industry. Please see the references listed in footnote 19 on page
especially Iron Age and the American Machinist, for more complete and up to
date information.
26
Iron Ages "The Machine Tools that are Building America," p. 158.
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begun even earlier, as in the emergence of the "American system of manufac-
ture, " when machines were designed to standardize the work of individual
craftspersons.
The emergence of the use of electricity to power machines, however,
represents the real beginning of modern control technology. Electrical
power, as opposed to earlier power sources such as steam or water power
permitted a much greater flexibility in the operation of the machine, and
it "also gave birth to various devices for starting and stopping machines
which were the predecessors of modern electric and electronic controls." 2 7
The major manufacturing industries have always been concerned about the
"human error" associated with the operators of machine tools, the fact that
they may be bored or disinterested in their work, and that too much "judge-
ment" on the part of the operator comes into play when machining. Complaints
about the "folklore knowledge that one operator relates to another ... that
is more or less intuitive information"28 have led these manufacturers to
demand more and more sophisticated machinery, where the skills needed to
operate the machine are lessened and the control over the machining is taken
out of the hands of the operator.
The use of electric power on machine tools, replacing the previous
system of a series of belts and line shafts, then, was a very important
development in this trend to build skills into the machinery. The electric
2 7Harless Wagoner, The Machine Tool Industry, p. 12.
28
Iron Age "The Machine Tools that are Building America," p. 158.
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switches which started and stopped the machinery took away some of the
"intuitive" aspects of machining. Instead of having the work stop when the
operator felt it was time, the electric switches stopped the work automat-
ically. The use of electricity to power machine tools did not become really
widespread until the 1920'-s. At this time, many manufacturers were becom-
ing interested in the scientific management of the production process, and
with this trend came the desire on the part of the major customers of the
machinery industry for more control over the production process. The major
customers of the industry in the first half of the 20th century, industrial
giants like the automotive, railroad, and electrical equipment industries,
were demanding more automatic machinery, and it was the conditions within
these industries that were more important in determining the direction of
technological developments that were conditions in the metalworking machinery
industry itself.
Further developments in machine design include the use of "tracer
technology, perfected during the late 1930's and 40's, which, involved the
use of patterns or templates; these were traced by an hydraulic or electronic
sensing device which in turn conveyed the information to a cutting tool which
reproduced the pattern in the workpiece."29 In the late 1940's and early
1950's, a radically new method of controlling the machining process was
developed - numerical control (14C). This process involves the feeding of
29David Noble, "Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case of Automat-
ically Controlled Machine Tools," Case Studies in the Labor Process, Monthly
Review Press, New York, forthcoming in 1979, pp. 5-6.
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numerical data directly into the machine tool to control the actions of the
machinery. This technology, devised by John Parsons and built at the Servo-
mechanisms Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, under con-
tract from the Air Force, was especially applicable to the machining of parts
for the aircraft industry. The involvement of the government was not limited
simply to supporting the research activity (the Air Force spent over $62
million on the research. from 1949-59) ; the Air Force also paid for, and
installed, 100 of these numerically controlled milling machines in the
plants of prime subcontractors, and paid "the contractors, aircraft manufact-
urers, and their suppliers . ... to learn to use and maintain the new tech-
nology.
Numerical control technology has been Qommerically developed over the
last twenty years in a number of ways. Computer numerical control (CNC -
where a minicomputer is placed directly on the machine tool to control the
production process) has been gaining popularity over tape numerical control
(TNC - where mathematical instructions are coded onto a tape which is read
by the machine and translated into machine control) due to its greater flex-
iblity, especially in handling small volume jobs. The first commercial
numerical control unit was built by the Bendix Corporation in 1954. The
initial period following the introduction of NC machine tools was not char-
acterized by a rapid acceptance of the technology. The industrial use of
NC machinery really didn't begin in any significant degree until the mid to
late 1960's. Even today, "less than one percent of all machine tools now
30
Iron Age ) "The Machine Tools that are Building America," p. 158.
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31
in use in the United States are numerically-controlled." Some reasons
for this limited acceptance include the fact that the NC machines are
extremely expensive relative to conventional ones, the average price of a
NC machine being about a quarter of a million dollars in 1977. Since many
users of these machines are relatively small metalworking firms, this expense
32
can be overwhelming. Moreover, the complexity of the technology has in-
hibited its rapid acceptance. And finally, "machine tool and controls ex-
perts estimate that NC is applicable to, and economically viable on, only
about five to ten percent of the machine tool population."33
However, NC machinery has been increasing its share of the machine
tool market since 1965, especially the CNC machines, where the overhead of
utilizing the technology (that is, the development of software) is consider-
ably less complex and expensive than that associated with the earlier devel-
opment of numerical control (TNC). 3 4
Numerically controlled machining appears, then, to have become increas-
ingly important in recent years, and is still touted, perhaps more so in
the last few years, as the major technological development in metalworking
31
Iron Age ,"The Machine Tools that are Building America," p. 158.
32 This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.
3 3 Iron Age ,"The Machine Tools that are Building America," p. 158.
34
See David Noble on reasons why the software of early NC development
was so complex and inaccessible.
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machinery design. Moreover, the extension of numerical control technology
from the early focus on milling machines, jig borers and drilling machines
to a broader line of machine tools has occurred. Additional applications
of this automatic technology have occurred in areas of materials transfer
and multi-function machining centers. One manufacturer has introduced
a machining center/transfer line consisting of some 65 machines, close to
60 industrial robots and computer controlled transferring devices. Materials
are introduced into the system and the finished product emerges. "There
were no machine operators involved. Only machine managers to oversee opera-
tions. ,35
Industry spokespersons have heralded these new developments as a means
of achieving greater productivity, more accurate production, and also as
necessary to survival in a period of extreme shortage of skilled mechanics.
David Noble 3 6 offers another explanation: the desire on the part of manage-
ment to remove control over the production process from the hands of the
operators on the shop floor. As has been discussed, the skills and judge-
ment of machine operators have traditionally been crucial in metalworking
manufacture. The operator decided when the specific dimensions of the work
have been achieved, when the cutting tools need to be replaced, when the
grinding wheel has worn down and needs redressing, etc. Noble notes that
35 Iron Age "The Machine Tools that are Building America," p. 158.
36David Noble, "Social Choice in Machine Design."
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.... the very same skills and shopfloor control that made
production possible also made 'pacing' possible (and that)
pacing was practiced by operators for many reasons: to keep
some time for themselves, to exercise authority over their own
work, to avoid killing 'gravy' piece-rate jobs by over-producing
and risking a rate cut, to stretch available work out for fear
of layoffs, to exercise their creativity and ingenuity in order
to 'make out' on 'stinkers' (poorly rated jobs), and of course
to express hostility to-management.37
The concern of management over shop-floor control is illustrated in the
following example:
There was evident prejudice on the part of the operators of
the machines in favor of the older type. Apparently, the quality
of the Fellows-cut gear was superior to the other and so the opera-
tor was stamping the other company's name upon the product from the
Gear Shaper and reversing the procedure with respect -to the other
machine's product. Bill Slomer (Fellows) discovered this and point-
ed it out to Durham (Buick). So Durham watched and caught the
operator red-handed stamping the wrong name upon the Gear Shaper
product. Durham swung his right fist from the cellar, so to speak,
and caught the operator on the jaw. He went down and out. He
nailed the other operator with his left hand and knocked him over a
bench. Then he called the foreman over, "Carry this sculch out of
here," said Durham, "If it happens again, the same thing will come
to you."38
The machine operator, in this case, had enough control over the production
process to be able to make the machine he liked appear to be more productive
than the machine management might prefer. While this example comes from
the early 1900's, other more recent statements from Iron Age further illus-
trate this point:
The fundamental advantage of numerical control had been
Ibid., p. 20.
3 8Wayne Broehl, Precision Valley, p. 64.
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clearly spelled out ... It brings production control to the
engineering department .... 39
The computer informs the operator which tools should
be changed and when to stop the machine to make tool changes.
If the instructions are ignored, the lights flash, and if
still ignored, the (production) line is stopped.40 (author's
emphasis)
This has created -a dilemna for the industry. Man's
expertise is desired but the man is not.41
In tool and cutter grinding operations, NC permits complex
contours and automatic backoff for clearance operations that
can be predicted and controlled rather than reliance on opera-
tor's judgement and feel.42
An uninformed or uninterested operator can easily remove
excessive amounts of wheel face. When and how much of the
wheel to dress is a major productivity decision for management.43
.... using pre-set, quick-change toolholders in conjuction
with a tool control board ... removes the responsibility for
tool maintainence from the operator.44
An advantage of this new CNC unit is that the user is not
required to handle the computational software of the system.
Software is stored in programmable read only memories. Control
diagnostics, machine logic and control programs are all in non
volatile firmware.45 (author's emphasis)
Noble examines the development of numerical control as opposed to a
39 Iron Age, "The Machine Tools that are Building America," p. 158.
4 0 Ibid., p. 220.
4 1Ibid., p. 226.
42
Ibid., p. 227.
43
Ibid., p. 228.
44
Ibid., p. 281.
45Ibid., p. 292.
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rival technology with similar capabilities (record-playback), and concludes
that NC was "chosen" because it did offer greater opportunities for manage-
ment to actually control the production process. The few examples presented
above suggest, that the NC machinery, if not developed specifically for the
purpose of removing control from the shopfloor, is nonetheless being pro-
moted for that very reason. A further note concerning this technological
development: NC machining does reduce the skill levels required in metal-
working manufacturing, as did earlier developments such as tracer technology,
electrical, pneumatic and hydraulic controls, etc. However, the degree to
which NC has effectively resulted in the transfer of control from the shop-
floor to the engineering departments and management offices is not yet
clear. 4 6
This brief discussion of numerical control technology illustrates a
number of aspects of the current trend in research and development in the
metalworking machinery industry that have been mentioned above. First, the
role of the federal government, in supporting particular research. programs,
has had a definite impact on the nature of technology developed. Second,
the focus of research and machine innovation has shifted from the individual
machinist/designer working independently to the large scale research facili-
ties or universities and the major corporate firms of large industries.
Third, and closely related to the previous point, is the fact that the
machinery builders themselves appear to simply incorporate the technology
developed elsewhere (and perhaps do some applied engineering work) to satisfy
4 6 David Noble, "Social Choice in Machine Design."
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the needs of their primary customers. And finally, it is these customers,
and the conditions existing within these consuming industries, which have
shaped the character of recent innovations in machine design. Specifically,
the labor problems, especially following World War II, of the automobile,
aerospace and other durable goods producers appear to have "encouraged"
these industries to demand more and more automated equipment which permits
management to exercise greater control over production and decreases the
requirements for skilled labor in manufacturing.
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Chapter 3
Important Characteristics of the Metalworking Machinery In~dustry
Cyclical Volatility of the Metalworking Machinery Industry
One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the metalworking
machinery industry, both in the United States as a whole and the New England
region, is its vulnerability to general business cycles. This cyclical
instability is a consequence of the nature of this capital goods producing
industry. Since the products of the metalworking machinery industry are
sold to industrial customers for capital investment purposes, the industry's
health is extremely dependent upon the health of its major customers. These
customers are often able to put off their investment expenditures indefinite-
ly during periods of low demand. For example, if the demand for automobiles
is depressed, the automotive industry can decide to delay their purchases
of new machine tools. The machine tools already in their plants are prob-
ably more than adequate for their decreased production requirements. Orders
for new machine tools can drop to nothing. On the other side of the busi-
ness cycle, the demand for new machine tools escalates enormously. Not
only are more machines needed to produce the increased volume-of automobiles
demanded, but the automotive industry needs to replace those older machines
whose replacement had been deferred in the downturn.
(This) durability of machine tools contributes to an
"aggravation" of the cyclical demand tendencies for all capital
goods to the extent that it may exceed the average durability
of such goods. The long life built into machines, and its pro-
longation through the addition of improvements or by rebuilding
means that the purchase of new machine tools can be almost in-
definitely postponed when business is poor. When the upturn
comes, and increased production plus cost savings is a competitive
must, the economic life of the equipment may be seriously cur-
tailed as obsolescence sets in. As a result, a "bunching" of
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orders for new machine tools often occurs and thus the "typical"
pattern of cyclical demand for machine tools emerges with its
severe fluctuations in amplitude.1
It should be noted here that other segments of the metalworking machin-
ery industry, aside from the machine tool component, are similarly affected
by general business conditions. The tool and die industry, for example,
experiences similar "bunching of orders" when automobile manufacturers
change models and require new dies for body work. Moreover, since a portion
of the tool and die industry provides ancillary services such as tooling,
jigs and fixtures, to machine tool buyers, their business is very closely
tied to machine tool sales. Another factor which intensifies the instability
of the tool and die industry is the "make or buy" decision of major customers.
Industries such as automobile or aircraft manufacturing usually maintain
some in-house capacity for tooling, the so-called "captive" shops. Some
industry spokespersons have stated that the growth of the captive shop has
increased the vulnerability of small tool and die shops to business cycles.
These captive shops, it has been stated, are utilized more intensively
during business cycles troughs (so that these industries can stabilize their
own employment levels), thereby taking over a part of business that would
otherwise go to the independent shops. The degree to which this "make or
buy" decision varies over the business cycle will also accentuate the
1Robert S. Himes, A Study of the Machine Tool Industry with. Emphasis
on the Problem of Stability, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, The American
University, Washington, D. C., 1962, in H. Wagoner, The U. S. Machine
Tool Industry from 1900 to 1950.
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cyclical fluctuations experienced by the 'tool and die industry.
The "other" segment of the metalworking machinery industry (SICs 3545 -
Machine Tool Accessories, 3546 - Rolling Mill Machinery, and 3549 - Metal-
working Machinery, not elsewhere classified) is also subject to-cyclical
instability to some degree. First, some firms in this category also produce
machinery (although it is not classified as machine tools) . These firms
experience problems similar to those of the machine tool industry - durability
of product and the relatively minor size of replacement demand in business
cycle downturns. Second, other firms- which do not produce machine tools
may in fact be producing machine tool components, or, like the tool and die
industry, products that are required when a new machine tool is purchased
or installed. The fortunes of these firms, therefore, are also closely
linked to the sales of machine tools. However, this "other" category also
includes firms which produce expendable equipment. These are products which
are not classified as capital goods; they are used up in the production pro-
cess and must be periodically replaced. Therefore, to the extent that firms
in this category manufacture non-durable or non-capitalized products, they
are more insulated from the swings of the business cycle.
The 1967 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) national input-output table
(at the 484 industry level of aggregation) was examined in order to deter-
mine how much of the output of these component industries was classified
2
Most complaints about these captive shops appear to refer to the
policies of the automobile industry in the Mid West. Firms in New England
seem to feel that the captive shop problem is not a serious one in this
region.
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as capital purchases (gross private capital formation). The following
figures were obtained:
74% of the output of SIC 3541 (metalcutting machine tools) was
used in capital formation;
68% of the output of SIC 3542 (metalforming machine tools) was
used in capital formation;
18% of the output of SICs 3544 and 3545 (special tools and dies
and machine tool accessories 3) was used in capital formation;
and
66% of the output of SICs 3546, 3547 and 3549 (power driven hand
tools, rolling mill machinery and equipment, and metalworking
machinery, not elsewhere classified) was used in capital
formation.
A further look at the BEA input-output table was taken. In the national
accounting system used by the BEA in constructing this table, only purchases
by private domestic consumers are included in gross private capital forma-
tion. This excludes capital purchases by the federal, state and local
government, and sales to foreign countries. These categories were added to
4
gross private capital formation to obtain the following figures4:
90% of the output of SIC 3541 was used in capital formation;
3
Note that this includes both the tool and die industry and part of
the "other" portion of the metalworking machinery industry. Unfortunately,
this is the way the data were aggregated by the BEA.
4 Note that these figures are probably overestimates of the degree to
which the output of the metalworking machinery industries was used in capi-
tal formation, in that they assume that all government purchases and all
export sales are for capital equipment. While this assumption is probably
relatively realistic, it nevertheless represents an overstatement of the
degree to which sales of these component industries are of a capital rather
than current or expendable nature.
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86% of the output of SIC 3542 was used in capital formation;
24% of the output of SICs 3544 and 3545 was used in capital formation;
and
81% of the output of SICs 3546, 3547 and 3549 was used in capital
formation.
It is clear from these data that SICs 3544 and 3545 sell a much larger
percentage of output to current rather than capital account, and should
therefore be theoretically less vulnerable to business cycle fluctuations.
Figures 1 and 2 present, respectively, employment and deflated value of
shipments (sales) time series for the metalworking machinery industry (SIC
354), the machine tool industry (SIC 3541 and 3542), the tool and die
industry (SIC 3544), and the "other" sector of the three-digit industry
(SICs 3545, 3546, 3547, and 3549). It can be seen from Figure 1 that employ-
ment in the machine tool industry has climbed to higher peaks, and fallen
to lower depths than either the tool and die or the "other" metalworking.
machinery industry. The same pattern can be seen in Figure 2, although
here the value of shipments of "other" metalworking machinery reach a higher
peak in 1974 than either of the other two subindustries. The coefficients
of variation for both employment and sales for these industries are present-
ed below:
Table 4
Variability in the Metalworking Machinery Industry and Its Component
Sectors
United States
Employment Value of Shipments
(000) (millions of 1972
SIC 354 dollars)
Mean 287.6 7276.1
Standard Deviation 32.8 1810.7
Iii I Nb I
Figure 1
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Tools and Dies and "Other" Metalworking Machinery
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Coefficient of Variation 11.4% 24.9%
SICs 3541 and 3542
Me an 90.0 2418.3
Standard Deviation 13.5 688.5
Coefficient of Variation 15.0% 28.5%
SIC 3544
Mean 102.4 2242.6
Standard Deviation 10.5 503.4
Coefficient of Variation 10.3% 22.4%
SICs 3545, 3546, 3547 and 3549
Mean 94.6 2564.2
Standard Deviation 10.6 667.3
Coefficient of Variatiori~ 11.2% 26.0%
Sources: Annual Survey of Manufacturers and Census of Manufactures. 1958-
1976.
These figures support the conclusion that the tool and die industry, and
probably part of the "other" metalworking machinery industry experience
less violent fluctuations in both employment and sales than does the machine
tool industry. This phenomenon, moreover, appears to be a function of
the degree to which the industry's products are used in capital formation.
Cyclical Volatilty and the New England Region
Turning to the New England region, the question of whether or not the
metalworking machinery industry in this region is more or less stable than
its national counterpart arises. There has been a great deal of concern
expressed lately as to the differential experiences of regions in business
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cycles.5 The industry mix of a region has been offered as an explanation
for these regional differences; that is, regions with a larger portion of
their employment in durable goods manufacture are more sensitive to national
6
economic conditions. However, by looking at the cyclical fluctuations of
a single industry, the question of industry mix is already accounted for
to some degree. Of course, the degree to which the industry is tied to
customers in the region will again bring up the question of regional industry
mix. However, a comparison of the cyclical instability of the metalworking
machinery industry in New England to that in the United States should indi-
cate the degree to which the industry is more or less stable at the two
geographical levels, relatively independent of the industry mix of the
areas.
Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 present time series of employment and
value of shipments for the United States, New England , Connecticut, Massa-
chusetts, Vermont, and Rhode Island (the only states for which time series
5Richard Syron, "Regional Experience During Business Cycles - Are We
Becoming More or Less Alike?" New England Economic Review, November/Decem-
ber 1978.
6Lynn Browne, "Regional Industry Mix and the Business Cycle," New Eng-
land Economic Review, November/December 1978.
7Please note that the data for New England after 1972 do not include
the states of New Hampshire and Maine, as information for these states was
not available after 1972.
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data were available). The differences among the states, the region, and
the nation are not immediately apparent in these charts. However, it can
be seen that the states and the region follow rather similar cyclical
patterns. A series of bivariate regressions were fitted, regressing either
employment, the number of production workers, or sales, against time. The
standard errors of these equations were then compared to the mean value of
the dependent variable to see if, after correcting for the secular trends
in the variables, there were discernable differences in stability between
the region and states and the nation as a whole. The results are presented
below:
Table 5
Variability in the Metalworking Machinery Industry
United States and the New England Region
Employment Number of Value of
Production Workers Shipments
United States
Mean 284.7 213.2 7140.3
Standard Error 29.0 23.4 1053.0
Standard Error/Mean 10.2% 11.0% 14.8%
New England
Mean 41.8 30.3 921.8
Standard Error 5.6 4.4 173.9
Standard Error/Mean 13.3% 14.5% 18.9%
Connecticut
Mean 15.9 11.4 328.2
Standard Error 1.7 1.3 74.8
Standard Error/Mean 15.3% 17.3% 21.8%
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Massachusetts
Mean 15.9 11.4 328.2
Standard Error 1.7 1.3 74.8
Standard Error/Mean 10.8% 11.0% 22.8%
Vermont
Mean .4.3 2.9 97.4
Standard Error .6 .4 19.7
Standard Error/Mean 14.4% 13.5% 20.2%
Rhode Island
Mean 4.7 3.4 85.6
Standard Error 1.2 1.0 -21.3
Standard Error/Mean 25.1% 28.6% 24.9%
Sources: Annual Survey of Manufacturers and Census of Manufactures, 1958-
1976.
In all cases, there is a greater degree of variation in industry sales in
the New England states and in the region as a whole than is the case for the
U. S. And, with the exception of Massachusetts, there is also a greater
degree of variability in both employment and the number of production workers
in the New England region.
Two questions immediately come to mind. First, why is the metalworking
machinery industry more cyclically sensitive in the New England region? And
second, what kind of influence has this instability had on the industry?
The former question is difficult to deal with. One possible explanation may
be, once again, the industry mix issue. In the first place, the machine
tool industry appears to be a substantially larger share of metalworking
machinery in this region relative to other areas of the country, and since
this component of the three-digit industry is less stable even in the nation,
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New England's metalworking machinery industry is more volatile. In the
second place, the degree to which the industry is tied to local industries
may also offer part of an explanation. The tool and die industry in New
England, and particularly in Connecticut, is to some degree a service indus-
try for aircraft firms in the region. The aircraft industry, particularly
through the 1960's and early 1970's, experienced enormous growth and de-
cline, presumably causing a "ripple" effect downwards to those firms pro-
viding services to the industry. Browne, examining the relationship between
industry mix and cyclic vulnerability, notes that:
New England's industry mix (is) somewhat more procyclical
in the sense that the industries followed - in exaggerated
fashion - the national cycle more closely. This was particular-
ly so in the late sixties ... New England is much more involved
in the manufacture of aircraft and aircraft parts ... In the
East North Central division (where the metalworking machinery
industry is most concentrated), motor vehicles and primary
metals explain why its industry mix does not follow the same
pattern as New England ... Both are very volatile - but they do
not move exactly in step with the rest of the economy.8
Browne goes on to point out that, in cases where an external factor, such
as a decrease in government demand for defense materials, coincides with
a general recession, regional responses to the recession may diverge sharply.
This, then, appears to have been the case in the late sixties in New England,
while in other regions the health of the metalworking machinery industry
was tied to other industries not subject to "capricious" changes in govern-
ment policy.
8
Lynn Browne, "Regional Industry Mix and the Business Cycle," p. 44.
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It is also of interest to examine the ways in which the industry deals
with this problem of instability. This question will be examined from two
perspectives: active responses and reactive responses of the industry.
The active responses would consist of attempts by the industry to stabilize
or smooth out these cycles in product demand. Reactive responses to the in-
stability of demand are of a more passive nature. Specifically, the instab-
ility of demand is taken as a given. Firms then are forced to cope with
this problem, as opposed to actually alleviating the problem itself.
Active Responses to Instability - Diversification
One way to actively respond to demand instability is to diversify
products and/or markets. By diversifying product lines, a firm's fortunes
are not tied simply to the sales of one product. This response, however,
does not appear to be prevalent among metalworking machinery firms, both
in the nation and in the New England region. The probable reason for this
is that, given the nature of the production processes of metalworking
machinery, any diversification of product would probably be in the direction
of other types of capital equipment subject to similar cycles of demand.
Moreover, especially for smaller firms, the capital requirements of taking
on another, related product line are substantial. Most smaller firms inter-
viewed have expressed the opinion that it is simply not worth the trouble to
diversify their product line, since this would entail not only different
capital requirements, but also would probably require different labor skills,
getting involved in advertising, and other management problems. The Census
of Manufacturers publishes "specialization ratios" for manufacturing
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industries at the national level. These ratios indicate the extent to which
an industry's output is specialized in its primary product -- that is, the
degree to which the industry produces secondary products (is diversified).
The specialization ratios for the four-digit component industries of SIC
354 reveal that, if anything, the industry has become more specialized
in the production of its primary product since 1958, supporting the opinion
expressed in the interviews, that product diversification (outside the
four-digit product group) is not a widely-used response to cyclical volatility.
Table
Specializat
Sector
SIC 3541 (metalcutting machine tools)
SIC 3542 (metalforming machine tools)
SIC 3544 (special tools and dies)
SIC 3545 (machine tool accessories)
SIC 3546 (power driven hand tools)
SIC 3547 (rolling mill machinery and
equipment)
SIC 3549 (metalworking machinery, not
elsewhere classified)
Source: Census of Manufactures, 1972.
6
ion Ratios
1958
85%
82%
93%
85%
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
The other way a firm can diversify is to expand or broaden its market.
This response is much more evident among the firms interviewed. Some small
firms stated that they did not allow themselves to become too dependent
upon any one industry or firm as a major customer. Moreover, those firms,
1972
86%
89%
94%
86%
82%
84%
86%
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both large and small, who stated that they made a conscious effort to divers-
ify their customers reported a greater deal of stability in their operations
over the business cycle. However, this is by no means a universal practice;
there are still a large number of firms completely dependent upon a particular
industry, and in some cases a single company, for a substantial portion of
their business.
On a more macro level, the metalworking machinery industry, particularly
the machine tool industry, has been traditionally interested in the possibil-
ity of using the international market as a means of smoothing out the cycles
9
of product demand. During the depression of the 1930's, for example, the
export market, especially to countries like the U. S. S. R. and Japan, proved
to be extremely important to many firms. The argument of the machine tool
industry has been that, in periods of low demand domestically, firms should
try to stimulate their foreign export business to pick up the slack in orders.
Presumably, in cyclical upswings, when business is booming, firms will then
concentrate primarily on the domestic market. Figure 9 presents data on
the sales of the machine tool industry and on the percentage of total sales
that were exported for the last twenty years. The figure shows that, to some
degree, the share of total sales that are foreign moves countercyclically.
When the domestic market was expanding enormously in the mid to late 1960's,
foreign sales represented a relatively small proportion of total sales.
When the domestic market was on the downturn, particularly from 1969 to
1971, foreign sales became a much larger component of total sales. When the
9
The tool and die industry, which is much more attached to the local
market, is not able to engage in extensive export activities due to the
nature of the product and the importance of close contact with customers,
as mentioned in Chapter One.
Figure 9
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domestic market picked up (from 1972 to 1974), exports fell as a share of
sales; and in the subsequent downturn of 1974 to 1976, exports again assumed
a relatively greater importance. However, these data do not appear to sup-
port the hypothesis that firms are completely successful in using the inter-
national market as a buffer in periods of low demand, given the fact that
the relative importance of exports seems to have declined rather substantially
over the last twenty years.
There are a number of reasons why the U. S. machine tool industry has
not been able to use export trade to alleviate the cyclical problems of
the industry. First, foreign markets are not accessible to all machine tool
firms, and, as mentioned above, is not at all relevant to other components
of the metalworking machinery industry. Specifically, small firms have a
lot of difficulty coordinating an export trade program. Involvement in
foreign trade entails a lot of difficult paperwork, extensive advertising
and servicing arrangements, and other management problems that most small
firms are not prepared to deal with. This is a serious constraint given
the fact that a large number of machine tool companies are relatively
small. A second limitation on the export programs of the machine tool
industry is the fact that business cycles are not exclusively American
phenomena. That is, when business is poor in the domestic market, it is
likely to be just as bad in the world market, especially in other industrial-
ized nations.
Another very important issue in this regard is the competitiveness of
the American machine tool industry. This will generally be influenced by
two different sets of factors. First, differential labor and transportation
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costs and levels of technological development affect the relative costs of
machine tools. As far as labor costs are concerned, the American industry
faces relatively similar labor costs as competitors in West Germany and
Switzerland, but labor costs are significantly lower in both Japan and the
United Kingdom, as Table 7 shows.
Table 7
Average Hourly Earnings and Supplemental Labor Costs in
The Machine Tool Industry
United States $7.58
West Germany $7.25
Switzerland $6.87
Japan $3.62
United Kingdom $3.16
Source: 1978-1979 Economic Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry.
The United States, then, does experience differentially greater labor costs,
although this may not be as great a problem as it appears to be from looking
at the data. Specifically, both West Germany and Switzerland have relatively
high labor costs, and the machine tool industry in both these countries
10
appears to be doing quite well in the world market.
The problem of differential transportation costs does not appear to pre-
sent a large problem either. Most firms interviewed expressed the opinion
1 0 It should be noted here that differential unit labor costs would be
the more appropriate comparison. Unfortunately, these data were not avail-
able.
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that, in general, transportation costs were not very important, and didn't
appear to damage their competitive position vis a vis the world market.
Finally, the question of technological competitiveness arises. Although
the U. S. machine tool industry has enjoyed a position of technological super-
iority in the world market, probably since the development of interchangeable
parts manufacturing, this position has gradually eroded, especially over the
last ten to 15 years. Most machine tool builders felt that major internat-
ional competitors, particularly the German and Japanese machine tool builders,
have reached a position of technological parity with the American industry
(this is especially evident in the more recent penetration of the American
machine tool market by German and Japanese builders). Some industry spokes-
persons expressed concern that American machine tool builders are less com-
petitive in that their capital stock is older and less productive that that
of their major international competitors. While it is not possible to obtain
data on the age of the capital stock of the metalworking machinery industry
in different countries, data are available on the age of machine tools in
12
use in several countries.
1 1 In fact, at one firm a very large machine was being air freighted to
Germany. The machine itself cost about $250,000; the transportation cost
would amount to approximately $50,000. It was pointed out, however, that
the cost of air freighting the machine was insignificant when compared to
the amount of money that would be lost by having to wait for the machine to
be shipped and using a less productive machine on the customer's production
line in the interim.
1 2The age of the capital stock, then, is not specifically for the machine
tool industry alone. The data represent the age of machine tools in use in
all industries in each country. However, since most of the machine tool
builder's capital stock (equipment) is machine tools, and there does not appear
to be any reason to assume that the machine tools owned by the machine tool
builders differ in age, across countries, from those held by other industries,
these data provide an approximate comparison of the age of the capital stock
in the machine tool industry in these countries.
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United States
France
West Germany
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Japan
Notes:
Table 8
Age of Machine Tools in Seven Countries
Percentage of Machine Tools:
Year Under 10 years old Over 20 years old
1977 31% 34%
1974 - 34%1 33%3
1977 37%2 27%
1977 39% 24%
1975 42%1 28%4
1978 47% 18%
1973 60% n.a.
1 Under nine years old.
2 Under 11 years old.
3 Over 19 years old.
3
4 Over 17 years old.
n. a. - not available
Source: The 12th/ American Machinist Inventory of Metalworking Equipment,
1976-1978.
These data support the contention that the American machine tool industry is
at a competitive disadvantage on the world market due to a relatively out-
dated capital stock. Particularly striking is the fact that Japan has ap-
proximately twice the percentage of newer machine tools than the U. S. The
U. S. machine tool industry, then, would appear to be less competitive in
the world market when considering both factor costs and the quality and age
of the capital stock.
There are, moreover, other sets of factors which work against the
industry in competing for foreign trade. These factors are basically exter-
nal to a particular firm. First, international currency exchange rate
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fluctuations can have a significant effect on the prices of machine tools.
Industry spokespersons say that the devaluation of the dollar has benefitted
the export business of American builders.1 3 Other external factors, however,
have not had such a favorable impact on U. S. machine tool firms. Specific-
ally, international government policies have been cited as a key barrier to
foreign trade. For example, NATO countries have agreements on the level of
technological sophisitication of products that can be exported to Eastern
European countries. The U. S. limits on technological sophistication, how-
ever, are more strict than those of other NATO countries, and consequently
American machine tool builders cannot compete effectively in this market.
Other governmental policies that have been cited as disadvantageous include:
the subsidization of credit terms offered by the foreign builder's government
in international markets; government financial support for firms exhibiting
abroad; and other forms of government support for the machine tool industry
(especially in Japan) that enables foreign builders to compete more effectively
on the world market. In sum, the machine tool industry has been very interest-
ed in using the world market as a kind of cushion in recessionary periods, in
order to smooth out the volatile cycles of product demand. However, due to
the factors enumerated above, this has not been a particularly successful
way of solving the instability problem, particularly in recent years.
1 3 The devaluation of the dollar has also been cited as an important
factor in curbing American machine tool imports in recent years.
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Active Responses to Instability - Lobbying
The other major attempts of the metalworking machinery industry to
stabilize demand center on lobbying activities. The industry, through
the major trade associations such as the National Machine Tool Builders
Association (NMTBA), the National Tool, Die and Precision Machining Asso-
ciation (NTDPMA), and the American Machine Tool Distributors Association
(AMTDA) have lobbied for greater government support of capital investment
for many years. In particular, these associations have been active sup-
porters of government policies such as liberalized depreciation allowances,
investment tax credits, and other policies which would stimulate industrial
investment activity. Moreover, the NMTBA also lobbies extensively on
foreign trade issues. Specifically, the industry has been interested in
getting most favored national status conferred on Eastern European countries
so that, through the Export-Import Bank, they can provide financing arrange-
ments that are more competitive with those offered by other countries.
It is a mistake, however, to classify these lobbying efforts as attempts
to stabilize demand over the business cycle. With the exception of the
foreign trade lobbying, these activities are not really directed at smoothing
out demand. Rather, they attempt to stimulate total demand but do not really
address the timing problem. A different type of lobbying activity, directed
at private firms rather than public policy, is actually concerned with the
timing of investment. This effort consists of convincing industry to follow
more "rational" investment and replacement policies, to develop long range
goals and capital budgeting programs. The Machinery and Allied Products
Institute (MAPI) represents the interests of the producers of capital
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equipment (not just the metalworking machinery industry) and has been quite
active in trying to get industry to follow more "rational" (that is, steady,
less lumpy) investment programs. They have produced a number of management
handbooks on the subject 4 and would appear to represent the most significant
attempt, on the part of the metalworking machinery industry, to actively
work towards stabilizing demand. 1 5
The extent to which these active attempts do in fact smooth out the
bunchiness of demand appears to be rather limited. A quick look at Figures
1 and 2 immediately reveals that demand is extremely unstable and there are
no real indications that it is becoming less so. The reasons why these active
responses have met. with relatively little success are rather straightforward.
Primarily, it would appear that the problem is one of scale. The metalwork-
ing machinery industry is relatively small when compared to other industries.
In 1976, the sales of the metalworking machinery industry represented less
than one percent of the sales of all manufacturing industries. Moreover, in
14See, for example, George Terborgh, Business Investment Management,
The Machinery and Allied Products Institute and the Council For Technological
Advancement, Washington, D. C., 1967.
15
Some 6f the firms interviewed do in fact follow the MAPI guidelines on
investment policy.
- 85 -
terms of the actual size of firms in the metalworking machinery industry, it
can be seen that this industry is characterized by much smaller firms than
other industries. In 1972, the average size of firm in the metalworking
machinery industry was 28 employees; the average size of firm in all manufac-
turing was 59 employees. Therefore, it is not surprising that lobbying
efforts by this industry appear to meet with less success than the efforts
of other more powerful industries (such as the automotive, petroleum, aero-
space industries).
Reactive Responses to Instability
As described below, reactive responses represent those attempts by the
metalworking machinery industry to cope with cyclical instability. They
reflect an acceptance of unstable demand as a fact of life. These reactive
16
responses center around labor policies vis a vis the business cycle. At
this point, it is necessary to introduce an important constraint on manage-
ment's labor policies - a significant shortage of skilled labor. The metal-
working machinery firms in New England have complained, unanimously, about
16It should--be noted here that, to the extent possible, firms also try
to accumulate back orders in order to provide a cushion in periods of low
demand. However, it might be argued that this is more of an active response
(that is, changing the stability of production) , particularly at the firm
level.
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the serious shortage of skilled labor in the region. This is not a new
phenomenon. The industry has voiced this complaint throughout the twentieth
century. Nor is this phenomenon limited to New Lngland. The shortage of
labor has been felt in all major centers of the industry. This limited
availability of skilled labor appears to have had a definite influence on
the management policies of ~firms in this region. The influence of the short-
age on management policies, particularly with reference to business cycle
fluctuations, will be discussed below.17 But first, it is necessary to
examine the causes of this shortage.
Causes of Labor Shortages
One factor which seems to have exacerbated the shortage of workers is
the fact that the skill levels required in this industry are extremely high.
Tool and die makers, particularly, are considered to be "at the top of the
occupational ladder among skilled craftsmen."18 These workers must complete
a very long training period to become fully qualified. Horowitz and Herrn-
stadt, in a study of skills acquisition of tool and die makers, found that,
in order to become "all around craftsmen" the following time was required:
6.5 years for individuals who combined vocational high school
education with an apprenticeship program, to become compe-
tent, all around tool makers and 8.0 years to become
competent, all around diemakers;
7.0 years for individuals in apprenticeship programs (with no
vocational education) to become competent all around tool
makers, and 10.0 years to become competent, all around
diemakers;
1 7The shortage has also influenced investment behavior in the industry.
This will be examined in Chapter Four.
1 8 Morris- A. Horowitz and Irwin L. Herrnstadt, The Training of Tool and
Die Makers, Department of Economics, Northeastern University, Boston, Mass.,
September 1969, p. 15.
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between 10 and 12 years for individuals either having vocational
education, by itself, or who "picked up the trade" to become
proficient toolmakers or diemakers.19
The accepted apprenticeship period for tool and die makers and machinists
is four years,20 but Horowitz and Herrnstadt point out that, at least for
tool and die makers, a longer period is necessary before the workers
become competent craftspersons. There are a wide range of skills required
in the metalworking machinery industry, with corresponding differences in
training requirements. At one end, the training time necessary to become a
21
skilled machine operator can range from six months to a year. At the
other end, there are certain jobs within the industry which require years
and years of experience. On a plant tour of one firm in the interview
sample, a man was pointed out doing a very delicate adjustment and measuring
operation on a small part. He explained that it took him at least twenty
years or more to master the critical skills necessary for his job; he had
to be able to "feel" that the piece was of the proper dimensions and it took
many years of experience to develop this "feel."
19
Ibid., p. 7.
20
U. S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Special Investigations of Small
Business Problems of the Select Committee on Small Business, Problems of the
Tool and Die Industry and Associated Problems of Manufacturers and Distribu-
tors of Machine Tools: Hearings on H. Res. 13, 89th/ Congress, 2nd/ session,
26 and 27 July, 1966, p. 85.
21
Ibid., p. 85.
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The high level of skills required, with the consequent long periods
of training, is probably responsible for short-run shortages of skilled
labor. Specifically, in a business cycle upswing, labor is in very great
demand, but there is a substantial lag between the supply of new labor
and its demand, given the extensive amount of time it takes to adequately
train the new entrants to the labor force. However, the shortage of labor
is not simply a short-run adjustment problem.
There has been, in recent years, a shift in attitudes in this country.
There has been a shift in emphasis away from blue collar careers and vocation-
al education in favor of white collar occupations and college education.
Many firms in the region have stated that area vocational high schools, with
some notables exceptions, are woefully inadequate. The machinery used in
these schools is often outdated, and the skills taught are not always those
most needed in local shops. Moreover, there is the feeling in many firms
that young people are not interested in this trade. More high school students
are interested in college education at the present time than has been the
case in the past. Additionally, the aptitude and skills required for these
occupations are very similar to those of an engineer, and so many young
people with this aptitude are turning to an engineering career rather than
working in blue collar jobs.
Aside from the competition from college, firms have also cited compe-
tition from other industries for entrants into the labor pool as a major
problem. A small tool and die shop, for example, might offer a vocational
high school graduate an apprenticeship, with a starting pay of, say $3.50
to $4.00 per hour. In five or ten years that individual would be earning
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about $25,000 per year (.these figures were supplied by the owner of a small
shop). However, this graduate might also be offered a job on the production
line of an aircraft plant, say at $5.00 to $6.00 per hour. While the over-
all earning potential in the tool and die business may be superior in the
long run, the owner said that it is nonetheless quite difficult to attract
new entrants when the immediate rewards in another industry are so much
higher.22 An additional factor that was mentioned -in connection with this
difficulty in attracting new workers was that, at least for one owner, the
occupation itself had "a bad reputation." People think its a dirty job,2 3
it's not very glamorous.
The industry has taken some steps to alleviate this labor shortage.
First, the industry has historically been involved with eduational institu-
tions. In 1868, a group of machine tool builders started the Worcester Free
Institute of Industrial Science (later to become Worcester Polytechnical
Institute) to train machinists. Individual firms have set up cooperative
training programs with local high schools (such as the Springfield Coopera-
tive Training Course, set up in 1916 and still active today in Springfield,
Vermont) to provide preliminary training and shop experience for students.
2 2 This difficulty of attracting apprentices due to low entry wages is
not a new problem. In the early 1900's, for example, "the apprentice was
supposed to receive valuable instruction for which he paid his employer a
part of the value of his work ... the apprentice was also usually required
to post a bond upon entering his apprenticeship ... to ensure his employer
that he would not leave before completing his apprenticeship and would make
a conscious effort to complete it successfully." H. Wagoner, The Machine Tool
Industry, pp. 87-88.
2 3 This owner, however, pointed out how clean his shop. and workers were
to dispel this myth.
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Additionally, both the National Machine Tool Builders Association and the
National Tool and Die and Precision Machining Association have set up appren-
ticeship programs, with the support of the Deparmtent of Labor (which pays
for the costs of instruction while the trade associations handle the paper-
work and administration of the program). And finally, CETA money is often
available to help defray the training costs incurred by firms. While all
firms interviewed have said that programs of this kind are extremely impor-
tant, the magnitude of these efforts is not great enough to meet their needs.
It appears that, at best, perhaps ten percent of a firm's new recruits are
connected with any of these programs.
There are a few reasons why these programs are not able to supply a
sufficient number of workers, however. Many firms are very reluctant to
institute extensive apprenticeship programs due to the expense of doing so.
Again, the cyclical nature of the industry is important, in that firms
don't want to train workers, only to lay them off when business is slow.
Additionally, many smaller firms are at a distinct disadvantage in that it
is necessary to maintain a certain ratio of journeymen to apprentices. The
small shops interviewed seem to feel that eight or nine journeymen are required
to adequately train one apprentice in the shop. Since many firms, especially
in the tool and die industry, are quite small, the potential for large scale
apprenticeship programs are limited. And finally, what appears to be the
biggest perceived disincentive to in-house training is the fear of "pirating."
This fear has been around for most of the twentieth century, beginning
with the advent of automobile manufacturing at the start of the century and
continuing to the present day. Since machinists and tool and die makers are
needed in almost every manufacturing industry, firms in the metalworking
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machinery industry are always fearful that skilled workers, especially
those the firm itself has trained, might leave for greener pastures in
other industries. These pastures, moreover, do appear to be greener as the
following figures illustrate:
Table 9
Average Hourly Wages of Production Workers
Motor Vehicles and Aircraft and Parts Metalworking
Year Equipment Industry Industry Machinery Industry
1971 $4.74 $4.32 $4.28
1972 $5.11 $4.65 $4.59
1973 $5.45 $5.00 $4.84
1974 $5.90 $5.40 $5.18
1975 $6.47 $5.99 $5.51
1976 $7.10 $6.45 $5.94
1977 $7.90 $6.91 $6.44
The hourly wage in the automotive and aircraft industries has been consis-
tently higher than those in the metalworking machinery industry. In addition
to the wage differential, the fact that both the automobile and aircraft (and
many other durable goods) industries are much larger and more concentrated
also influences the situation. The larger firms are able to engage in much
more extensive recruiting operations. And since, on average, these industries
are more unionized than metalworking machinery (from 1973 to 1975, 36% of
production workers in metalworking machinery were union members; 82% of pro-
duction workers in motor vehicles and equipment were union members; and 60%
of production workers in aircraft and parts were union members)124, it is
quite probable that fringe benefits and security are greater in these other
R. B. Freeman and J. L. Medoff, New Estimates of the Industrial Locus
of Unionism in the U. S., Discussion Paper Number 636, Harvarci Institute of
Economic Research, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, July 1978, pp. 17-18.
- 92 -
industries, offering further inducements to labor than are apparent by
looking only at hourly wage data.
This problem was aggravated during the Vietnam War (before the down-
turn of the late sixties) by government policies. Certain defense industries
were classified as "essential activities," particularly aircraft and ordnance
industries. This classification, in many cases, carried with it a draft
deferrment status for workers. While draft deferrment was not guaranteed to
workers in these industries, local draft boards would nonetheless be more
inclined to draft a machinist or tool and die maker working in the machine
tool industry than one aircraft.25 A National Machine Tool Builders Associa-
tion survey of 22 major machine tool firms in 1966 found that "a number equiva-
lent to more than one out of every three skilled workers hired by these
companies since July 1, 1965, has been lost in this period to non-machine
26
tool defense industries alone."
The degree to which workers shift among comparable industries has been
investigated with mobility data from the Longitudinal Employer Employee
Data (LEEDs) file. This analysis will be discussed in more detail below.
However, insofar as "pirating,,27 among industries does take place, it appears
that this is a two-way street. The number of employees leaving the
2 5The machine tool industry petitioned the Interagency Advisory Committee
on Essential Activities and Critical Occupations, Bureau of Employment Security,
Department of Labor, for essential industry status in 1966, but this petition
was denied.
U. S. Congress, Problems of the Tool and Die Industry: Hearings on
H. Res. 13, 1966, p. 169.
2 7Wagoner, The Machine Tool Industry, notes that "the term (pirating)
hardly seems appropriate since the only force used (is) that of persuasion,
the promise of better pay in expanding industries, more rapid upgrading, and
steadier employment." (p. 347).
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metalworking machinery industry for jobs in "competing" industries appears
to be almost equally balanced by the number of employees leaving competing
industries for jobs in metalworking machinery. Some firms interviewed have
expressed the opinion that, while larger firms in other industries may be at
an advantage in recruiting workers, the smaller firms offer "better working
conditions" -- more flexibility, more informality, less of an assembly line
atmosphere, etc. The owner of one small firm (eight employees) said that*,
in the last five years, three of his employees had left for jobs in "compe-
ting" industries, and all three have since returned to his shop.
In conclusion, the degree to which firms in the metalworking machinery
industry are at a disadvantage in competing for a given labor pool is unclear,
at best. What is clear is that skilled machinists and tool and die makers
are in great demand, both in New England and other regions of industrial
concentration. The following section will examine the ways in which this
labor shortage has affected management decisions, particularly as a constraint
on the ability of firms to cope with business cycle fluctuations.
2 8The following industries were considered to be competitors for the
supply of skilled machinists and tool and die makers:
SIC 33 (primary metal industries);
SIC 34 (fabricated metas products, except machinery products and
transportation equipment);
SIC 35 (machinery except electrical, excluding metalworking machinery);
SIC 36 (electrical and electronic machinery, equipment and supplies); and
SIC 37 (transportation equipment).
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Responses to Unstable Demand under the Constraint of Labor Shortage
The shortage of labor, combined with the extreme instability of product
demand, has created problems for firms in the metalworking machinery industry.
On the one hand, when product demand is very low, there is very little demand
for skilled labor. On the other hand, many firms try to avoid laying off
their workers for fear that they will never be able to replace them when
product demand picks up again. Companies first respond to changes in product
demand by changing the number of hours worked by production workers. As
Table 10 - shows, in peak periods, there is a great deal of overtime work.
All man
2.
2.
2.
2.
2.
2.
3.
3.
3.
3.
3.
3.
3.
2.
3.
3.
3.
2.
3.
3.
1978-1
Table 10
Weekly Overtime Hours of Production Workers
Durable Goods Metalworking
ufacturing Industries Machinery Industry
0 1.9 2.5
7 2.7 4.0
4 2.4 4.3
4 2.3 3.4
8 2.8 4.7
8 2.9 4.8
1 3.3 5.9
6 3.9 6.7
9 4.3 7.8
4 3.5 6.5
6 3.8 5.4
6 3.8 6.0
0 2.9 4.3
9 2.9 2.8
5 3.6 4.9
8 4.1 6.4
2 3.4 5.8
6 2.5 3.3
1 3.1 4.0
4 3.6 5.4
)79 Economic Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry.
Year
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Source:
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In slack periods, hours are decreased but the number of workers remains
constant, thereby keeping the existing labor force intact. However, there
are periods when business is so poor that shortening the number of hours
worked is simply not enough. Specifically, from 1967 to 1971, and from
1974 to 1976, the demand for metalworking machinery decreased dramatically,
and large scale lay offs occurred.
The owners/managers of most firms interviewed have said that, in recent
years, they have attempted to retain as many workers as possible during these
slack periods. They have expressed the fear that, if they lay off a skilled
worker, he/she may either migrate to another state or region in search of
more stable employment, or take a job in a different industry and be unwill--
ing to return to the firm when business is on the upswing. In order to
examine these issues, data were obtained to investigate the following questions:
(1) Have firms become more reluctant to lay off workers in cyclical
downturns?
(2) When layoffs do occur, who gets laid off? Where do these workers
go?
(3) When product demand is on a cyclical upswing, where do the new
employees come from?
The first question was addressed by looking at data from the Census
of Manufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. It is hypothesized
that, if firms are laying off workers in periods of low demand, then output
per worker will remain relatively constant over the business cycle. However,
if firms are afraid to lay off workers, then the output per worker will
actually decline in downturns; that is, sales would decrease at a faster
rate than employment. Figures 10 and 11 present the sales or output (value
of shipments) of the metalworking machinery industry from 1958 to 1976,
Figure 10
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along with the output per production worker (value of shipments per product-
ion worker), for both the United States and the New England region. Output
per production worker has clearly increased substantially over this period
(all figures are in constant dollars) reflecting. increases in productivity
associated with the use of more labor saving equipment. The interesting
thing to note, however, is -the different pattern of the output per worker
line in the two recessionary periods in this time interval.
From the U. S. figure, it can be seen that, from the peak of 1967 to
the trough of 1971, industry sales decreased dramatically. Output per worker,
however, remained constant, indicating that decreases in employment kept up
with decreases in sales. The same pattern can be seen on the New England
figure. In fact, from 1967 to 1971, U. S. sales decreased by 25%, and the
number of production workers also decreased by 25%. In New England, industry
sales fell off by 37% and the number of production workers diminished by 37%
for the same period. From the peak of 1974 to the trough of 1976, however,
a different picture is visible. Again, in both the U. S. and the New England
region, sales of metalworking machinery declined. But in this downturn, out-
put per production worker also declines, indicating that employment is declin-
ing less rapidly than sales. In the U. S., sales decreased by 16%, the
number of production workers by 11%; in New England, sales. declined by 20%,
the number of production workers by 16%.
These data support the claims made by representatives of the firms inter-
viewed: namely that, especially after the 1971 recession, they have been less
inclined to lay off workers than had been the case in the past. Apparently,
after the massive layoffs during the 1967 to 1971 cycle, many firms found it
difficult to obtain sufficient labor needed for the subsequent business cycle
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upturn and so have modified their management policies in an attempt to alle-
viate this problem. The data presented above appear to support this hypo-
thesis; that metalworking machinery firms have become more concerned with
stabilizing their employment levels perhaps at the expense of productivity
(output per worker). It is interesting to note that this phenomenon is not
limited to the New England region. Rather, the data for the U. S. as a whole
suggest that the same thing is happening at the national level, again sup-
porting the assertion that the shortage of skilled labor is not a uniquely
New England experience.
The latter two questions address the issue of worker mobility. When
workers are laid off, what happens to them, and when metalworking machinery
firms are hiring on the busness cycle upturn, where do they get their
expanded work. force? These questions attempt to determine if management's
perception of worker mobility is consistent with reality. Specifically,
if management is acting under the impression that workers who are laid off
are leaving the region or taking jobs in other industries and are unwilling
to return to the metalworking machinery industry, then it is interesting to
discover if in fact workers do not return to the industry in business cycle
upswings. The Longitudinal Employer Employee Data (LEEDs) file was utilized
in order to examine these questions.
The LEEDs file is a one percent sample of all workers covered by Social
Security for the period 1957 to 1975.29 It is possible, with the LEEDs file,
to see where workers go from the peak to trough of a business cycle, and
2 9 Please see Barry Bluestone, Alan Matthews and Lynn Ware, "Worker Mobi-
lity in the New England Region (LEED Analysis) ," New England Economy Project
Working Paper No. 3, Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard Univ.,
Dec. , 1978, for a more complete description of this data source.
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conversely, to see where workers employed in a peak period were employed in
the preceding trough. Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14 present this information
for two business cycles in this twenty year period for the New England
region, and the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont. The
cycles under consideration are the expansionary periods of 1964 to 1967 and
1971 to 1974; the recessionary periods of 1967 to 1971 and 1974 to 1975 (al-
though the actual trough in this latter recession was 1976, unfortunately
data were not available for this year) .
The most striking feature of these tables is the cyclical instability
of employment in this industry. Only 44% of those employed in the industry
in New England in 1967 had been employed in the industry in 1964; only 40%
of those employed in the industry in 1967 were still employed in the industry
in 1971; only 39% of those employed in 1974 had been employed in the industry
in 1971; and 74% of those employed in 1974 were still employed in the industry
in 1975.30 The mobility of workers in the individual states appear to be
relatively consistent with that of workers in the whole region, with the pos-
sible exception of Vermont.3 1 Therefore, for the sake of clarity and ease
of understanding, these tables will be discussed with reference to the New
England region as a whole, and not to each individual state.
30
This last percentage is substantially greater than the previous ones
since the real trough occurred in 1976, and this was a less severe recession
than that of 1971.
31
The small absolute number of workers included in the Vermont sample
appear to render this data less reliable than those for the other states and
the region as a whole. Additionally, there appear to be some data problems>
particularly for the period 1974 to 1975 (where the "unknown" category is
so large)) with the Vermont sample.
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Table 11
Source of New Entrants to Metalworking Machinery Industry
New England, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont
1964 to 1967
New
Enctland Connecticut Massachusetts Vermont
Employment in Metal-
working Machinery in
1967
Percent of workers
employed in Metal-
working Machinery
in the region (state)
in 1964
Of those workers not
employed in Metal-
working Machinery
in the region (state)
in 1964, the percent-
age who were:
Retired in 1964
Not in covered employ-
ment 1964
659 281
44% 38%
0%
27
0%
34
Employed in:
Metalworking Machinery
outside the region in
1964
Metalworking Machinery
in another state in
New England in 1964
Other Metalworking
manufacturing in
1964 1
Non-Metalworking
manufacturing in
1964 2.
Trade and services
in 1964 3
Other industries
in 1964 1
0 2
0n. a.
24
16
18
15
23
10
10
13
n. a.: not applicable
Source: LEEDs data, prepared by Alan Matthews and Barry Bluestone
217 65
. 48% 66%
0% 0%
16 24
0
0
0
0
32
24
18
22
22
16
10 16
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notes to Table 11
lEmployed in SICs 33 (Primary metal industries), 34 (Fabricated metal
products except machinery and transportation equipment), 35 (Machinery,
except electrical and metalworking machinery), 36 (Electrical and elec-
tronic machinery, equipment, and supplies), and 37 (Transporation equip-
ment).
2 Employed in SICs 20 (Food and kindred products), 21 (Tobacco manufact-
ures), 22 (Textile mill products), 23 (apparel and other finished
products, except furniture), 25 (Furniture and fixtures), 26 (Paper
and allied products)' 27 (Printing, publishing, and allied industries),
28 (Chemicals and allied products), 29 (Petroleum refining and related
industries) , 30 (Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products) , 31 (Leather
and leather products), 32 (Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products),
38 (Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments; photographic,
metal and optical goods; watches and clocks), and 39 (Miscellaneous
manufacturing industries).
3Employed in SICs 50 (Wholesale trade - durable goods), 51 (Wholesale
trade - nondurable goods), 52 (Retail trade - building materials,
hardware, garden supply, and mobile home dealers), 53 (Retail trade -
general merchandise stores), 54 (Retail trade - food stores), .55 (Retail
trade - automotive dealers and gasoline service stations), 56 (Retail
trade - apparel and accessory stores), 57 (Retail trade - furniture,
home furnishings, and equipment stores), 58 (Retail trade - eating and
drinking places), 59 (iscellaneous retail trade), 70 (Hotels, rooming
houses, camps, and other lodging places), 72 (personal services), 73
(Business services), 74 (Automotive repair, services, and garages), 76
(Miscellaneous repair services), 78 (Motion pictures), 79 (Amusement
and recreation services, except motion pictures), 80 (Health services),
81 (Legal services), 82 (Educational services), 83 (Social services),
84 (Museums, art galleries, botanical and zoological gardens), 86
(Membership organizations), 87 (Private households), and 89 (Miscellan-
eous services).
4
Employed in SICs 01 (Agricultural production - crops), 02 (Agricultural
production - livestock.), 07 (Agricultural services), 08 (Forestry), 09
(Fishing, hunting, and trapping), 15 (Building construction - general
contractors and operative builders), 16 (Construction other than build-
ing construction - general contractors), 17 (-Construction - special
trade contractors) , 40 (Railroad transporation) , 41 (Local and suburban
transit and interurban highway passenger transportation) , 42 (Motor
freight transportation and warehousing), 43 (U. S. Postal Service), 44
(Water transportation), 45 (Transportation by air), 46 (Pipe lines,
except natural gas), 47 (Transporation services), 48 (Communication),
49 (Electric, gas and sanitary services), 60 (Banking), 61 (Credit
agencies other than banks), 62 (.Security and commodity brokers, dealers,
exchanges, and services), 63 (Insurance), 64 (Insurance agents, brokers,
and service), 65 (Real Estate), 66 ( Combinations of real estate, insur-
ance, loans, law offices), 67 (Holding and other investment offices),
91 (Executive, legislative, and general government, except finance).,
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92 (Justice, public order, and safety), 93 (Public finance, taxation,
and monetary policy), 94 (Administration of human resources programs),
95 (Administration of environmental quality and housing programs), 96
(Administration of economic programs), and 97 (National Security and
international affairs) -- but only workers in these SICs who are. covered
by Social Security.
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Table 12
Destination of Workers Displaced from
Metalworking Machinery Industry
New England, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont
1967 to 1971
New
England Connecticut Massachusetts
Employment in Metal-
working machinery
in the region (state)
in 1967
Percentage of workers
employed in Metalwork-
ing Machinery in the
region (state) in
1971
Of those workers not
employed in Metal-
working Machinery
in the region (state)
in 1971, the percen-
tage who were:
Retired (dead or dis-
abled)
Not in covered employ-
ment
65,900 28,100
40% 37%
12% 10%
15% 15%
Employed in:
Metalworking Machinery
outside the region
in 1971
Metalworking Machinery
in another state in
New England in 1971
Other Metalworking
manufacturing in
1971
Non-Metalworking
manufacturing in
1971
Trade and services
in 1971
Other industries
in 1971
1% 1%
0%n.a.
22% 25%
10% 8%
21% 21%
19% 20%
n. a.: not applicable
Source: LEED's data, prepared by Alan Matthews and Barry Bluestone
Vermont
21,700 6,500
45% 52%
13%
20%
25%
12%
1%
0%
4%
4%
4%28%
13%
13%
13%
10%
20%
22%
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Table 13
Source of New Entrants to Metalworking Machinery Industry
New England, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont
1971 to 1974
New
En..gland Connecticut Massachusetts Vermont
Employment in Metal-
working Machinery
in 1974 54,500 22,000 20,400 3,600
Percentage of workers
employed in Metal-
working Machinery in
the region (state)
in 1971 39% 39% 38% 56%
Of those workers not
employed in Metal-
working Machinery
in the region (state)
in 1971, the percent-
age who were:
Retired in 1971 2% 2% 0% 0%
Not in covered
employment in
1971 19% 25% 18% 18%
Employed in:
Metalworking machinery
outside the region
in 1971 5% 5% 7% 0%
Metalworking machinery
in another state in
New England in 1971 n.a. 0% 0% 0%
Other Metalworking
manufacturing in
1971 21% 22% 22% 18%
Non-Metalworking
manufacturing in
1971 13% 10% 18% 0%
Trade and services
in 1971 24% 19% 27% 31%
Other industries
in 1971 16% 17% 8% 3%
n. a.: not applicable
Source: LEED'S data, prepared by Alan Matthews and Barry Bluestone
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Table 14
Destination of Workers Displaced from
Metalworking Machinery Industry
New England, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont
1974 to 1975
New
England Connecticut Massachusetts Vermont
Employment in Metal-
working Machinery .
in 1974 54,500 22,000 20,400 3,600
Percentage of workers
employed in Metal-
working Machinery in
the region (state)
in 1975 74% 74% 78% 58%
Of those workers not
employed in Metal-
working Machinery
in the region (state)
in 1975, the percen-
tage who were:
Retired (dead or dis-
abled) 4% 4% 17% 0%
Not in covered employ-
ment in 1975 19% 23% 16% 13%
Employed in:
Metalworking machinery
outside the region
in 1975 0% 4% 0% 0%
Metalworking machinery
in another state in
New England in 1975 n.a. 0% 0% 0%
Other Metalworking
manufacturing in
1975 19% 12% 32% 7%
Non-Metalworking
manufacturing in
1975 12% 8% 21% 0%
Trade and services
in 1975 23% 35% 5% 0%
Other industries
in 1975 19% 15% 16% 13%
SIC unknown in
1975 4% 0% 0% 67%
n. a.: not applicable
Source: LEEDs data, prepared by Alan Matthews and Barry Bluestone
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By examining the peak to trough tables, it is possible to see how work-
ers dealt with the rapid decline of the metalworking machinery industry in
business cycle downturns. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine
from these data whether workers leaving the industry in a cyclical down-
turn have done so voluntarily or involuntaryily. However, it appears reason-
able to assume that the majority of these workers have been involuntarily
displaced (laid off) in these periods of substantial industry contraction.
Tables 12 and 14 show that, for the two recessionary periods under considera-
tion, about 20% of those workers displaced from the peak year to the trough
year end up employed in what has been classified as "competing" industries,32
where, presumably, wages and benefits are relatively comparable with (if not
greater than) those in the metalworking machinery industry. Another 10%
or so of those workers displaced in the downturn are employed in other manu-
facturing industries where, again, wages are assumed to be relatively compar-
able. A rather large number of displaced workers are employed in what are
usually considered low-wage industries (trade and services) or are not in
covered employment in the trough year.33
3 2 The following industries were considered to be competitors for the sup-
ply of skilled machinists and tool and die makers:
SIC 33 (primary metal industries);
SIC 34 (fabricated metal products, except machinery products and trans-
portation equipment) ;
SIC 35 (machinery except electrical, excluding metalworking machinery);
SIC 36 (electrical and electronic machinery, equipment and supplies); and
SIC 37 (transporation equipment)
3 3 The percentage of workers not in covered employment in the trough year
is an upper limit on the unemployment rate of workers displaced from the in-
dustry in that it includes both unemployed workers and those workers employed
in non-covered public or private sector jobs, and workers who have dropped
out of the labor force.
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The interpretation of these data should not, however, necessarily be
that it is the skilled workers who are laid off and forced to accept much
lower paying, less skilled jobs or go on unemployment. If the age structure
of the displaced worker is taken into account, it can be seen that it is
the younger and presumably less skilled workers who are not in covered
employment or are employed in low wage industries. The following table 3 4
illustrates this point.
Table 15
Age Distribution of Displaced Workers
New England
Percent of 1967 less than over
workers: 25 years old 25-34 35-54 55 years old
Employed in SIC 354
in 1971 18% 37% 52% 46%
Employed in SIC 354
retired, dead, or disabled
in 1971 20 38 56 77
Not in covered employment
in 1971 13 12 7 5
Employed in trade and
service in 1971 22 14 9 6
It can be seen that the younger workers are much more likely to be laid
34
Table 15 presents age breakdowns for all workers in the New England
region for the downturn of 1967 to 1971. These figures are comparable, in
terms of age/destination characteristics, to the downturn of 1974 to 1975.
Additionally, the data are representative of the age/destination character-
istics of the individual states in the region in both downturns.
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off in cyclical downturns, and additionally, are more likely to be employed
in lower-wage industries. This result is certainly reasonable, given the
fact that it takes many years to acquire the skills needed in this industry
and, when business is poor, management tries to hold onto its most skilled,
older employees. The important conclusion to be reached from these data
is that, although employment in the metalworking machinery industry is extreme-
ly unstable over business cycles, it is the younger and less skilled compon-
ent of the labor force that bears the brunt of this instability. The older,
skilled workers are both less likely to be laid off, and when they are dis-
placed, they experience greater job mobility among comparable industrial
sectors.
The next question to be examined with the LEEDs file is what happens
in business cycle upswings? When business is growing, from what sources
do firms get their expanded labor force. Tables 11 and 13 present this
information for the two expansionary periods under consideration, 1964 to
1967 and 1971 to 1974. In both periods, the largest source of new employees
is the "not in covered employment" category. This category is a particularly
important source of young workers, as would be expected. The trade and ser-
vice sector has increased in importance as a source of new employees.
Again, this is not a surprising finding given the fact that this sector has
grown in size in the New England region in the recent past, relative to the
manufacturing sector. The workers drawn from the services and trade sector
tend to be younger than those drawn from both the metalworking manufacturing
sector and other manufacturing sector. This suggests that the metalworking
machinery industry is able to attract older, skilled workers from the "com-
peting" industries in periods of substantial expansion.
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The mobility of workers across industries is of interest insofar as
it relates to both the "pirating" issue raised previously, and the apparent
belief of management that, once workers have been laid off from the industry,
they are irrevocably lost as a future source of labor. Table 16 shows the
mobility pattern of workers among industries for the two expansionary and
recessionary periods under -study for the New England region. These data
present information on the destination of workers displaced from the metal-
working machinery in recessionary periods, and the source of new workers
added to the industry's labor force in expansionary periods. These data
would seem to discredit the industry's contention that workers laid off are
workers gone forever. For example, 23% of those workers displaced in the
1967 to 1971 recession were employed in the other metalworking manufacturing
sector in 1971; in the subsequent upturn of 1971 to 1974, 23% of the new
workers in SIC 354 had been employed in the other metalworking manufacturing
sectors in 1971. The mobility of workers among other industries in these
business cycles exhibits a similar, balanced pattern.
This is not to say, however, that it is the same workers bouncing back
and forth between the metalworking machinery industry and another specific
industry. The data only say that the flows of workers among those industries
across the business cycle appear to be quite stable -- the metalworking mach-
inery industry may lose workers displaced in downturns to other industries,
but these other industries also appear to represent important sources of new
labor when metalworking machinery is on the upswing. Moreover, to the extent
that age is correlated with skills, the metalworking machinery industry appears
to be holding its own in comparison to the "competing" industries. That is,
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Table 16
Inter-Industry Mobility Over the Business Cycle
New England
Origin of
workers
Entering SIC
354 from
1964-1967
Destination of
Workers Leav-
ing SIC 354
from 1967-
1971
Origin of
Workers
Entering SIC
354 from
1971-1974
Destination of
Workers Leaving
SIC 354 from
1974-1975
Number % Number % Number % Number %
36,700 100% 39,000 100% 31,500 100% 14,100 100%
0 0% 4,700 12% 300 1% 700
Not in
Covered
Employment
Employed
in:
Other metal-
working
manufactur-
ing
Non-metal-
working
manufactur-
ing
Trade and
services
Other
Industries
10,100 28% 6,200 16% 6,800 22% 2,700 19%
8,600 23% 8,800
6,000
23% 7,100 23% 2,600 18%
16% 4,200 11% 4,400 14% 1,600 11%
6,800 19% 7,900
5,200
20% 6,600 21% 3,100 22%
14% 6,800 17% 6,000 19% 2,200 16%
0 0% 400 1% 300 1% 1,200 9%
Source: LEEDs data, prepared by Alan Matthews and Barry Bluestone.
Total
Retired
Unknown
Industry
5%
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although a substantial proportion of older workers take jobs in the other
metalworking manufacturing sector in a recession, it is also true that a
large number of the workers drawn from the other metalworking manufacturing
sector in an expansionary period are in the older age groups. These figures
belie the industry's contention that other sectors have been capturing a
portion of their skilled labor force over successive business cycle fluctua-
35
tions.
The other concern expressed by many firms is that, after being laid off
by the metalworking machinery industry in the New England region, many workers
leave the region and thereby, again, deplete the labor force available to the
industry in subsequent expansionary periods. Table 17 examines this issue of
geographical mobility. It appears that, as in the case of inter-industry
mobility, there is a degree of stability in the outflow of workers in down-
turns and the inflow of workers in upturns. 3 6 For example, in the New England
region, 5300 employees, or 13% of the workers displaced in the 1967 to 1971
3 5 There is an important qualification to this conclusion. These data
represent only the percentage distribution of origins and destinations of
the expanded and displaced work force, respectively. . To the extent that the
metalworking machinery industry is experiencing an absolute shortage of labor,
the fact that an equivalent percentage of workers return from a given industry
as leave metalworking machinery for that industry may not be adequate from
the persepective of the metalworking machinery industry. The issue of an ab-
solute, as opposed to relative, shortage of skilled labor will be discussed
in more detail below.
36Please note that the number of workers leaving the region in a downturn
and returning to the region in an upturn may be underestimates. This is due
to the fact that the LEEDs data do not contain information on the geographical
location of unemployed workers, retired workers, workers in uncovered employ-
ment, and workers not in the labor force. Therefore, workers who are unemployed,
for example, in a recession year are assumed to be located in the New England
region although they may have moved to another region. Similarly, the geo-
graphical location of workers added to the labor force in an expansionary
period who were not in covered employment at the beginning of the period is
assumed to be the New England region, although these workers may have been
located outside the region at the time.
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Table 17
Inter-Regional Mobility Over the Business Cycle
New England
Workers Entering Metalworking Machinery Industry
in New England from 1964 to 1971 36,700
Number employed outside the region in 1964 1,900
Percentage of new entrants from 1964 to 1967
from outside the region 5%
Workers Leaving Metalworking Machinery Industry in
New England from 1964 to 1971 39,300
Number employed outside region in 1971 5,300
Percentage of displaced workers leaving the region
from 1967 to 1971 13%
Workers Entering Metalworking Machinery Industry
in New England from 1971 to 1974 33,000
Number employed outside the region in 1971 6,000
Percentage of new entrants from 1971 to 1975
from outside the region 18%
Workers Leaving Metalworking Machinery Industry
in New England from 1974 to 1975 14,100
Number employed outside the region in 1975 2,300
Percentage of displaced workers leaving the
region from 1974 to 1975 16%
Source: LEEDs data, prepared by Alan Matthews and Barry Bluestone
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recession, left the region; however, 6000 employees, or 18% of the expanded
1974 labor force, consisted of workers employed outside of the region in
1971. Summing over the two complete business cycles under consideration,
it can be seen that 7,900 (1,900 from 1965-1967 plus 6,000 from 1971-1974)
of the new entrants to New England's metalworking machinery industry during
these two upswings came from outside the region. 7,600 employees (5,300
from 1971-1974 plus 2,300 from 1974-1975) displaced from the industry in the
two downturns took jobs in other areas of the country. These data do not
support industry claims that the New England region has experienced a net
loss in metalworking machinery workers, relative to other regions, over the
last two business cycles.
Why, then, are firms apparently more reluctant to lay off workers in
recessions? The LEEDs data suggest that while there is a great deal of
both inter-industry and inter-regional mobility among workers displaced in
downturns, the flow of workers to other industries and regions is not uni-
directional. Therefore, the fears that workers laid off are workers gone
forever do not appear to be substantiated by these data. A few factors
will be discussed that will attempt to reconcile the contradiction between
this mobility data and.the expressed reluctance of management to lay off
employees.37 First, there is the problem that, as metioned above, while
3 7 Remember that the data on output per worker presented previously ap-
pear to support the fact that, at least in the 1974 to 1976 recession, fewer
workers were laid off than would have been expected given the decline in
industry sales.
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the flows across industries and regions are relatively equivalent, there is
no indication that these are the same people entering and leaving the indus-
try. There is the possibility that the workers leaving the industry in
downturns are more highly skilled than those entering the industry on the
upswing. Unfortunately, there are not data available which would permit
an analysis of inter-industry or inter-regional mobility by different skill
levels. With the data available, it would seem that this is a distinct pos-
sibility, in light of the fact that firms have stated that they are increas-
ingly reluctant to lay off workers.
A second possible explanation is related to the problem of an absolute,
rather than relative, shortage of labor. Firms may be getting an equivalent
percentage or number of returning workers but, as mentioned previously, this
may not be a sufficient supply of labor in expansionary periods. Every firm
interviewed stated that they could expand their production if only they had
more skilled workers. This absolute shortage of employees may be condition-
ing management's perceptions of the mobility of workers. If a firm has dif-
ficulty obtaining an adequate number of employees, it is probably more likely
to be reluctant to lay off workers, regardless of whether or not workers who
are laid off return to the firm (or industry) in later periods. So, it
would appear that, since the absolute shortage of labor looms so large in
the eyes of management, firms. may not be distinguishing between this absolute
shortage and the shortage relative to other industries or regions.
The empirical results presented in this chapter have established the
two major problems of the metalworking machinery industry in both New England
and the United States: the extreme volatility of product demand and the
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shortage of skilled labor. These two problems, both separately and in
combination, are important factors influencing investment behavior in the
industry. These influences on investment behavior, along with a considera-
tion of how other factors such as ownership and size characteristics influence
investment, will be the subject of Chapter Four.
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Chapter 4
Investment Behavior
This chapter will examine the investment behavior of firms in the
metalworking machinery industry; what factors appear to have an important
influence on investment behavior, and particularly, are there influences
on investment that differentially affect the metalworking machinery industry
in the New England region. First, it is necessary to distinguish between
short term and long term investment decisions. Short term investment deci-
sions concern the annual capital budgeting activities of firms, while long
term investment decisions concern such issues as whether firms will expand
their plant, move to another site, or close down operations entirely. This
analysis will look at these two types of behavior separately, in that dif-
ferent factors are more or less important depending upon the time frame
under consideration.
Short Term Investment Behavior
In order to examine short term behavior, it is necessary to understand
how investment is financed in this industry. The large majority of metal-
working machinery firms finance their capital expenditures out of retained
earnings. There is very little interaction with capital markets, as firms
usually do not seek to finance investment by borrowing. In the cases where
borrowing does occur, it is usually because the firm does not have the
necessary resources at hand. Metalworking machinery firms get most of their
outside financing from local banks, and loans are usually made on a short
term basis. In some instances, notably with the larger firms in the industry,
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long term loans are obtained from insurance companies. However, as mentioned,
the magnitude of borrowing from sources such as banks or insurance companies
is relatively insignificant when compared to the amount of financing obtained
from internal sources. The use of stock issuance as a means of obtaining
financing is extremely limited in this industry. Industry spokespersons
have stated that this is thle case due to the fact that the industry is not
particularly glamorous, it is relatively high risk and there is very little
product identification. As a result, it is not easy to interest this invest-
ing public in the metalworking machinery industry.
Cyclical Behavior
The fact that most investment is financed out of retained earnings is
very important when looking at short term investment behavior. Specifically,
since the industry experiences such extreme volatility over the business
cycle, retained earnings are also subject to such instability. The following
table illustrates, for example, the net income or rate of profit in the
machine tool industry compared to that of all manufacturing industries from
1965 to 1976.
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Table 18
Net Income After Taxes
As Percent of Sales
Year Machine Tool All Other
Industry Manufacturing
Industries
As Percent of
Machine Tool
Industry
Assets
All Other
Manufacturing
Industries
6.0% 5.6%
6.5 5.6
6.4 5.0
5.6 5.1
4.3 4.8
1.5 4.0
(1.7) 4.1
(.1.1) 4.3
2.4 4.7
3.2 5.5
4.0 4.6
4.9 5.4
4.8 5.3
in parentheses indicate losses.
1978-1979 Economic Handbook of
7.7%
8.8
8.8
7.3
5.1
1.9
(1.7)
(1.2)
2.7
4.1
7.0
6.5
7.4
7.7%
7.7
6.6
6.6
6.1
4.9
5.1
5.5
6.5
7.6
6.0
7.3
7.6
the Machine Tool Industry.
It can be seen that, in recessionary periods, the income of the machine
tool industry is significantly less than that of other manufacturing indus-
tries. Only during the peak periods of the late 1960's was the income of
the machine tool industry significantly greater than that of other manufac-
turing industries. For example, in 1971, the machine tool industry experienced
a net loss of 1.7% of sales, while other manufacturing industries had income
of 4.1% of sales. It is quickly apparent that, if the metalworking machinery
industry depends upon retained earnings to finance investment expenditures,
then firms in the industry will not be able to pursue very extensive invest-
ment policies in periods of low demand unless they have accumulated a fair
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Numbers
Source:
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amount of savings when business was good.
Figures 12 and 13 present data on gross investment expenditures for
the metalworking machinery industry in the United States and the New England
region, along with data on sales and employment for the period 1958 to 1976.
Before examining these data, however, it is necessary to discuss the source
of this information. These data were obtained from the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers and the Census of Manufacturers, and represent the annual
expenditures of the industry for new capital equipment. Since these data
are for gross expenditures, they include both net new investment and expen-
ditures for replacement. Data were obtained from the Office of Economic
Growth (OEG) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics that compare gross and net
investment expenditures for the metalworking machinery industry at the
national level for the period under consideration.1 Figure 14 presents
both the gross and net capital expenditures of the industry, along with the
net stock of capital assets for the period of 1959 to 1974. This figure
shows that, although there is a large difference between gross and net
expenditures -- for example, in 1971 gross expenditures amounted to $143
million while net expenditures were minus $21 million -- the two lines follow
1 These data are based on the Annual Survey of Manufacturers figures, but
have been adjusted to take into account both the discards of worn out assets
and the decline in productivity of the assets over the service life of the
equipment.
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the same pattern. The data from the Office of Economic Growth on gross
investment were then compared to those from the Annual Survey of Manufac-
turers for both the U. S, as a whole and the New England region, and are
presented in Figure 15. It can be seen, for the U. S., that although the
gross investment reported by the Annual Survey of Manufacturers is quite a
bit larger than that calculated by the Office of Economic Growth, again
the pattern is quite similar. The purpose of this discussion is simply to
show that, while data on net investment are not available for the New England
region, the gross investment data reported in the Annual Survey of Manufac-
turers is probably representative of the relative, but not absolute, mag-
nitude of net new investment in the region.
Returning to Figures 12 and 13, and assuming that gross and net invest-
ment move in very similar patterns, it can be seen that investment in the
industry is quite cyclical, both in the New Enland region and the nation as
a whole. As discussed above, this is partially a function of the usual
means of financing new investment. Moreover, the metalworking machinery
industry is, like many of its customers, likely to follow somewhat "lumpy"
investment programs. Specifically, since much of the capital equipment
purchased by the industry is also produced by the industry (particularly
machine tools), the durability of the capital equipment accentuates the
cyclical instability of investment behavior.2 These two factors (the
dependence on retained earnings as the source of investment finance and
2Recall that, since machine tools are extremely durable, their replace-
ment can be deferred almost indefinitely in recessionary periods, but on
the business cycle upswing replacement and updating becomings essential to
satisfy greatly increased demand, especially given the greatly increased
productivity of the newer machine tools.
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the ability to defer replacement of capital equipment in recessionary periods)
combine to produce a very cyclical pattern of investment expenditures in the
metalworking machinery industry.
Ownership Status
At this point, it is interesting to ask if there are differences in
short-term investment behavior among different types of firms. Specifically,
are certain types of firms better able to pursue more long term, steady invest-
ment strategies that are not so sensitive to business cycle fluctuations.
Representatives of some firms interviewed have expressed the opinion that
corporate or conglomerate ownership of a metalworking machinery firm may
confer advantages in this regard. That is, the parent firm can supply invest-
ment financing in periods when a particular firm is experiencing short-term
net losses of income. A number of firms interviewed have said that this
has been, in fact, the case for them. Unfortunately, data are not available
with which to test the hypothesis that corporate or conglomerate ownership
of metalworking machinery firms results in more even, less cyclically
unstable investment behavior. All that can be said definitively is that
the managers of the corporate and conglomerate owned firms interviewed seem
to feel that this is the case.
Firm Size
However, there is another important factor which needs to be examined
when discussing the stability of investment expenditures over the business
cycle. This factor is firm size. It must be remembered that, on the average,
it is the largest metalworking machinery firms that are owned by corporations
or conglomerates. It is possible, then, that it is really the size of the
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firm, and not the ownership status of that firm, that permits the owner/
manager to pursue a stable investment program. For example, a small firm
in the industry may very well be unable to generate the savings needed
to finance capital improvements over downturns in the business cycle. The
larger, independent firms, on the other hand, are better able to accumulate
this cash reserve and therefore will be relatively less dependent on general
economic conditions when planning their capital expenditures. Moreover,
industry spokespersons have stated that the larger independent firms are
likely to have greater management expertise and more concern for long-range
planning than are the smaller independent companies. This difference in
management sophisitication and length of planning horizon is apt to result
in greater instability in investment expenditures among small, relative to
large (either corporate or conglomerate owned or independent) firms. For
example, the owner of one relatively large, independent, machine tool com-
pany stated that his capital expenditures remain quite constant over the
business cycle. Another very large independent firm engaged in rather sub-
stantial capital investment spending in a period when the company was exper-
iencing losses. The controller of this firm stated that the management
of the firm was being reorganized, and that, although they experienced signi-
ficant losses in the short run, the company was more concerned with the long
run growth potential of the business.
Again, it is unfortunate that data on the investment policy of firms,
by size and ownership status, are not available. Interviews with. represent-
ative firms in the region, however, appear to suggest that it is more likely
that the size of a particular firm, rather than its ownership status, enables
the firm to follow a steady investment program in the face of unstable
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product demand.
The size of the firm may have other influences on short term invest-
ment behavior. First, to the extent that borrowing is an important
source of finance, it might be expected that smaller firms would have
more difficulty obtaining funds than larger firms. Reasons for this
might include factors such as reluctance on the part of banks to deal
with the smaller firms (due to a higher perceived risk), unfamiliarity
of owners of firms with the banks and financing arrangements, and other
miscellaneous factors that might limit the access of small firms to
capital markets. 3 Among the small and medium sized firms interviewed,
however, the ability to obtain adequate outside financing was cited as
a problem only once. This firm experienced difficulty in obtaining
funds from a commercial bank five years ago due to the fact that the
firm was undercapitalized. The treasurer of this firm, however, stated
that this has not been a problem since that time. Moreover, it should
be recalled that the importance of borrowing, relative to retained
earnings, as a source of investment finance is minimal. There also
appears to be some more idiosyncratic approaches to financing among
smaller firms in this industry. One firm, for example, was advanced
money from its customers to buy the machinery necessary to start the
3See U.S. Congress, Problems of the Tool and Die Industry, 1966,
for a description of problems small metalworking machinery firms face
in financing their capital expenditures through borrowing. One factor
cited was the lack of familiarity of bankers with the metalworking
machinery industry. Spokespersons stated that banks were reluctant
to finance the machinery purchases of small firms because "of their
inability to handle the reclaimed machinery in case of default. They
knew nothing about the machinery business and did not want to get into
it." p. 61.
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business. 4 On the whole, then, it would appear that the size of firm
does not adversely affect ability to obtain external financing for capital
expenditures.
The second way in which size may affect investment practices concerns
the types of equipment that can be purchased. In the last ten years,
the complexity, sophistication, and particularly the cost of modern
machinery has increased enormously. The degree to which small firms can
utilize these technological developments is related to three issues: cost;
applicability; and accessibility. The cost of numerically controlled
machine tools is substantially greater than the cost of the more conventional
machine tools they replace. The following table shows how the average
price of complete machine tools (.the value of shipments divided by the
total number of units shipped) has grown,5 and how it compares with the
average price of numerically controlled machine tools.
Table 19
Average Costs of Machine Tools
Average Cost of Complete Average Cost of Numerically
Machine Tools Controlled Machine Tools
1960 $4,244 n.a.
1965 $5,819 n.a.
1970 $6,147 $109,942
1975 $8,583 $122,026
1977 $8,907 $116,228
Source: 1978-1979 Economic Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry
4The larger machine tool companies sometimes provide financing services
for their customers.
5
These data are in current dollars, and therefore don't control for
inflation.
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It is quite clear that numerically controlled machine tools are
very expensive, costing on the average about a quarter of a million dollars.
The question is, can a small metalworking machinery shop afford such
expensive equipment? The answer appears to be equivocal. Of the small
firms interviewed, one (nin.e employees) had just purcahsed a $125,000
computer numerically controlled EDM (electrical discharge machinery) wire
6
cutting machine, and has plans to purchase another next year. However, two
other small firms (both under ten employees) reported that they use only
conventional machine tools -- they can't afford the expensive numerical
control equipment, and they don't do any capital spending other than for
replacement and maintainence. It is difficult to draw a firm conclusion
as to whether or not small firms can afford to utilize these new techno-
logical developments. At least one small firm can and does, which would
suggest that it is feasible. Is this firm an aberration or is it typical
of other small metalworking machinery companies? The owner feels that
he is somewhat more aggressive than other small shops in the region, but
not in comparison to small firms in the Mid West. He feels that it is
indeed financially feasibly for small shops to take advantage of numerical
control technology, but that the owners of other small firms in the area
are too cautious and aren't willing to pursue aggressive investment programs.
6 The purchase of the first EDM machine is financed out of retained
earnings. The owner plans to borrow part of the cost of the second machine,
and doesn't foresee any problems obtaining this financing from a local bank.
He attributes this cautiousness to what he calls "an Old Yankee mental-
ity," and says that small firms in the Mid West and West aren't afflicted with
this shortcoming.
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The applicability of and accessibility to numerical control technology
by small firms is also of interest. Small firms in the metalworking
machinery industry tend to do low volume and often very customized work.
In the earlier stages of numerical control development, the technology was
really only economically justified for very large volume jobs, and was there-
fore not applicable to the work of smaller (and many larger) shops. However,
in recent years, and particularly with the development of computer numerical
control (CNC) rather than tape numerical control (TNC), this has changed .
to some degree. As discussed in the history of technology in metalworking
machinery (Chapter 2), CNC is much more flexible than TNC and more readily
applicable to small volume work. Therefore, although it hasn't been the
case in the past, it does appear that numerical control technology is becom-
9
ing more relevant to the operations of small, low volume shops. And finally,
the issue of accessibility of small shops to the new technology arises.
This discussion is similar to that concerning applicability. Specifically,
in the early days of numerical control, the complexity of the soft-ware asso-
ciated with its use was overwhelming.10 Again, however, in more recent years
8
It has been said that over 70% of all metalworking jobs are small
volume jobs. U. S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Special Investigations
of Small Business Problems, Hearings on Problems of the Tool and Die Industry,
1966, p. 60.
9Recall that, as discussed in Chapter 2, numerical control technology is
by no means applicable to all jobs, of either large or small firms.
1 0 Please see David Noble for a discussion of why small firms couldn't
easily get into using numerical control because of complicated program-
ming requirements.
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the soft-ware has become less complicated, and the newer machines can be
utilized by persons having relatively minimal training in computer program-
ming.
This discussion of firm size and investment policy began by examining
the stability of investment expenditures over business cycle fluctuations
and continued by looking at the ability of small firms to invest in modern
equipment. While it appears that there are some reasons to believe that
larger or corporate/conglomerate owned firms may be in a better position
to follow stable investment programs, there does not seem to be any major
constraints on the ability of smaller firms to purchase modern equipment.
Data from the 1 2 th/ American Machinist Inventory of Metalworking Equipment
1976-1978 strongly support this notion, as the following table shows.
Table 20
Age of Machine Tools Owned by Firm Size
Firms w/20- Firms w/50- Firms w/100 or more
49 employees 99 employees employees
Total Units 306,593 234,002 1,197,687
Percentage 0-4 years
old 12% 12% 10%
Percentage 5-9 years
old 25% 25% 19%
Percentage 10-19 years
old 36% 38% 34%
Percentage over 20 years
old 27% 25% 37%
Percentage of units
that are numerically
controlled 1.3% 1.8% 2.7%
Source: 1 2 th/ American Machinist Inventory of Metalworking Equipment 1976-
1978.
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Before interpreting these figures, it should be noted that they represent
the age of machine tools in all industries. That is, they include machine
tools in automotive, appliance, construction machinery firms, etc. Moreover,
they do not include firms with less than 20 employees due to data problems
with that subsample.
However, to the extent that these figures are representative of firms,
by size class, in the metalworking machinery industry, the numbers are very
interesting. First, as would be expected given the considerations raised
above (cost, applicability and accessibility), the percentage of numerically
controlled machines is much lower in the smaller plants. However, the smaller
and medium sized firms have both a greater percentage of new machine tools,
and a much smaller percentage of old machine tools than do the larger firms.
These data suggest that the two small firms interviewed that did no updating
of their capital stock are not typical of other small and medium sized firms.
Rather, the smaller firms in this sample appear to be keeping up with larger
firms in purchasing new equipment and are probably ahead of the larger
firms in retiring older, less productive equipment. These figures appear to
support the hypothesis that, at least in terms of the purchase of convention-
al machine tools, smaller and medium sized firms do at least as much updating
of capital stock as do larger firms.
The question of whether or not small firms pursue less steady investment
programs, however, is not addressed by these data. It is interesting to note
that the survey from which these data were obtained was performed in 1978, an
expansionary period for the metalworking machinery industry. If smaller
firms are more likely to purchase new capital equipment only in periods when
business is quite good, then these figures are reasonable. The smaller
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firms will have been purchasing new machinery and getting rid of older,
less productive machinery on this upswing, and so it is natural that the age
of the capital stock in these firms is relatively new. Presumably, in a
recessionary period, such as that experienced from 1969 to 1971 or 1974 to
1976, the age of the capital stock would be older. Unfortunately, data are
11
not available with which t6 investigate this question.
Labor
The next factor to be examined as an influence on short term investment
behavior is labor. Specifically, the availability of labor is hypothesized
to have an important effect on both the type and level of investment under-
taken by metalworking machinery firms. As discussed in some detail in Chap-
ter Three, the industry is experiencing severe shortages of skilled labor,
both in the New England region and in the nation as a whole. One response
to this labor shortage might be to purchase more capital intensive, labor
saving equipment. It has been noted that, over the history of this industry,
the trends in technological development have been in the direction of build-
ing the skills of the machinists into the machine itself and thereby decreas-
ing the skill requirements of workers in the industry. It is very difficult,
however, to quantitatively prove that the metalworking machinery industry
has become more capital intensive over time due to the paucity of capital
stock data available. Qualitatively, this assertion would seem to be true.
11
For example, the last American Machinist Inventory was taken in
1973, another expansionary period for the industry and again, the smaller
firms had more newer and less older machine tools in their capital stock.
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The representative of most firms interviewed seemed to feel that this was,
in fact, the case. Trade journals advertise the newer, more sophisticated
and labor-saving machinery extensively as a way to decrease the labor and
skill requirements of production. The 1 2 th/ American Machinists Inventory
12
of Metalworking Equipment 1976-1978 states that the productivity of
machine tools has increased dramatically over the last 20 years. The 12_
American Machinists Inventory of Metalworking Equipment 1976-1978 index of
productivity increased by approximately 70% from 1945 to 1960; by approximate-
ly 110% from 1960 to 1975; and for the 20 year period of 1958 to 1978, the
index increased by about 145%. These figures, however, refer to the product-
ivity of machine tools in all users industries.
In order to see if the metalworking machinery industry itself has be-
come more capital intensive, the data from Office of Economic Growth were
examined. Recall that this source contains data on both gross and net in-
vestment expenditures, and net capital stock for the industry at the national
level. (See Figure 14). It is hypothesized that, if the industry has
become more capital intensive, the net value of capital stock per production
worker will increase. Data on the value of capital stock per production
worker for the period 1958 to 1974 are presented below.
12
Productivity is measured by the output of and number of machine tools
in user industries.
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Table 21
Net Value of Capital Stock per Production Worker
(1972 dollars)
Year Net Stock/Production Worker
1974 $ 9,446
1973 9,816
1972 10,866
1971 11,069
1970 9,476
1969 8,635
1968 8.463
1967 7,572
1966 7,080
1965 7,102
1964 7,359
1963 7,496
1962 n.a.
1961 7,787
1960 7,481
1959 7,779
1958 8,296
n.a.: not available.
Source: Office of Economic Growth, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The net value of capital stock per production worker has varied considerably
over the business cycle. As would be expected, the value is greater in down-
turns (where there. are less workers) such as 1971, and relatively low in
peak periods (where the work force is enlarged) such as 1957 and 1974.
It is interesting to note, however, that, over this period, the value of
stock per production worker does not really appear to have increased dramatic-
ally. In fact, on average over this period, the value of net capital stock
13
per production worker increased only about $200 per year.
13
A bivariate regression of value of stock per production worker
against time produced a regression coefficient of 199.
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The figures presented in Table 21 do not appear to strongly support
an hypothesis of increasing capital intensity in the metalworking machinery
industry. However, this is not a definitive answer to this question of
capital intensity. It should be recognized that the quality of the data
on capital stocks may be suspect. It is very difficult to obtain accurate
data in this area, and the Office of Economic Growth developed a capital
stocks model to derive these figures. This model may contain various spec-
ification errors and moreover, some assumptions made in developing the model
14
are questionable. Therefore, it is possible that these figures are in-
accurate.
In conclusion, it is difficult to document how the labor shortage has
affected the type of equipment purchased by metalworking machinery firms.
On the one hand, firm representatives interviewed have usually stated that
they are taking advantage of more automated machinery as a means of dealing
with the shortage of skilled labor. However, they have also stated that
much of their work is.not amenable to automatic or numerically controlled
machinery. Unlike other metalworking industries, the work done by metalwork-
ing machinery firms is more likely to be specialized or prototypical and
14
For example, 1958 and 1963 capital investment flow matrices were used
to derive the investment "bundles" of particular industries. These bundles
are assumed to remain constant over time. Additionally, the replacement
and decay functions derived in the model contain unrealistic assumptions,
such as assuming the service life of certain assets are the same in all
industries, that the asset does not depreciate over its service life, etc.
This is not intended as a criticism of the Office of Economic Growth model.
The model attempts to deal with difficult data problems by making the most
realistic assumptions possible. This discussion of the capital stock model
is only intended to point up problems associated with using the data from
the model and to emphasize the fact that these data may be biased or in-
correct and should be interpreted with caution.
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therefore less conducive to automation. For example, comparing the purchases
of numerically controlled machinery across different industries, it can be
seen below that the metalworking machinery industry is relatively less ad-
vanced than other industries.
Table 22
Percentage of New Machine Tool Purchases that are for Numerically
Controlled Machine Tools
Purchasing Industry Metal Cutting Metal forming
Machine Tools Machine Tools
Metalworking machinery (SIC -354) 8.1% .3%
Railroad equipment (SIC 374) 10.1% 2.4%
Construction and mining machinery (SIC 353) 15.3% 3.0%
Ordnance and accessories (SIC 348) 15.5% 1.2%
Guided missles, space vehicles (SIC 376) 18.0% 2.7%
Aircraft and parts (SIC 372) 23.4% 2.2%
Scurce: 12 th/ American Machinist Inventory of Metalworking Equipment 1976-
1978.
To some extent, the metalworking machinery industry is limited by the nature
of its production processes from utilizing more capital intensive equipment.
The data on the value of stock per production worker also suggest that,
while the newer and more automatic machinery generates a lot of attention
among firms in this industry, the degree to which it has been used to sub-
stitute capital for labor does not appear to be substantial.
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Another way in which the limited availability of labor has affected
investment has been suggested by some industry spokespersons. Specifically,
it has been stated that, contrary to conventional micro-economic theory,
firms do not treat labor as a variable cost. Fearing that workers who are
laid off are lost forever as a source of new labor, the owners/managers of
metalworking machinery firms do not lay off workers in downturns, thereby
effectively treating labor as a fixed cost. This issue has been discussed
in detail in Chapter Three. Recall that the data on the value of shipments
per production worker (.see Figures 10 and 11 in Chapter 3) over recent busi-
ness cycles support the contention that firms have become more reluctant
to lay off workers in recessions.15 It is this combination of cyclical
instability and severe scarcity of skilled labor that has induced firms
to treat labor costs as fixed. The argument continues, moreover, that
since labor is a fixed cost that is underutilized in recessions, firms are
afraid to overextend themselves in terms of capital investment. The firm
is forced to pay for one underutilized factor of production in periods of
low demand, and it simply cannot afford to pay the cost of also having idle
capital at the same time. Therefore, it is claimed that this scarcity of
labor has resulted in underinvestment in the industry as a whole.
While this is certainly a very interesting argument, it is quite dif-
ficult to document empirically. It is probably impossible to determine
whether or not the American metalworking machinery industry is undercapitalized,
15
Also recall that the data from the LEED file (see Tables 15 and 16
in Chapter 3) suggest that management's fears are unfounded.
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particularly as a result of labor shortages. It is infeasible to try to
compare investment behavior in the metalworking machinery industry with
that of other industries which do not experience such cyclical volatility
or extreme labor shortages, since there are such enormous differences in
production processes across industries. It might be interesting to compare
the metalworking machinery industry in the U. S. to that in other countries
(again with less severe instability and/or labor scarcity problems) but
again the comparison is complicated by many exogenous factors (i.e., dif-
ferences in depreciation laws, different levels of government support for
capital investment, etc.) . Therefore, while the argument that the combina-
tion of cyclical instability and labor shortages has resulted in underinvest-
ment in the metalworking machinery industry appears plausible, it is beyond
the scope of this study to do more than present the discussion as an inter-
esting idea.
Government
Governemnt policies have influenced short run investment behavior in the
metalworking machinery industry. These influences can be categorized as
either direct or indirect. The direct influences include those that have
an immediate effect on a metalworking machinery firm's investment decisions.
The indirect influences include various government policies that affect the
metalworking machinery industry's customers, and thereby the industry itself.
While it could be argued that these latter policies really influence the
demand for metalworking machinery, in some cases this demand actually
changes the way in which the metalworking machinery industry makes investment
decisions.
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Government policies that directly influence investment behavior are
investment tax credit and depreciation allowance laws. Some firms inter-
viewed felt that more liberalized depreciation and investment tax credits
were extremely important in enabling them to engage in capital investment,
while others stated that these regulations had not significantly influenced
their decision-making. Ali firms, however, were very much in support of
16
any further liberalization of these laws. The industry has also complain-
ed that depreciation laws are much more liberal in other countries, and that
this has resulted in a rather undercapitalized metalworking machinery industry
in the U. S. relative to its major competitors. The following data gives
some, but not overwhelming, support to this contention, although not with
respect to West Germany and France.
Table 23
Cost Recovery Allowable for Tax Purposes on Machinery and Equipment
(% of original cost)
First Year Third Year Seventh Year
U. S. 41.1% 70.8% 103.0%
U. K. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Japan 61.9% 82.0% 102.7%
West Germany 25.0% 57.8% 86.7%
France 31.3% 67.5% 94.9%
Source: 1978-1979 Economic Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry.
16
It should be rememberd that this support may be due to the fact that
a liberalization of depreication laws, for example, would stimulate demand
for the output of the metalworking machinery industry substantially, rather
than due to the fact that it would enable these firms to engage in greater
investment activity in their own plants.
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The extent to which the U. S. metalworking machinery industry is under-
capitalized and hence less competitive with the world industry is not known
(although the data in Table 8, Chapter 3, suggest that the capital stock in
the U. S. is quite older than in other countries) .
Another government policy that directly affects investment is the pro-
vision of Small Business Association financing to the industry. There was
some interest in this in the late 1960's,17 although no firm interviewed
mentioned the Small Business Association as a source of financial capital.
This is not surprising given the fact, discussed previously, that most firms
finance investment out of retained earnings and usually do not borrow.
A final government policy that is seen as directly influencing the
character of investment is product liability legislation. This has become
an extremely important issue to the industry in the last few years, and is
the object of some very intense lobbying efforts on the part of the metal-
working machinery industry. What has happened is that the builders of machine
tools have been held liable for injuries of workers using the machine. In-
dustry complaints center on the unlimited liability born by the machine
tool builder1 8 and the fact that the costs of product liability insurance
17See U. S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Special Investigations of
Small Business Problems, Hearings on Problems of the Tool and Die Industry,
1966.
18
The builder is liable even if the fault lies with the owner of the
plant in which the machinery was being used. That is, the owner may have
removed a protective guard, or may be running a shop that is very unsafe,
but the liability for injury is born by the original builder of the equip-
ment. See American Machine Tool Distributors, A State Legislator's Guide
to Product Liability Problems, Washington, D. C., 1977.
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have skyrocketed in recent years.19 This issue of escalating product lia-
bility insurance costs may be influencing the character of investment in the
following way. Firms are very anxious to be able to "prove" that their pro-
duct was not defective leaving the factory door. This appears to have
spurred demand for automated product inspection equipment. Some equipment
is advertised as being abl6 to reduce the risk of human error associated
with manual or visual inspection techniques. The new equipment, through
the use of advanced technologies like lasers, can determine if the work is
accurately dimensioned, constructed, etc. Moreover, the equipment can pro-
duce computer printouts detailing the quality of the work, and this material
would presumably be very useful in proving innocence in court. While many
of the firms interviewed have not yet begun to explore these new product
inspection techniques, other firms (and trade journals) seem to feel that
this is an important development and will become more widespread, particularly
in the face of increasing insurance costs.
The government indirectly influences short term investment behavior in
the metalworking machinery industry in two ways. First, various government
policies and/or regulations may stimulate demand for the products of the
metalworking machinery industry. Specifically, policies such as the invest-
ment tax credit or the liberalization of depreciation allowances influences
the industry in that they stimulate demand for investment goods in general,
and metalworking machinery in particular. Moreover, government defense
1 9 Firms interviewed, even those who had had no claim against them, re-
ported increases of greater than 1000% in their product liability insurance
premiums.
- 144 -
expenditures also stimulate the demand for metalworking machinery. Govern-
ment contracts for airplanes or armaments, for example, necessitate the
purchase, on the part of the prime contractors, of machine tools, tools and
dies, etc. In some cases, the government itself purchases the machine tools
(when the prime contractor does not have the types of machinery required and
is unwilling and/or unable -to purchase them on its own)20 and places the
21
machinery in the plant of the prime contractor. This increased demand
20
"The justification for the Government providing such equipment is
supposedly that the capacity to do this work is not otherwise available and
that the prime contractors are not able to purchase this expensive equipment
for what might be short-term use on Government contracts." U. S. Congress,
House Subcommittee on Special Small Business Problems of the Select Committee
on Small Business, Problems Facing the Tool and Die Industry: Hearings on
H. Res. 66, 91st Congress, 1st session, June 3 and 4 and July 5, 1969, p. 9.
21
Some concern has been expressed, on the part of smaller firms in the
metalworking machinery industry, that this practice of placing machine tools
in the hands of prime contractors is detrimental to the industry (Ibid.).
Specifically, it has been alleged that the prime contractors use these govern-
ment owned machines on commercial contracts (there is an arrangement whereby
the prime pays a "rent" to the federal government for the amount of time the
machine is used for commercial purposes, but the extent to which this arrange-
ment is enforced, and the reasonableness of the rental schedules, are not
clear -- again, see Ibid.). They are thereby able to get more business be-
cause they don't have to pay the cost of machine purchase and can therefore
bid less than a smaller firm for a comparable job. Moreover, it has been
alleged that prime contractors with government owned machine tools in their
plants have a competitive advantage in bidding for other government contracts,
relative to firms who are not prime contractors, again, because they either
are not paying the full purchase cost of the machine, or because the machine
performs specialized functions and the other firms cannot afford to purchase
the machinery necessary to perform similar work. Therefore, the extent to
which the practice of the federal government purchasing machine tools to
place in the plants of prime contractors actually benefits firms in the
metalworking machinery industry is questionable. The 12th American Machinist
Inventory of Metalworking Equipment, 1976-1978 finds that there are approxi-
mately 28,000 machine tools owned by the Department of Defense and located
in the plants of contractors (no estimate is made of the value of these mach-
ine tools, but it is probably reasonable to assume that these machines are
relatively sophisticated - such as numerically controlled machine tools in
the plants of contractors in the aerospace industry).
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generates the need, within the metalworking machinery industry, for increased
productive capacity, and hence greater capital investment.
The second way in which government policies, and particularly regulatory
policies, influence investment behavior in the metalworking machinery is
rather interesting. In recent years, the federal government (and some
state governments) have instituted a number of laws regulating, for instance,
safety in the work place, the level of pollution that industries can emit,
the level of gas mileage required on new cars, etc. All of these regulations
require some capital investment on the part of the regulated industries.
Utilities must install air scrubbers to cut down on the level of pollution
emitted from their smokestacks, factories must update their machinery to
get rid of equipment that may be unsafe to operate, automobile companies
must design new models that are more fuel efficient, etc. While industry
in general usually resents. this type of government intrusion in the "free
market," the metalworking machinery industry, and to some extent many other
capital goods producing industries, are in a somewhat different position.
The representatives of most of the firms interviewed expressed some resent-
ment of government encroachment in their domain, the pervasive influence of
"big brother" in our society. 2 2 However, these firms may in fact be benefit-
ting from this "excessive regulation." Specifically, most of these government
regulations require investment in newer, safer, less polluting, etc., capital
equipment, and to a greater or lesser degree, the demand for metalworking
machinery is thereby stimulated.
22
There is one exception to this statement. All metalworking machinery
industry firms interviewed expressed the opinion that they were in favor of
recent Occupational Health and Safety (OSHA) regulations, although a few firms
felt that either the timetables for compliance were unreasonable, or that the
regulations were to some extent picky.
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These regulations are interesting, not only because they may stimulate
the demand for metalworking machinery, but also because they may affect the
character of that demand. That is, when an industry is forced to comply
with a particular regulation, it is usually given a certain amount of
time to demonstrate compliance. For example, the automotive industry has
been given between about five and ten years (depending upon how successful
the automotive lobby is in Congress) to meet federal miles per gallon stand-
ards on new cars. Similarly, there are timetables for compliance with
Environmental Protection Agency and Occupational Health and Safety Admini-
stration standards. This is extremely important for the metalworking machinery
industry. The regulated industries know when they have to meet a particular
standard, and can plan the necessary conversion of their capital stock well
in advance. In turn, the metalworking machinery industry, with orders placed
up to five to eight years ahead, is no longer facing the uncertain, unstable
product demand picture to which it is accustomed. This reduces the risk
associated with investment in the metalworking machinery industry, and there-
fore enables firms in the industry to pursue more long term, steadier, invest-
ment programs. Representatives of a few firms in the interview sample have
stated that the retooling going on in Detroit associated with the construc-
tion of smaller, more fuel efficient cars has given them a much less uncer-
tain picture of their future business. They say that they now have enough
orders to keep them busy through 1985. These firms have also stated that
they are much better able to plan their capital investment needs for the
future.
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Long Term Investment Behavior
As mentioned breifly above, long term investment decisions concern such
management decisions as: do we expand, do we contract, should we move to
another location, either in the New England region or elsewhere, should
we close down altogether? It is very difficult to really address these
questions, either with published data or with information gathered in the
interviews. Therefore, the discussion of long term investment behavior
will be somewhat more tentative than that concerning short term behavior.
Factors will be examined which do have an influence on these types of
decisions, but only in a rather speculative manner. The factors to be
discussed are of particular interest insofar as they influence the compe-
titive position of the New England region as an attractive site for future
continued or expanded investment activity in the metalworking machinery
industry. Therefore, where applicable and possible, an attempt will be made
to compare the interregional and/or international differences in the factors
under consideration.
Labor Situation
It has been made clear earlier that the metalworking machinery industry
is, in general, experiencing a significant shortage of skilled labor. This
shortage has influenced the long run investment behavior of almost every
firm in the interview sample. Specifically, the owners and managers of these
firms have stated that they would really like to expand their physical
capacity, if only there were enough employees available to work in these
plants. The labor shortage, then, has acted as a constraint on the expan-
sionary plans of the firms interviewed. It is important to recognize that
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this labor shortage does not appear to be adversely affecting the potential
for expansion in the New England region vis a vis other areas of the country.
Industry spokespersons have stated that the same problem exists and probably
of a more severe nature in the other industrialized areas of the country.
Moreover, most firms didn't feel that, for example, the Sunbelt region re-
presents a superior location for expansion in terms of labor availability.
While wages may be somewhat less, most owners and managers felt that the
skill levels of the work force in that region are not up to par with those
of New England workers. This same feeling appears to extend to prospects
of expanding the industry internationally.23 Again, it is felt that skill
levels in places such as Southeast Asia or South America are suitable only
for the production of relatively unsophisiticated, lower tolerance work
(of course with the notable exception of Japan).
However, this is not a static phenomenon. After World War II, Japan
produced only rather "simple-minded" machine tools, where the required skills
were minimal. Today, however, the Japanese machine tool industry is recogn-
ized to be on equal terms with the American industry, in terms of the qual-
ity and sophistication of its products (and by implication, the skills of
its work force). Therefore, although at the present time other areas are
not suitable locations for the industry due to an inadequate supply of skilled
labor, there is no reason to believe that this will always be the case.
A contributing factor here concerns the "deskilling" of occupations in the
metalworking machinery industry. It has already been noted that, although
23
A more detailed description of foreign investment by American machine
tool builders is presented below.
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the metalworking machinery industry is probably less amenable to automation
and mass production technology, it is true that the use of numerically
controlled machine tools does result in the need for less skilled machinists
and machine operators. It takes much less time and energy to train a
qualified button pusher than it does a tool and die maker or machinist.
Therefore, it is possible that, in the future, the metalworking machinery
industry may become less tied to its present locations in industrialized
areas (where a large, albeit insufficient, pool of skilled labor resides) as
the skill levels required in production diminish or change. 2 4  It must be
pointed out, again, that these changes in labor requirements have not
really been substantial up till now, and it is necessary to recall that it
is very unlikely that all of the metalworking machinery industry has the
potential to become relatively deskilled.
A second factor concerning the labor situation that is often mentioned
in discussions of industrial location/relocation is the extent of unioniza-
tion and the militancy of the labor force. It is generally assumed that the
more extensive the unionization or the greater the militancy, the less desir-
able is a particular location for economic development. As mentioned earlier,
about 40% of the production workers in the metalworking machinery industry
are unionized (the unions include, but are not limited to, the International
Association of Machinists (IAM), the United Auto Workers (UAW), the United
24
It should be noted that required skills are changing with technology.
Demand is particularly high for engineers, computer programmers and operators,
and electricians. To the extent that the amenities of the New England region
continue to be attractive to these labor groups, the region is probably in
a better position in the long run, compared, for example, to some industrial-
ized areas in the Mid West.
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Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), and the United
Steel Workers of America). Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain
regional breakdowns on the extent of unionization in the metalworking
machinery industry. However, with the exception of one firm, the unioniza-
tion and/or militancy of the work force was not cited as a problem in the
New England region. It may, in fact, represent a competitive advantage
for firms in this region relative to other major concentrations of the
industry. That is, it is probably reasonable to assume (and representatives
of a number of firms interviewed suggested) that the metalworking machinery
industry is less unionized in New England than in its major center - the
Mid West. Certainly, the hourly wages of production workers in New
England region are, and have been, lower than the national average, as the
following table documents.
Table 24
Wages per Hour of Production Workers
Metalworking Machinery Industry
(Current Dollars)
Year New England United States
1976 $5.77 $6.22
1975 5.41 5.72
1974 5.08 5.29
1973 4.70 4.93
1972 4.38 4.65
1971 4.09 4.38
1970 3.98 4.21
1969 3.72 4.21
1968 n.a. 3.76
1967 3.35 3.54
1966 3.13 3.35
1965 2.93 3.21
1964 2.96 3.13
1963 n.a. 3.08
1962 2.66 3.08
1961 2.56 2.83
1960 2.54 2.82
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n. a.: not available
)Data for New England after 1972 are weighted averages of hourly wages in
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont and Rhode Island since data were not
available for New Hampshire and Maine after 1972.
Source: Annual Survey of Manufacturers and Census of Manufacturers.
Therefore, the issues of relative degree of unionization and the relative
wages paid to production workers would seem to suggest that the New England
region is not at a disadvantage, and may in fact be in an advantageous
position, as a site for capital investment in the metalworking machinery
industry.
Firm Size
The long term investment behavior of firms, by size class, is of interest
insofar as different sized firms are more or less likely to expand, contract,
or go out of business entirely. This issue will be examined with respect to
business cycle fluctuations. It is hypothesized that the larger firms in
the industry are better able to withstand business cycle fluctuations, while
smaller firms are more likely to be "shaken out" in periods of low demand.
Over a series of cycles, presumably, the larger firms will be able to capture
a greater share of the market, resulting in greater concentration in the
industry as a whole. At the national level, concentration ratios for the
seven four-digit SIC components of metalworking machinery were examined to
determine if these industries have become more concentrated over the last
twenty years. While SICs 3541, 3544 and 3545 have become slightly more con-
centrated in this period, SIC 3542 has become noticeably less concentrated.
Unfortunately, data are not available to determine whether SICs 3546, 3547
or 3549 are more or less concentrated, since prior to 1972, these SICs were
SIC 3541 -
1972
1963
1958
SIC 3542 -
1972
1963
SIC 3544 -
1972
1963
SIC 3545 -
1972
1963
SIC 3546 -
1972
SIC 3547 -
1972
SIC 3549 -
1972
SIC 3548 -
1963
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Table 25
Concentration Ratios - United States
Percentage of Value of Shipments Accounted for by:
4 largest 8 largest 20 largest 50 largest Total Number
companies companies companies companies of Companies
Metal cutting machine tools
22% 33% 55% 75% 857
20 32 52 74 784
21 32 52 74 608
Metal forming machine tools
18 33 54 75 375
22 39 61 80 362
Special tools and dies, jigs, fixtures and molds
7 10 14 21 6513
6 9 14 21 5850
Machine tool accessories
19 30 47 63 1113
17 29 46 63 983
Power driven hand tools
48 70 93 99 71
Rolling mill machinery
69 88 96 100 40
Metalworking machinery,
15 27
Consisted of SICs 3546,
25 40
not elsewhere
50
3547, 3549 in
64
classified
72 384
earlier census years
85 420
Source: Census of Manufactures, 1972.
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combined into one category, SIC 3548. These figures suggest that, not only
is the metalworking machinery industry as a whole not extremely concentrated,
but also that the industry does not appear to be moving toward greater con-
centration. Concentration data are not available at the regional level,
and, if available, it is likely that New England would be even less con-
centrated than the nation as a whole, since most of the really large machine
tool and tool and die companies are located in the lid West.
While these data do not support the contention of increased concentra-
tion, they really do not address the issue of the survival of small versus
large firms over the business cycle. The distribution of firms by size class
may be becoming more skewed towards larger firms over time, or this pattern
may show up to a greater degree in recessionary relative to peak periods.
These phenomena would not necessarily be apparent in the concentration data,
for selected years, presented above. Two data sources were utilized in
order to investigate this question of survival. First, information on the
number of firms, by size class, was obtained from the County Business Pat-
terns for the period 1959 to 1976. These data were examined in order to
determine if, in fact, the distribution of firms by size class had changed
in the last twenty years, and if the distibution varied with changes in the
business cycle.
A series of cross-section regressions of the following form were per-
formed on the distribution of firms, by size class, for each year in the
period 1959 to 1976 for the New England region.
X a + Y + c
where: X = the log of the number of firms in each size class; and
Y = 1-6, depending on size class.
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1 = less than 20 employees,
2 = 20-49 employees,
3 = 50-99 employees,
4 = 100-249 employees,
5 = 250-499 employees, and
6 = more than 500 employees.
The smaller the coefficient of the equation ( ), the steeper the slope of
the line (the coefficient is always negative), and hence the greater impor-
tance of smaller, relative to larger firms. Conversely, the larger the co-
efficient, the flatter the line and hence the relatively greater importance
of larger sized firms. The value of the coefficient in 1958 (a recessionary
year) is -1.212; the value of the coefficient in 1976 (also a recessionary
year) is -1.076. The shape of the distribution, then has flattened over
this period, implying a relatively greater share of larger versus smaller
firms. It must be kept in mind that this is not the same thing as concentra-
tion. Larger and medium sized firms may have become more important, but this
does not mean that only a few large firms have gained an increasing share of
the market.
A comparison of this slope over recent business cycle peaks and troughs
is also of interest. The figures shown in Table 26 would appear to support
the hypothesis that the larger firms (or the right hand side of the distri-
bution) are probably more successful in weathering the ups and downs of re-
cent business cycles.
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Table 26
Changes in the Distribution of Firms by
Size Class over Business Cycles
New England
1967 peak year b = -1.180
1971 trough year b = -1.134
1974 peak year b = -1.143
1976 trough year b = -1.076
Source: County Business Patterns, 1959-1976.
While the differences among the beta coefficients may not be statistically
significant, it is quite interesting to note that the slope flattened from
the peak to trough in both cases, and, in the only example of trough to
peak movement, the slope then steepened (but not to its previous high).
Dun and Bradstreet data were then obtained to further examine this
question. Table 27 presents data on the net change in the number of metal-
25
working machinery establishments in New England for three time periods.
It is clear that smaller firms experience greater losses in the number of
establishments over recessionary periods than do larger ones. For example,
from 1969 to 1972, there was a 6.9% decrease in the number of firms with
less than 20 employees, but only a 3.0% decrease in the number of firms
25
These periods roughly correspond to recent cyclical fluctuations:
1969 to 1972 compare with the metalworking machinery downturn of 1967 to
1971; 1972 to 1974 compares with the upswing of 1971 to 1974; and 1974 to
1976 exactly corresponds to the most recent downturn in the metalworking
machinery industry in New England.
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Table 27
Components of Change in the Number of Firms by Size Class
New England
Net Change Due to
Size of firm
(# of employ-
ees)
1969-1972
less than
20 employees
21-100 employees
greater than
100 employees
Total
Total Number
of Firms at
Beginning of
the Period 1
1,018
254
67
1,339
Net Change in
Number of Firms
Number %_
Openings of
New Firms
-70 -6.9% 11.5%
-23 -9.1% 5.5%
- 2 -3.0% 10.4%
-95 -7.1% 10.3%
Closings of
Existing Firms
-18. 3%
-15.0%
-13.4%
-17.4%
1972-1974
less than
20 employees
21-100 employees
greater than
100 employees
Total
1972-1974
less than
20 employees
21-100 employees
greater than
100 employees
Total
1,047
217
-16 -1.5% 7.4%
- 8 -3.7% 4.1%
- 1 -1.7% 10.3%
-25 -1.9% 7.0%
58
1,322
1,088
238
-75 -6.9% 5.5%
-14 -5.9% 1.7%
- 2 -3.1% 4.7%
-91 - 6.5% 4.7%
64
1,390
1These data represent three
ments, for example, for the
establishments in 1969 plus
- 8.8%
- 7.8%
-13.8%
- 8.9%
-12.3%
- 7.6%
- 7.8%
-11.3%
different samples, hence the number of establish-
base year 1972, is not equal to the number of
the net change from 1969 to 1972.
Source: Dun and Bradstreet data prepared by David Birch, M. I. T.
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with more than 100 employees. The relationship is almost exactly the same
in the 1974 to 1976 downturn. It is interesting to note that the number of
firms decreased even in the expansionary period of 1972 to 1974, particularly
among firms with between 21 and 100 employees.26 The loss in the number of
firms in this period was approximately the same for both the smaller and
larger sized establishments.
Although there appears to be a higher mortality rate among the smaller
and medium sized firms in the industry in New England during recessionary
periods, this is not to say that employment in the larger establishments is
any more stable in recessionary periods. Table 28 presents information on
employment changes by size class of establishments. In the 1969 to 1972
downturn, particularly, the larger and medium sized firms experienced a much
26
A possible explanation for this occurrence is that, if it is at all
possible, firms would much prefer to liquidate their assets on a business
cycle upswing. At the start of an upturn, prices for capital equipment tend
to be much higher. Consuming industries are demanding new machinery, and the
metalworking machinery industry itself needs to expand it capacity in order
to satisfy this increased demand. Coupled with this is the fact that the
lead time on new machinery tends to be long, particularly in expansionary
periods. Therefore, the market for used machinery is very strong on the
upswing. The metalworking machinery firm that has to go out of business,
then, will try to remain open (even if business is extremely poor) until
the upswing, when it can obtain top prices when liquidating its capital
stock. This explanation appears to be reasonable, given the data on closings
in the 1972 to 1974 period. Specifically, there is a greater incidence of
closings among the larger firms in this expansionary period. Presumably, these
larger firms have a greater ability to remain in business during the period
of low demand in order to liquidate in a period when the price of used
capital equipment is substantially greater.
Table 28
Components of Employment Change by Size Class of Firm
New England
Net Employment Change Due to
Size of firm
(# of
employees)
Total Employment
of Beginning of
Period 1
Net Change in
Employment
Openings of
New Firms
Closings of
Existing
Firms
Expansion of
Existing
Firms
Contraction of
Existing Firms
1969-1972
less than
20 employees
21-100 employees
greater than
100 employees
Total
1972-1974
less than
20 employees
21-100 employees
greater than
100 employees
Total
1974-1976
less than
20 employees
7,052
11,072
31,724
49,848
7,059
9,518
23,915
40,492
7,514
21-100 employees 10,548
greater than
100 employees 27,100
Total 45,172
1
See note 1, Table 27.
Source: Dun and Bradstreet data prepared by David Birch, M. I. T.
- 5.7%
-16.7%
-22.6%
-18.9%
9.0%
5.1%
9.6%
8.5%
-16.7%
-14.1%
- 7.6%
-16.2%
14.4%
4.3%
1.7%
4.1%
-12.5%
-12.3%
-17.2%
-15.4%
11.8%
3.2%
4.0%
5.2%
u,
5.7%
4.2%
8.8%
7.1%
2.9%
1.4%
5.2%
3.9%
- 7.6%
- 8.2%
-14.8%
-12.0%
- 9.0%
- 8.0%
- 3.5%
- 5.4%
19.9%
11.8%
8.6%
11.3%
12.9%
5.6%
3.6%
4.3%
- 1.5%
- 9.7%
- 7.9%
- 7.3%
- 6.1%
- 4.7%
- 0.6%
- 2.6%
- 8.6%
- 8.7%
-11.1%
-10.1
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greater loss of employment than did the smaller ones. Moreover, smaller
firms experienced much greater employment growth in the subsequent upturn
of 1972 to 1974. The major source of this growth was through the expansion
of existing firms, rather than through the openings of new firms. This
finding is interesting in that it is often assumed that, in expansionary
periods in this industry, a large number of small firms enter the industry.
However, these data show that, in fact, there was a net loss in the number
of small firms (and also medium and large firms) in this recent growth
period.
Another interesting difference between small and large establishments
can be seen in this data. Both small and large firms experienced large
employment losses in the two recessionary periods under consideration (al-
though the larger firms had much greater losses). However, the sources of
this employment loss is very different between the two size classes). In
the 1969 to 1972 recession, small firms experienced an employment loss of
about 17% due to the closings of existing firms, while small firms exper-
ienced a net growth in employment of about 2% due to the expansion of exist-
ing firms (14.4% expansion - 12.5% contraction). In this same period, large
firms experienced an employment loss of about 8% due to the closings of
existing firms, while the employment loss due to the net contraction of
existing firms was over 15% (1.7% expansion - 17.2% contraction). The dif-
ferences are even more striking in the 1974 to 1976 recession. Here, small
firms lost about 9% of their employment due to closings of existing firms,
but gained about 4% of their employment as a result of net expansions (12.9%
expansions - 8.6% contractions). The larger firms lost only about 3.5%
employment as a result of the closings of existing firms, but had a net
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loss of about 8% (3.6% expansion - 11.1% contraction) due to the contraction
of existing firms.
It is clear that, in recessionary periods, larger firms accomplish
reductions in employment by contracting in size, while smaller firms are
more likely to go out of business entirely. Additionally, those small firms
that do not go out of business appear to be able to expand, even over down-
turns. This implies that those small firms that survive recessions are
quite successful, and it is likely that it is the more marginal smaller
27firms that are shaken out of the industry. These data suggest that larger
firms are not more insulated from business cycle fluctuations (in fact, the
opposite appears to be the case, in terms of employment loss). Rather, it
appears that the larger firms are more likely (or better able) to deal with
this volatility of demand by the expansion and contraction of employment
within existing firms, while smaller firms are more likely (or forced) .to
deal with decreased product demand by going out of business.
Ownership Status
The influence of ownership status on long term investment behavior has
been the subject of much interest among researchers of industrial location/
relocation decisions. It is sometimes argued that independently owned firms
are likely to have a greater attachment to the local area, while firms
owned by corporations or conglomerates are more likely to pick up stakes and
move to another area if the going gets tough. On the other hand, it can be
27An industry representative concurs with this assertion, saying that
it is the undercapitalized, under-financed small firms with limited manage-
ment skills that go under in recessions.
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be argued that corporate or conglomerate ownership confers some benefits
on a particular firm. Specifically, a metalworking machinery firm may
be better able to last out periods of very low demand if it is owned by
a corporation/conglomerate, in that the parent firm may provide a cushion
(in terms of cash flow) to the firm in these periods, while an independent
firm might be driven out of business. This argument is reminiscent of the
discussion of ownership and short term investment behavior presented pre-
viously.
The information gathered from firms in the interview sample are some-
what equivocal. Most representatives of corporate or conglomerate owned
firms felt that, at least to some degree, the parent firm was helpful in
providing funds, particularly investment funds, in recessionary periods. 28
29
However, the general feeling was that this was not a major consideration,
and that corporate/conglomerate ownership had not greatly altered their
operations. The issue.of attachment to the region among corporate/conglo-
merate owned firms is also difficult to examine. Again, the interview data
are somewhat ambiguous. The managers of a number of corporate/conglomerate
owned firms felt that this was not the case for their firms. However, a few
28
Other cited advantages of corporate/conglomerate ownership include the
accessibility to greater management training and expertise, national adver-
tising outlets, and accessibility to more advanced research and develop-
ment facilities.
29The corporate/conglomerate firms visited tended to be rather large and
very well established firms (in the area for 50 to 150 years). Therefore,
these firms are undoubtedly very used to dealing with cyclical volatility,
and so it is not too surprising to find out that these firms did not seriously
consider outside ownership to be an important factor influencing their ability
to survive in business cycle downturns.
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others expressed the opinion that firms owned by corporations or conglomer-
ates might be in a somewhat more vulnerable position relative to independ-
ently owned firms. Specifically, one manager said that many corporations/
conglomerates follow certain rules of thumb in assessing the performance of
a particular division or subsidiary. For example, the corporation in which
he had previously been employed (incidentally, this was not a metalworking
machinery corporation nor one that has extensive holdings in the metalwork-
ing machinery industry) had a rule that if a particular plant experienced
a strike of longer than a specified duration, the parent would close that
division, regardless of the long run health of that firm. He mentioned that
another conglomerate owned machine tool company in the area began to talk
about moving out of the area when it experienced an extended strike in the
late 1960's. This manager did state that the corporation that owns the
firm he presently works for does not follow such arbitrary rules of thumb;
he cited this example as a possible disadvantage of outside ownership. The
representatives of a few other firms have also discussed this type of pro-
blem, but always in a rather unspecific manner, never mentioning it as
something that they would have to deal with in their own operations.30
There is, however, one example from the interview sample where corporate
ownership appears to have distinctly lessened attachment to the New England
region. The corporation under consideration purchased a machine tool plant
in the region quite a number of years ago. The corporate representative
said that labor costs were higher, unionization stronger, and productivity
30
One possible reason for this phenomenon is that, from the interviews
and secondary data sources examined, it does not appear that New England is
a particularly disadvantageous location for the metalworking machinery
industry. This assertion will be discussed further in the concluding
chapter.
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lower in this plant than in most of the other holdings of the corporation.31
The corporation has intentionally disinvested in this plant over this period,
paring down product lines (to those which are most profitable, not necessarily
the same as those with the greatest sales), stabilizing employment (it
has remained constant over the last ten years) , and not doing any capital
investment (other than maintainence and limited replacement) in the plant's
facilities.3 2 The corporate ownership of this firm, apparently, has resulted
in a much lower attachment to the New England region than might be the case
otherwise, as the corporation has chosen to invest in other regions (in the
same product line) and disinvest in the New England plant.
In order to more fully examine the role of ownership in long term
investment behavior, data were obtained on employment and establishment
change by ownership status. Table 29 presents information on the change
in the number of establishments, by ownership status, for the New England
region, for the periods 1969 to 1972, 1972 to 1974, and 1974 to 1976.
In every period under consideration, non- independent firms experienced greater
mortality (closings) than did the independent firms. However, the data on
31
Please note that these complaints do not appear to be substantiated
by the wage data presented above, or by the opinion (.of every other owner/
manager interviewed) that unionization was a "neutral" factor affecting the
competitive position of the New England region relative to other areas of
the country.
3 2 The corporation has not completely divested of this plant for some-
what idiosyncratic reasons. The plant is a very old and very distinguished
name in the metalworking machinery industry, and the corporation keeps it
operating, in this diminished capacity, for "traditional" reasons.
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Table 29
Components of Change in Number of Firms by Ownership Status
New England
Net Change Due to
Ownership Total Number Net Change in Openings of Closings of
Status of Firms at Number of Firms New Firms Existing Firms
Beginning of
Period Number %
1969-1972
Independent 1,190 -82 - 6.9% 9.0% -15.8%
Non-Independent2  179 -10 - 5.6% 19.0% -25.1%
Total 1,369 -92 - 6.7% 10.3% -17.0%
19-72-1974
Independent 1,172 -29 - 2.5% 6.1% - 8.4%
Non-Independent 180 + 7 + 3.9% -13.3% -10.0%
Total 1,352 -22 - 1.6% 7.0% - 8.7%
1974-1976
Independent 1,222 -70 - 5.7% 3.7% - 9.6%
Non-Independent 201 -21 -10.4% 10.0% -19.9%
Total 1,423 -91 - 6.4% 4.6% -11.0%
1These data represent three different samples, hence the number of establish-
ments, for example, for the base year 1972, is not equal to the number of
establishments in 1969 plus the net change from 1969 to 1972.
2Non-Independent includes the headquarters or branch plant head/office of a
multi-unit corporation and the parent or subsidiary of a conglomerate.
Source: Dun and Bradstreet data prepared by David Birch at M. I. T.
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net change in the number of establishments show that, at least for the per-
iods 1969 to 1972 and 1972 to 1974, the non-independent firms had a smaller
loss in the number of establishments than did independent firms (that is,
there were more openings, relative to closings, of non-independent firms
that independent firms).
Table 30 presents information of the components of employment change by
the ownership status of the firm. As was the case with the data on employ-
ment change by size class, the non-independent firms experienced greater
employment losses in downturns- and smaller gains in upturns than the in-
dependent firms. This is not at all surprising given the fact that the
independent firms tend to be much. smaller than the corporate/conglomerate
owned firms, as the following tables shows.
Table 31
Average Firm Size
New England
Year Independent Firms Noi-Independent Firms
1969 16 employees 174 employees
1972 14 employees 137 employees
1974 15 employees 137 employees
Source: Dun and Bradstreet data.
In every case, the non-independent firms experienced a greater percentage
employment loss due to closings than did the independent firms, and, in both
recessionary periods, the non-independent firms also had greater employment
losses due to net contraction of existing firms (expansions - contractions).
When looking at the net changes in employment due to openings and closings
Ownership
Status
1969-1972
Independent
Non-Independent 2
Total
1972-1974
Independent
Non-Independent
Total
1974-1976
Independent
Non-Independent
Total
See note 1, Table
2See note 2, Table
Total Emp
at Beginni
of Period
18,652
31,196
49,848
15,920
24,572
40,492
17,661
27,511
45,172
Table 30
Components of Employment Change by Ownership Status of Firms
New England
Net Employment Change Due to
Loyment Net Change in Openings of Closing of Expans
ng Employment New Firms Existing Existi
1 Firms
-13.0%
-22.5%
-18.9%
6.0%
4.7%
5.2%
- 4.7%
- 9.0%
- 7.3%
4.1%
11.1%
8.5%
2.5%
10.2%
7.1%
1.2%
5.7%
3.9%
- 9.6%
-20.1%
-16.2%
- 7.7%
-14.7%
-12.0%
- 3.9%
- 6.4%
- 5.4%
6.4%
2.8%
4.1%
17.2%
7.5%
11.3%
6.9%
2.7%
4.3%
ion of Contraction of
ng Firms Existing Firms
-13.9%
-16.3%
-15.4%
- 6.0%
- 0.3%
- 2.6%
- 9.1%
-10.8%
-10.1%
27.
30.
Source: Dun and Bradstreet data prepared by David Birch, M. I. T.
H
C.'
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and expansions and contractions in the 1969 to 1972 recession, it can be
seen from Table 32 that there is not a significant difference between the
way independent and non-independent firms effect employment decreases.
Table 32
Net Changes in Employment in Recessionary Periods
Percentage of Net Employment Loss Due to
Openings and Closings Expansions and Contractions
of Firms of Existing Firms
1969 to 1972
Independent Firms 42% 58%
Non-Independent Firms 40% 60%
1974 to 1976
Independent Firms 53% 47%
Non-Independent Firms 8% 92%
Source: Dun and Bradstreet data prepared by D. Birch.
However, in the 1974 to 1976 recession, it can be seen that the non-independ-
ent firms accomplished employment decreases almost exclusively through the
contraction of existing firms, while the independent firms experienced a
greater net loss of employment due to the closings of existing firms. It
is difficult to draw conclusions from these data. It is clear that the non-
independent firms experience greater employment losses than do the independ-
ent firms, but only in the case of the 1974 to 1976 recession does there
appear to be a significant difference between these two types of firms in
the way they effect these employment changes.
In conclusion, the issue of ownership status and long term investment be-
havior is not definitively resolved. Insofar as being able to weather business
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cycle fluctuations, it would appear that the size of the firm is at least as an
important consideration (and probably even more so) than the ownership status of
the firm. This conclusion is consonant with the assertion made earlier that size,
rather than corporate/conglomerate ownershipis probably the determining
factor in enabling a firm to pursue a steady short term investment program
in the face of volatile product demand. The other quesiton raised -- the
relationship between ownership and attachment to the region (or, perhaps,
propensity to close) -- has certainly not been adequately settled. There
is some evidence from the interview sample that corporate/conglomerate
ownership may reduce such an attachment, but it is quite possible that this
finding is not generalizable- to all metalworking machinery firms in the
region. Moreover, there are no secondary data available that are really
capable of answering this question. The Dun and Bradstreet data would
appear to suggest that there is a higher frequency of closing among corp-
orate/conglomerate owned firms, but it is also true that there is a higher
frequency of openings among this class of firms in the New England region
in the period under study. The Dun and Bradstreet data also suggest that,
in the more recent recession in the region, corporate or conglomerate owned
firms are more likely to accomplish employment decreases through contraction
as opposed to closing than are the independent firms.
It must also be remembered that the analysis of these data are using
employment changes as a proxy for changes in capital investment (for lack
of any investment data), and it is possible that there are differences in
investment per employee between independent and non-independent firms.
Specifically, a corpoate owned firm may experience employment declines but
may be investing more capital in its plant (becoming more automated or
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capital intensive) than an independent firm experiencing employment increases.
The reverse of this situation is clearly the case with the corporate owned
firm mentioned above, where employment was quite stable, but the corporation
was intentionally disinvesting in the physical plant. And finally, this
discussion of ownership has not addressed the New England question at all.
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to determine if there is a greater
or lesser degree of corporate/conglomerate ownership of metalworking machi-
nery firms in this region, and/or if corporate/conglomerate investment poli-
cies adversely affect this region relative to the rest of the nation. It
would be possible, given data for another region (.such as the Mid West
or the West), to see if corporate/conglomerate ownership is differentially
affecting the long term investment picture in the New Englnad region, rela-
tive to investment in other areas. However, although it is unsatisfying,
the limitations of this analysis and discussion make it impossible to answer
these latter questions.
Other Factors
This final section on long term investment behavior will discuss a
number of factors, including government policies, the costs of doing busi-
ness, agglomeration economies, and finally, idiosyncratic factors which in-
fluence long term investment. These issues will be examined, with particular
attention given to the influence of these factors in the New England region
relative to other locations.
Government policies: Government policies will be divided into two.
parts; domestic and inter-national government activities. Since the object
of this discussion is to determine if government policies (domestic) adversely
affect the metalworking machinery industry in New England, the focus here will be on
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state and local policies. Specifically, the New England region has often
been assailed as a high tax region, and it has sometimes been alleged that
the high taxes are a deterrent to capital investment in the region. Represent-
atives of all firms in the interview sample have complained about the high
taxes in the region, but these complaints seem to be pro forma. That is,
no firm felt that the relatively higher taxes were a sufficient reason
to relocate out of the region, or to reduce their investment expenditures
here. In fact, even the corporation, mentioned earlier, that is disinvesting
in its New England plant said that taxes in the region, relative to other
regions, were not any problem. A number of firms said that, while state
and local taxes may be higher here, this does not affect the competitive
position of metalworking machinery firms in the region. Among the firms in
the interview sample that have relocaed in the last twenty years (all re-
locations were within the region) 33, a number have said that they received
tax concessions (in the form of property tax abatements) from the community
to which they had moved. However, all of these firms said that the receipt
of tax rebates was not at all a determining factor in their choice of loca-
tion.34 Rather, it was considered "gravy" or "icing on the cake," after the
new location was chosen.
33
An expanded discussion of relocation is presented below.
3 4This finding is consistent with other empirical studies of industrial
location decisions, such as Dennis Carlton, "Models of New Business Location,
University of Chicago, CMSBE Report number 7756, Nov. 1977; Roger Schmenner,
Manufacturing Location Decisions: Evidence from Cinncinnati and New England,
Report to the Economic Development Administration, Department of Commerce,
March, 1978; and Due, "Studies of Local Tax Influences on Location of Industry,"
National Tax Journal, 1961.
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The consideration of international governmental activities concerns
the attempts of American metalworking machinery firms to gain larger
shares of the international market. As was discussed in Chapter 3, metal-
working machinery firms have had some difficulty competing in foreign
markets, partially as a result of policies that limit imports of machinery
in some countries. A number of firms, particuarly larger firms, have set
up plants in these countries in order to circumvent these import restrictions.
The magnitude of this phenomenon is rather substantial, as the data in Table
33 document.
Table 33
Capital Expenditures by Majority Owned Foreign Affiliates
of U. S. Companies and all U. S. Companies
Captial Expenditures by Majority
Owned Foreign Affiliates of
U. S. Companies
All manufacturing firms
Machinery (except electrical)
firms
Capital Expenditures by U. S.
Companies
All manufacturing firms
Machinery (except electrical)
firms
1971 1973 1975
(Millions of Dollars)
$ 7,046 $ 9,247 $11,242
1,787 2,602 2,798
$29,990
2 ,800
$38,010
3,420
$47,950
4,500
1977
$12 ,285
3,360
$60,160
5,760
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Table 33, continued
1971 1973 1975 1977
(Millions of Dollars)
Ratio of Capital Expenditures
by Majority Owned Foreign
Affiliates of U. S. Companies
to Capital Expenditures of
U. S. Companies
All manufacturing firms .23 .24 .23 .20
Machinery (except electrical) .64 .76 .62 .58
firms
Source: 1978-1979 Economic Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry.
The capital expenditures by majority owned affiliates of U. S. companies are
very significant, especially for firms in the machinery industry,35 where
the foreign affiliates invest, on average, almost two thirds the amount
invested by domestic companies. Table 34 presents data on the geographical
location of this foreign investment, and it is clear that Europe, particularly
West Germany and the United Kingdom, are very important locations. These
data suggest that, to some extent, capital investment projects in metal-
working machinery in the U. S. and New England must compete with those in
other areas of the world, especially Europe. To the extent that the poli-
cies of other countries inhibit the ability of the U. S. metalworking machin-
ery industry to do business there, and to the extent that the U. S. industry
decides to actively compete in these markets, then the prospects for
35
It is probable that data for the machinery, except electrical, industry
(SIC 35) are upper limits on foreign investments by the metalworking machinery
industry SIC 354)-, because SIC 35 includes such industries as construction,
mining, and other machinery, whose foreign holdings are thought, by metal-
working machinery spokespersons, to be more extensive than those of SIC 354.
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Table 34
Estimates of Capital Expenditures by
Majority Owned Foreign Affiliates of U. S. Companies in
Selected Areas
Capital Expenditures by Majority
Owned Foreign Affiliates of 1971 1973 1975 1977
U. S. Companies (Millions of Dollars)
All manufacturing firms . $7,046 $9,247 $11,242 $12,285
Machinery (except electrical) 1,787 2,602 2,798 3,360
firms
Percentage of these expenditures in:
Canada
All manufacturing 18% 20% 19% 22%
Machinery (except electrical) 11 8 12 11
Latin America
All manufacturing 9 11 12 12
Machinery (except electrical) 6 6 6 7
Europe
All manufacturing 62 58 58 55
Machinery (except electrical) 69 74 69 69
West Germany
All manufacturing 18 15 13 13
Machinery (except electrical) n.a. 17 16 16
United Kingdom
All manufacturing 15 17 14 15
Machinery (except electrical) 18 n.a. 21 21
Asia and the Pacific
All manufacturing 7 7 7 8
Machinery (except electrical) n.a. n.a. n.a. 12
n.a. - not available
Source: 1978-1979 Economic Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry
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long term investment in the U. S. and the New England region are somewhat
diminished.
Costs of Doing Business: The factors to be discussed here include
various costs that may affect New England, vis a vis other regions, as a
place to do business. Representatives of most firms interviewed felt that
energy, transportation, and environmental (that is, the cost of compliance
with environmental regulations) costs- are higher in New England than else-
where in the country. However, these representatives did not feel that
these cost differentials seriously affected their competitive position,
probably because these factors costs are not an enormous share of total
costs. Additionally, it must be remembered that hourly wages of metal-
working machinery production workers are lower than the national average,
and therefore these cost advantages/disadvantages may offset one another.
Agglomeration Economies: The importance of agglomeration economies in
the metalworking machinery industry is also of interest. Representatives of
some firms in the interview sample have stated that they sometimes share or
trade special machinery. In this way, a firm does not have to incur the
large capital costs of an expensive heat treatment facility, for example,
that it needs only a few times a year. The firms that share or trade machinery
have usually stated that this is a very informal, unstructured process.
Moreover, managers seem to feel that this type of activity is really a con-
venience, not a necessity, and that it does not really influence their
locational preferences. On the other hand, access to a skilled labor pool
(for which a large industrial base is often crucial) is extremely important
to firms, and may therefore represent a type of agglomeration
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economy.36 And finally, especially for the small tool and die shops, close
contact with customers is very important (urbanization economies). This
latter fact may present something of a problem for tool and die firms in
the region. That is, if other industries move out of the region, tool and
die firms, which are essentially service providers to these firms, will lose
their business. The locational decisions of these tool and die companies
(and their decisions to expand, contract, or go out of business) are of
necessity tied to the locational decisions of their major customers.
Idiosyndratic Factors; The last influence on long term investment
behavior to be discussed here has been termed "idiosyncratic." This idio-
syncratic behavior is difficult to analyze empirically, but this is not
to say that it is an insignificant influence on investment behavior. As
Chapter 2 documents, the metalworking machinery industry has had a long
history in the New England region. Some firms are still run by direct
descendents of the original founders of the 19th century. From the inter-
views conducted, it appears that there is a very strong attachment, even
among some newer firms, to the region for traditional/historical reasons.
The fact that many firms are family owned and run also contributes to the
importance of such "idiosyncratic" investment behavior. For example, the
owner of one firm said that, if his oldest son remained in the business,
he would expand. If the son returned to his previous job as a teacher,
36This large industrial base may also represent a disagglomeration
economy, in that a large number of firms are competing for a limited labor
supply. It is also of interest that some firms, apparently, prefer being
the big fish in a little pond. That is, rather than being in urban areas,
these firms are in somewhat isolated areas, but are able to attract labor,
by, say, paying the highest wages in the county.
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however, the owner would close the plant down. Other large old firms are
closely held corporations, with the major stockholders (aside from family
members) being members of nearby communities. The owners of these firms
feel that, although the plant might be moved to another location, it would
be to a location in the same general vicinity. Even among firms owned by
large corporations or conglomerates, attachment to the region appears to be
quite strong. The manager of one of these firms said that it would take
a really extreme situation, such as no energy or no labor, to get the firm
to move out of New England.
It must be recognized that this professed attachment to New England
may be masking another important issue - the extremely high cost of moving.
Firms in the metalworking machinery industry have a great deal of capital
equipment, and hence their mobility is somewhat constrained by the costs
of moving this equipment. It took one firm, which moved to its present
location in the early 1960's, about two and a half years to complete its
move of about 20 miles. However, a number of firms who had moved over the
study period were interviewed. In all cases (three), the firm moved to a
location within 20 to 30 miles of the original site. The reason for the
move was always to expand/update the companies' physical capacity. Two
firms had been operating in multi-storied plants built between 1850 and
1900 which were clearly inadequate for modern production processes. The
third had moved when it outgrew its previous plant (and is planning to move
in a year or two as it has again outgrown its present space). What is
important is that each firm (one large, independent; one large corporate
owned; and one smaller independent) moved a very short distance. In all
cases, the selection of the site was for somewhat idiosyncratic reasons
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Cthe owners had bought the land earlier for speculative purposes, and when
the decision to move was made, that land seemed an appropriate location),
and one of the prime considerations: in the move was keeping the existing
labor force intact.
In conclusion, it appears that the New England region, at the least,
is not in a particularly disadvantageous position as a site for long
term investment in the metalworking machinery industry. Firms in the region
appear to be attached to the area - the manager (who hails from the Mid
West) of one large corporate owned firm in western Massachusetts "loves"
the quality of life in New England, and feels that there is an excellent
"work ethic" and a lot of "Yankee ingenuity" in the work force. There do
not appear to be any overwhelming cost disadvantages to doing business in
the region. And finally, although every firm complains about the labor
shortage, there seems to be a feeling that the labor force in New England.
is at least a known quantity and quality. Managers and owners, when asked
about the labor situation in the South or Mid West, seemed to feel that
the quality of skilled labor in the South was questionable, and that the
availability of skilled labor might be even less certain in the Mid West
than in New England.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This chapter will review some of the principal findings of this
study, and briefly discuss the implications of these results for
firms in the metalworking machinery industry in New England.
Principal Findings
Volatility
It has been shown, in Chapter Three, that the metalworking
machinery industry is extremely sensitive to business cycle fluctuations.
Moreover, the industry in New England appears to be more volatile than
its national counterpart. This is probably because metalworking
machinery firms in New England are more closely related to the defense
industries in the region and, particularly in the recession of 1967
to 1971, decreases in demand for defense-related products coincided
with a general decline in economic activity. It would appear that
firms in this region are probably more dependent upon federal govern-
ment procurement policies than are firms in other areas of the country.
However, it is beyond the scope of this analysis to try to predict
future federal government policies and thereby determine if this
dependence will have a beneficial or detrimental impact on metalworking
machinery firms in New England.
Labor
The existence of a skilled labor shortage was first discussed in
Chapter Three. However, this problem does not appear to be differentially
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affecting metalworking machinery firms in New England. The representa-
tives of most firms in the interview sample expressed the opinion that
the labor shortage problem is at least as bad, if not worse, in other
parts of the country, particularly the' Mid West. Also, the labor
shortage problem may be alleviated, to some degree, by the fact that
attitudes towards work and college among young people in this country
may be shifting. That is, with many college graduates unable to find
suitable employment after graduation, there appears to be more interest
in recent years in blue-collar work than had previously been the case.
Although this is difficult to empirically document, it is true that in
a few of the firms in the interview sample, some of the work force
was college educated. These workers found that pay in the metalworking
machinery industry was better than what they would receive in other,
white-collar jobs. Some workers had quit their jobs as school teachers,
for example, in order to make more money as tool and die makers and
machinists.
Another factor that influences the relative availability of labor
in the New England region concerns the types of jobs that are being
created in the industry. As was noted in Chapter Four, the industry
is now demanding a greater nudraer of engineers, computer programmers
and operators, and electricians. To the extent that these occupational
groups prefer the amenities of the New England region (as opposed to,
say, the amenities of Detroit or Cinncinnati), then the labor supply
situation in New England is probably in better shape than in other
regions (with the exception, perhaps-, of the growing concentration of
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the industry in California).
It is also necessary to consider the relative wage issue. On
the one hand, the fact that wages are lower in New England than else-
where (see. Table 24, Chapter Four) is certainly an advantage to
employers in the region. -On the other hand, however, the labor
shortage in New England will be exacerbated if employees decide to
migrate to other regions in order to take advantage of higher wages.1
Related to the wage issue is the question of unionization. Recall
that firm representatives seem to feel that, at worst, the degree of
unionization in New England is a neutral factor affecting their
competitive position, and quite probably is actually an advantage.
While it cannot be documented, most industry spokespersons seem to feel
that firms in New England are probably less unionized than firms in
the Mid West.
And fi.nally, the issue of agglomeration economies was discussed.
Location in an industrialized area provides for a large pool of skilled
workers. Is this an important influence on the locational decisions
of metalworking machinery firms? The results of this study are somewhat
equivocal on this point. Location in a heavily urbanized area does
1 Whether or not workers will migrate to take advantage of higher
wages is debatable. Heath Paley, in a study of a metalworking
machinery firm in Maine, found that workers were very attached to
their employer; their wages were substantially lower. than those of
similar workers in other parts of New England, but the workers were
willing to accept this negative wage differential in order to live
in rural Maine. (Heath Paley, ".'Business Succsss in a Rural Environ-
ment: The Case of Dexter Maine," Paper prepared for the Regional
Institute of Employment Policy, Boston University, 1979.)
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provide a larger pool of workers, but, at the same time, there is also
more competition from other industries in the area for the same
workers. Some firms, particularly larger ones, are located off the
beaten track; they are able to secure a large enough labor force by
paying somewhat higher wages than other rural employers and they draw
their workforce from a rather large geographical area.
Firm Size
The data presented in Chapter Three (see Figures 10 and 11)
suggest that metalworking machinery firms have become more reluctant
to lay off workers in business cycle troughs, even in the face of
declining productivity. This phenomenon would appear to be beneficial
for the labor force, but its effect on firms is probably less so. The
data in Chapter Four (Table 28) suggest that larger firms are more
likely to effect employment decreases through contractions than closings,
while the reverse is true for smaller firms. This finding is reasonable,
in that it is likely that employees and employers in smaller firms
know each other better and this makes it more difficult for owners and
managers of small firms to lay off people. Moreover, smaller firms
may have more difficulty replacing laid off workers in periods of
expansion (especially if they pay lower wages than the larger firms in
the area) and so would have better reason to hold onto their employees
even when business is bad. As a result, it appears that small firms
hold onto their work force as long as they can (until they are forced
out of business), while larger firms are more apt to (or better able to)
lay off and hire with cyclical fluctuations. The implication of this
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for the metalworking machinery industry in New England, however, is
not differentially more severe than it would be for other areas.
Specifically, it appears that firms in other locations also experience
labor shortages. and also engage in similar management tactics.
Nonetheless, these results are not especially encouraging for small
firms in the industry, either in New England, or in other parts of the
country.
Ownership Status
The issue of ownership status was raised both with respect to
short term and long term investment behavior in Chapter Four. It was
found that firms owned by corporations or conglomerates in New England
have experienced greater mortality (closings) over recent business
cycles. However, it is important to recall that there were not data
available to see if this is the case for other locations of the industry.
Therefore, it is not known if corporate or conglomerate ownership
of metalworking machinery firms is disadvantageous to the New England
region.
Government
The influence of government policies on metalworking machinery
firms was discussed in a number of places. First, the fact that the
metalworking machinery industry in New England is probably more
dependent upon federal government defense procurement policies was noted.
In the dis.cussion of short term investment, it was found that government
regulations, particularly Occupational Health and Safety Administration
(OSHA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations may be
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affecting the character of demand for metalworking machinery. These
regulations have timetables for compliance which enable the regulated
industries to place orders for capital equipment well in advance. In
turn, metalworking machinery firms have a better picture of their
future production requirements and are themselves better able to pursue
long range capital investment programs.
In the discussion of long term investment behavior, it was found
that the differentially higher taxes and stricter environmental
regulations in the New England do not appear to have had a substantial
influence on the locational decisions of metalworking machinery firms.
International government policies, particularly those which limit the
ability of American firms to compete successfully in world markets,
were seen as detrimental to the domestic metalworking machinery industry.
That is, if firms want to compete successfully in world markets, they
may decide to locate plants overseas in order to circumvent some of
these policies (such as import quotas in some countries). It is
assumed that, were it not for these restrictive policies, the investment
might have taken place in areas in the U.S. However, it is not
possible to ascertain whether or not the investment would have taken
place in New England or in other regions of the country.
Agglomeration Economies
The question of agglomeration economies in the metalworking
machinery industry was raised in connection with long term investment
behavior. It was found that agglomeration economies are not very
important for firms in the interview sample; that instances of sharing
- 184 -
equipment are rather limited, and that firms view this as a convenience
rather than as a necessity. Moreover, as discussed above, location
in very industrialized areas may be advantageous or disadvantageous
in terms of securing labor (that is, the disagglomeration economies
of having to compete with -other industries or firms for a given labor
supply must be taken into consideration). However, it is true that
urbanization economies are important for tool and die firms. These
firms provide services for industrial customers, and the need for close
contact and consultation between the tool and die shop and these
customers is extremely important. Therefore, the extent to which New
England is losing its industrial base clearly has important negative
implications for tool and die shops in the region.
Regional Attachment
It was noted at the end of Chapter Four that New England metal-
working machinery firms appear to have strong attachments to the region.
The historical reasons for this attachment were discussed: many
metalworking machinery firms have been in the same location for over a
hundred years; the descendants of some of the early figures in the
industry still run a number of these companies; and there is a substantial
number of family owned (or closely held) firms in this industry. The
high costs of moving were also mentioned in this discussion. It was
noted that the fact that it is so expensive and time consuming for
metalworking machinery firms to change locations is probably related to
the locational stability of the industry.
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Implications for the Metalworking Machinery Industry in -New England
The principal findings reviewed above would appear to paint a
fairly sanguine picture for the metalworking machinery industry in New
England. It is ironic that, although the metalworking machinery
industry is very unstable -over business cycles, it is rather stable in
its geographical distribution in this country. Miller notes that "there
has been little change (in locational patterns) since the establishment
of the spatial pattern of production of machine tools early in the
twentieth century." 2 This is perhaps less true for the tool and die and
"other" metalworking machinery sectors of the industry. Since these
sectors are more dependent upon the existence of industrial customers
in the region, and since New England has been losing manufacturing
employment under the period under consideration, the markets for these
firms have diminished.
The New England region's share of metalworking machinery sales,
however, has decreased over the last twenty years, from 14% of total
industry sales in 1958 to 11% in 1976. Two considerations should be
noted, however, before assuming that the industry in the region is in
decline. First, New England maintained a constant proportion of industry
sales from 1959 to the peak period ending in 1967. When business
dropped off, from 1967 to 1971, however, New England's share of sales
2
E. Willard Miller, Manufacturing: A Study of Industrial Location,
University Park, Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University Press,
1977, p. 212.
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dropped to about 12% of the industry total. This share has remained
relatively constant up until 1976, the latest year for which data
were available. Therefore, it was really only in the 1967 to 1971
recession that New England lost ground; its share is quite constant for
the rest of the period. As noted earlier, it is probable that this
severe decline in New England is related to federal defense cutbacks
that were differentially more important in this region.
The second consideration is that the data for New England cited
above includes only the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont
and Rhode Island after 1972, since information was not published for
either New Hampshire or Maine after the 1972 Census of Manufactures.
Therefore, the figures for New England after 1972 are underestimates
of the region's sales, and as a result, they overstate the "decline" that
has taken place in New England, relative to other areas.
On the whole, then, the prospects for metalworking machinery
firms in New England appear to be good. The industry does not experience
any overwhelmingly unfavorable cost differentials here; the labor
situation in this region seems to be at least as good as in other areas;
and the owners and managers interviewed do not seem to be unhappy here.
However, there are a number of external factors that may work against
metalworking machinery firms in this area: the ties to the government,
and the possibility that federal procurement activities may adversely
affect firms in this region; the exodus of other manufacturing firms
from the region and consequent drying up of markets for some sectors of
the metalworking machinery industry; and the possibility that international
- 187 -
political considerations may be encouraging American metalworking
machinery firms to invest abroad as opposed to investing domestically.
Moreover, it should be noted that business in this industry was e.xtremely
good at the time the interviews took place. Most of the firms in the
interview sample were operating at or near capacity. The opinions of the
interviewees, then, may be somewhat optimistic. It would be interesting
to interview these firms in both- a period of expansion and a period of
decline in order to get a more complete perspective. Unfortunately, given
the limitations of this analys-is, this was not possible.
Finally, it is of interest to see what the implications of the
metalworking machinery industry's presence are for the New England region.
In 1976, over two and a half percent of New England's manufacturing employ-
ment was in this industry. Is this concentration of employment in this
industry aood or bad for the region ? The major disadvantage is the cyclical
instability of demand for metalworking machinery. When the industry is on
the downswing, there are enormous displacements of workers, as Tables 11-
14 (in Chapter Three) show. On the other hand, metalworking machinery is
"a clean, high-skill, decently paying, non-objectionable, regionally
tenacious industry of which New England does not have very many. One
might be tempted to wave the flag and say thank God for SIC 354, without
3
which we would be further in the soup than we already are." However,
it is beyond the scope of this study to decide if the advantages of
metalworking machinery outweigh its disadvantages for the New England
economy.
3Personal correspondence from Benjamin H. Stevens
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APPENDIX
Products of the Metalworking Machinery Industry
SIC 3541 - Machine Tools, Metal Cutting Types
Automatic chucking machines
Boring, drilling, and milling machine combinations
Boring machines (machine tools)
Boring mills
Broaching machines
Brushing machines (metalworking machinery)
Buffing and polishing machines (machine tools)
Burnishing machines (machine tools)
Centering machines
Chemical milling machines
Countersinking machines
Cutoff machines
Cutting machines, pipe (machine tools)
Cylinder reboring machines
Deburring machines
Die sinking machines
Drill presses (machine tools)
Drilling machine tools (metal cutting)
Duplicators (machine tools)
Electrical discharge erosion machines
Electric dishcharge grinding machines
Electrochemical milling machines
Electrolytic metal cutting machine tools
Electron-discharge metal cutting machine tools
Facing machines
Filing machines, metal (machine tools)
Flange facing machines
Gear chamfering machines (machine tolls)
Gear cutting and finishing machines
Gear tooth grinding machines (machine tools)
Grinding machines
Grooving machines (machine tools)
Home Workshop machine tools, metalworking
Honing and lapping machines
Jig boring machines
Jig grinding machines
Keyseating machines (machine tools)
Lapping machines
Lathes, metal cutting
Lathes, metal polishing
Machine tool replacement and repair parts, metal cutting types
Machine tools, metal cutting, exotic (chemical explosive, etc.)
Metal polishing lathes
Milling machines (machine tools)
Pipe cutting and threading machines (machine tools)
Planers, metal cutting (machine tools)
Pointing, chamfering, and burring machines
Polishing and buffing machines (machine tools)
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Polishing machines (machine tools)
Plasma process metal cutting machines, except welding machines
Reaming machines
Rebuilt machine tools, metal cutting types
Regrinding machines, crankshaft
Rifle working machines (machine tools)
Sawing and cutoff machines (metalworking machinery)
Saws, power (metalworking machinery)
Screw and nut slotting machines
Screw machines, automatic
Shapers and slotters
Shaving machines (metalworking)
Slotting machines (machine tools)
Tapping machines
Threading machines (machine tools)
Turning machines (lathes)
Turret lathes
Ultrasonic assisted grinding machines (metalworking)
Ultrasonic metal cutting machine tools
Valve grinding machines'
Vertical turning and boring machines (metalworking)
SIC 3542 - Machine Tools, Metal Forming Types
Arbor presses
Beaders, metal (machines)
Bending and forming machines
Brakes, metal forming
Bulldozers (metalworking machinery)
Can making machines
Chemical explosives metal forming machines
Die casting machines
Drop hammers, for forging and shaping metal
Elastic membrane metal forming machines
Electroforming machines
Extruding machines (machine tools), metal
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Forging machinery and hammers
Hammers, power (forging machinery)
Headers
High energy rate metal forming machines
Knurling machines
Machine tools, metal forming types: including rebuilding
Magnetic forming machines
Mechanical-pneumatic or hydraulic metal forming machines
Metal deposit forming machines
Nail heading machines
Plasma jet spray metal forming machines
Presses: forming, stamping, punching and sizing (machine tools)
Presses: hydraulic and pneumatic,
Punching and shearing machines
Rebuilt machine tools, metal forming types
Riveting machines
Rolling machines, thread and spline
Shearing machines, power
Sheet metalworking machines
Shock wave metal forming machines
Spinning lathes
Spinning machines, metal
Spline rolling machines
Spring winding and forming machines
Stretching machines
Swaging machines
Thread rolling machines
Ultrasonically assisted metal forming machines
Upsetters (forging machines)
SIC 3544 - Special Dies and Tools, Die Sets, Jigs and Fixtures, and
Industrial Molds
Diamond ides, metalworking
Die sets for metal stamping (presses)
Die springs
Dies and die holders for metal cutting, forming, die casting, etc.
Dies, paper cutting
Dies, plastics forming
Dies, steel rule
Extrusion dies
Forms, metal (molds): for foundry, plastic working machinery, etc.
Industrial molds
Jigs and fixtures (metalworking machinery and accessories)
Jigs; inspection, guaging and checking
Punches, forming and stamping
Subpresses, metalworking
Welding positioners (jigs)
Wire drawing and straightening dies
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SIC 3545 - Machine Tool Accessories and Measuring Devices
Angle rings
Arbors (machine tool accessories)
Balancing machines (machine tool accessories)
Bits for use on lathes, planers, shapers, etc.
Boring machine attachments (machine tool accessories)
Broaches (machine tool accessories)
Calipers and dividers
Cams (machine tool accessoires)
Chasers (machine tool accessories)
Chucks: drill, lathe, and magnetic (machine tool accessories)
Collars (machine tool accessories)
Collets (machine tool accessories)
Comparators (machinists' precision tools)
Counterbores, metalworking
Countersinks and countersink drill combinations (machine tool accessor-
ies)
Cutters, milling
Cutting tools and bits, for use on lathes, planers, shapers, etc.
Diamond cutting tools for turning, boring, burnishing, etc.
Diamond dressing and wheel crushing attachments
Dies, thread cutting
Dressers, abrasive wheel: diamond point and other
Drill bits, metalworking
Drill brushings (drilling jig)
Drilling machine attachments and accessories (machine tool accessories)
Drills (machine tool accessories)
Files, machine tool
Gauge blocks
Gauges except optical (machine tool accessories)
Headstocks, lathe (machine tool accessories)
Hobs
Honing heads
Hopper feed devices
Knives, shear
Lathe attachments and cutting tools (machine tool accessories)
Letter pins (gauging and measuring)
Loading, unloading, and transfer devices
Machine knives, metalworking
Machine tool attachments and accessories
Mandrels
Measuring tools and machines, machinists' metalworking type
Micrometers
Milling machine attachments (machine tool accessories)
Optical measuring devices
Precision tools, machinists'
Pushers
Reamers, machine tool
Scales, measuring (machinists' precison tools)
Shaping tools (machine tool accessories)
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Shear knives
Sockets (machine tool accessories)
Tables, rotary
Taps, machine tool
Threading tools (machine tool accessories)
Tool holders
Tools and accessories for machine tools
Verniers (machinists' precision tools)
Vises, machine (machine tool accessories)
Wheel turning equipment, diamond point and other (tool accessories)
SIC 3546 - Power Driven Hand Tools
Attachments for portable drills
Buffing machines, hand: electric
Calking hammers
Cartridge-activated hand power tools
Chain saws, portable
Chipping hammers, electric
Drills (except rock drilling and coring), portable: electric and pneu-
matic
Drills, hand: electric
Flexible shaft metalworking machines, portable
Grinders, pneumatic and electric: portable (metalworking machinery)
Grinders, snagging
Guns, pneumatic: chip removal
Hammers: portable electric and pneumatic chipping, riveting, calking,
etc.
Hand tools, power driven: woodworking or metalworking
Masonry and concrete drilling tools, power: portable
Riveting hammers
Saws, portable hand held: power driven - woodworking or metalworking
SIC 3547 - Rolling Mill Machinery and Equipment
Bar mills
Billet mills
Blooming and slabbing mills
Cleanings lines, electrolytic (rolling mill equipment)
Cold forming type mills (rolling mill machinery)
Ferrous and nonferrous mill equipment, auxiliary
Finishing equipment, rolling mill
Galvanizing lines (rolling mill equipment)
Levelers, roller (rolling mill equipment)
Mill tables (rolling mill equipment)
Picklers and pickling lines, sheet and strip (rolling mill equipment)
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Pipe and tube mills
Rod mills (rolling mill equipment)
Roller levelers (rolling mill machinery)
Rolling mill machinery and equipment
Steel rolling machinery
Straightening machinery (rolling mill equipment)
Structural mills (rolling mill machinery)
SIC 3549 - Metalworking Machinery, Not Elsewhere Classified
Automotive maintenance equipment
Balancing equipment, automotive wheel (garage equipment)
Coil winding machines for springs
Coilers (metalworking machinery)
Cradle assemblies (wire- making equipment)
Cutting-up lines
Degreasing machines, automotive (garage equipment)
Draw benches
Drawing machinery and equipment, except wire drawing dies
Frame straighteners, automobile (garage equipment)
Marking machines, metalworking
Pack-up assemblies (wheel overhaul)
Pail mills
Propeller straightening presses
Rotary slitters (metalworking machines)
Screw downs and boxers
Screw driving machines
Soldering machines, except hand
Welding and cutting apparatus, except electric, laser, ultrasonic, etc.
Wheel mounting and balancing equipment
Wire drawing and fabricating machinery and equipment, except dies
Source: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and
Budget, Standard Industrial Classification Manual 1972,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972.
